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JUDGMENT 1. This is a transferred case from the Federal High Court. The case was initially commenced by writ of summons. However, when the case was transferred to this court parties were ordered to re-file their processes in line with the rules of this court. The claimant vide a complaint dated and filed 5/12/2018, complied with the directive of the court. The complaint was accompanied with Statement of facts, Claimant’s statement on oath, list of witnesses, list of documents, and photocopies of documents to be relied on at trial. The claimant prays for;- 2. A DECLARATION that the claimant’s dismissal from the 1st Defendant’s service as contained in the letter of dismissal dated 19th September, 2005 is wrongful and/ or unlawful. 3. AN ORDER reinstating the Claimant to the service of the 1st Defendant with effect from 19th September, 2005. 4. AN ORDER directing the 1st defendant to pay all the salaries and emoluments of the Claimant from September, 2005 till the day of reinstatement. 5. The 1st Defendant entered appearance on 19/01/2018 and filed statement of defence dated 11/12/2018 which was accompanied by a written statement on Oath, Defendant’s list of witnesses, Defendant’s list of documents, photocopies of document to be relied on at the trial. 6. The claimant filed their reply dated 30/11/2018 and filed 05/12/2018 to the statement of defence and another witness statement on oath dated 5/12/18 7. The 1st Defendant filed their witness statements on oath dated and filed on 11/07/2018. 8. The 2nd Defendant entered appearance dated 10/12/2018 and filed 12/12/2018 9. CASE OF THE CLAIMANT 10. The Claimant opened her case on 14/01/2019 wherein she testified as CL. In the course of giving evidence in chief, 28 documents were sought to be tendered in evidence, 27 documents were admitted into evidence while 1 document was tendered but rejected. The documents admitted into evidence and marked as Exhibits includes; EXHIBITS CLA-offer of provisional appointment dated 1st September, 1994, EXIHIBIT CLB- confirmation of appointment dated 1/6/98, EXHBIT CLC- Notification of promotion, EXHIBIT CLD- Dismissal from service dated 19/9/2005, EXHIBIT CLE- Query of 15/5/96, CLF-Re: query dated 20/5/96, EXHIBIT CLG- Query of 16/6/2003, EXHIBIT CLH- Query of 11/5/05, EXHIBIT CLI- Re:query dated 11/5/15, EXHIBIT CLJ- Query dated 5/4/04, EXHIBIT CLK- Appeal for stoppage of forceful eviction dated 15/4/2005, EXHIBIT CLL-Senior staff promotion dated 29/8/03, EXHIBIT CLM- Final quit notice dated 13/4/05, EXHIBIT CLN- Re:application for 25% rent subsidy to DD (Admin) signed by N.U El-Nafaty on 19/9/03, EXHIBIT CLO-Photocopy of maternity leave dated 8/12/03, EXHIBIT CLP- Photocopy of medical claims , EXHIBIT CLQ- Re: medical claim dated 22/4/04, EXHIBIT CLR- Letter of suspension dated 3/5/04, EXHIBIT CLS- Posting letter dated 18/8/04, EXHIBIT CLT1-3- An appeal to give me a fair hearing, EXHIBIT CLU1-6- Appeal against injustice dated 26/10/05, EXHIBIT CLV- Quit notice of 24/10/03, EXHIBIT CLW- Re:quit notice of 10/02/04, EXHIBIT CLX1-5-An Appeal 6/12/04 and Reply on 16/12/04, EXHIBIT CLY-Photocopy of an application dated 18/4/05, EXHIBIT CLZ- Photocopy of reply to query, EXHIBIT CLAA1-2- Medical receipts. However, the attendance register was marked tendered and rejected as it was not a certified true copy. 11. From the statement of facts, witness statement on Oath, Additional Claimant’s witness deposition on Oath and the oral testimony, the case of the Claimant was that she was employed by the 1st defendant on 1st September, 1994 as Tourism Office II on grade level 08 step 2 and she was thereafter confirmed by the 1st defendant on 1st June 1998 and promoted to Tourism Officer 1 on salary grade 09 on 1st June 1998 with effect from January, 1998. However the claimant testified that she was dismissed by a letter dated 19th September, 2005 on several false allegations levelled against her by the 1st defendant. She stated that she had replied to all queries issued to her by the 1st defendant and that at no time was she was queried for unauthorized disclosure of official information, nor had she ever been queried on any allegation bordering on negligence of duty. She further testified that the query received on 5th April, 2004 had nothing to do with performance of her official duty rather it was her failure to quit her official residence that was the cause of her dismissal. Claimant testified that prior to her dismissal she has been unjustly victimized and discriminated against unfairly. Claimant testified that some of such victimizations she had suffered includes but not limited to failure to recommend her for promotion on ground of poor performance, failure to refund her 25% of her rent subsidiary extra charge on the said accommodation despite authorizing same, failure to pay her bereavement/welfare package and suspension from work on 17/06/2003 and lastly compulsory posting out of Abuja without financial benefits. 12. The Claimant is praying the Court to grant her reliefs as stated on her complaint. 13. Under cross-examination, CL, testified that she is Ngozi Illo, Ngozi Felix is her maiden name, and she is also Flourish Alex, and also Flourish Alex Illoakonam is also her name. She testified that she has the five names. She testified that she was confirmed as at the time she was due for confirmation and that she was confirmed when the Management deemed it fit. She further testified that she never had a case of misconduct and that the apartment she occupied was allocated to her by her employer the 1st Defendant and that she was paying rent, she testified that she was in the process of buying the property. At this point of cross examination, 1st Defendant’s counsel tendered a duplicate copy of a document headed Query: late coming/absence from duty without permission dated 9/10/95 and signed by Greg A. Adigwe for Director General, the said document was tendered and marked as EXHIBIT CL1. The response of the claimant to the query was tendered and marked as EXHIBIT CL2. Furthermore the claimant testified that she was not aware of the number of quit notices served on her and she stated that she got the notices through her director and that the said notices came when she had started payment for the property. She stated that she had no idea of the other people given quit notices and she was aware that her employer can give her instruction. She stated that that there was an instruction given to her employer to refund her deductions but they failed to refund her. She stated that she was bound to obey instructions. But she did not obey the instruction to vacate but she was not given alternative. She testified that she was transferred to Enugu and she was to be given accommodation but she wasn’t given. She testified that she did not vacate after dismissal, that it was the defendant that ejected her. She stated that she was posted to Enugu office but cannot remember the day she resumed as directed. She further testified that when she was posted there was no accommodation, no transfer allowance and she was denied 3 months’ salary. She stated that she was served query for absenteeism in Enugu and she responded in EXHIBIT CLA1-2. She testified that in her response to the query, EXHIBIT CLi, she said she was on official assignment. She stated that she wrote to the Minister Culture and Tourism. She testified that she was not aware of any letter directing that she should be dismissed; she testified that it was not her employer that lodged complaint with the police. She testified that she wasn’t aware of the particular year but those who claims were paid. She stated that her father died in 1995. 14. THE CASE OF THE DEFENDANTS 15. One Mrs Nanna Yakubu Dashe, the chief Admin Officer of NTDC, testified for the Defendants as DW1 on 15/04/2019. DW1 adopted her witness statement on Oath deposed to, while One Mr Oladapo Adekunle a staff of NTDC gave his testimony as DW2 on the same day and adopted his witness statement on oath as his testimony. DW2 tendered 18 documents in evidence, the documents that were admitted into evidence were marked as EXHIBIT DW2A- letter of confirmation of appointment, DW2B1-2- CTC of minutes of meeting, EXHIBIT DWC-CTC of document addressed to Director (HTT) signed on 27/6/03 by Asst Director, EXHIBIT DWD1-4- Minutes of meeting of 27/4/04, EXHIBIT DWE1-8- CTC of document dated 25/7/05 titled RE: Special Disciplinary Committee, EXHIBIT DWF-CTC of letter of suspension, EXHIBIT DWG1-2 – CTC of document titled RE: The Berlin workshop 3- 4th Nov 1998, EXHIBIT DWH- CTC of letter of allocation dated 26/4/01, EXHIBIT DWI- CTC of complaint against Flourish Ngozi Illo, EXHIBIT DWJ-CTC of letter of complaint/ quarrel dated 16/4/01, EXHIBIT DWK- CTC of document Arrest of Civil Servant of 26/10/98, EXHIBIT DWL- CTC of letter addressed to AIG, Zone 7, EXHIBIT DWM- CTC of pages 54-56, EXHIBIT DWN- CTC of application for 25% house rent subsidy rebate, EXHIBIT DWO- CTC of report of disciplinary committee of 23rd August, 2005, EXHIBIT DWP1-3- CTC of document tagged annexed 25, EXHIBIT DWQ1-3- CTC of Report of Mrs Ngozi Alex Illo, EXHIBIT DWR- CTC of documents of medical claims. 16. The case of the Defendant is that the Claimant was given employment with the Defendant, and that confirmation of her appointment was delayed by over a year for her unsatisfactory attitude to work and bad conduct in the work place. Furthermore the defendant further stated that after confirmation, the claimant continued to display unsatisfactory conduct to work causing the defendant to issue her various queries, warning letters, suspension letter and eventually dismissal letter. The defendant further pleaded CTC of the queries, warnings, suspension letter amongst others. Defendant averred that the claimant was queried for misconducts such as absenteeism from work on different occasions, criminal allegation of house breaking and theft, refusal to vacate the official quarters despite notices to quit and thereby denying one Mr. Ajuji his right to enjoy the property allocated to him etc. The Defendant averred that upon investigation of the claimant’s case by the parent Ministry of culture and Tourism, the Ministry upheld the decision of the special disciplinary committee, holding that she should be dismissed accordingly. Defendant further averred that the claimant was given her right of fair hearing at every point in time and that the claimant was given ample opportunity to change positively but she refused. Defendant averred that the claimant’s dismissal was neither ill motivated nor premeditated but was done in accordance with Public Service Rules. 17. CROSS-EXAMINATION 18. Under cross-examination DW1 informed the Court that she had been in the service of the defendant since 1991, and the Claimant joined service after her. She testified that she was not aware of the year the Claimant joined the service. She further stated that as a Chief Admin officer she is a senior officer. And that an employee can be queried for gross misconduct. She stated that the claimant bringing her baby to work to poo on the rug is misconduct, fighting with superior officers is misconduct. She testified that the procedure is that the person is to be given verbal warning and then in writing and then setting up of disciplinary committee. She further testified that the claimant was made to face disciplinary committee and that she was aware she faced two committees but she does not know the details as she was not invited to any committee. 19. Under cross-examination DW2 testified that claimant’s confirmation was delayed for one year. He stated that confirmation was on merit and not sentiment and that the claimant’s appointment was made under the civil service rules. He further testified that gross misconduct is one of the ways appointment can be terminated and it also depends on the severity of the offence. He testified that he was not a participant in the disciplinary committee but he reviewed the file and that he was not called to testify against the claimant. He testified that no witness was called as there was no need to call any witness as Mrs Ngozi accepted what was presented to her. He further testified that the claimant was arrested at the time and the arrest was for housebreaking and theft. He further testified that one or two query is for the house she refused to leave. He further testified that the claimant was given fair hearing. He stated that he knows DW1, Dashe and that her termination was based on her conduct. 20. WRITTEN ADDRESS OF DEFENDANTS. 21. The counsel for the Defendant filed its final written address dated and filed 02/07/2019, out of time with the leave of Court. Counsel for the Defendants adopted the final written address of the Defendants as his argument in the case. 22. In the written address 4 issues were submitted for determination, to wit: 23. Whether the suit is not statute barred by virtue of the provisions of section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act, 2004. 24. Whether the claimant was wrongfully or unlawfully dismissed. 25. Whether due process based on Public Service Rules and the principle of fair hearing was adhered to in dismissing the claimant. 26. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any benefit whatsoever from the Defendants. 27. In arguing issue 1; Whether the suit is not statute barred by virtue of the provisions of section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act, 2004. Counsel for the Defendants contended that section 2(a) of the Public officers Protection Act 2004 applies in this case as the claimant’s appointment was terminated on the 19th of September, 2005 and she instituted this suit at the Federal High Court on the 16th day of March, 2006 which obviously indicates a five month period between when the cause of action arose and when the suit was filed, which is a contravention of section 2(a) which provides for a statutory period of three months. Counsel urged the court to dismiss this suit for being statute barred. 28. In arguing issue 2; Whether the claimant was wrongfully or unlawfully dismissed. Counsel for the Defendant argued that the claimant is a Public Servant and her contract of employment is governed by the Public Service Rules, hence her employment enjoins what is known as employment with statutory flavour. Counsel stated that hence claimant’s dismissal should be purely governed by the Public Service Rules, and that EXHIBIT CLD which is the claimant’s dismissal letter wherein reference was made out to in the disciplinary committee’s report dated 25th July 2005 (EXHIBIT DWE1-8) which considered the claimant’s claim, her response to query dated 11th May, 2005, and her representations before the panel. Counsel argued that the acts of misconducts of which the claimant’s dismissal was premised on include 04401(iii), 04412 of Public Service Rules deals with absenteeism from work which the claimant was accused of and that according to the disciplinary procedure as stated in the Public Service Rules, 2000 04302-04306 the claimant responded to the query in EXHIBIT CL1. Defendant’s counsel submitted that from the above arguments it was visibly clear that the claimant’s dismissal was done with due compliance to the provisions of the Public Service Rules, 2000 and was therefore lawful. Counsel further relied on the cases of ANASAMBE V B.O.N (2005) 8NWLR 650 & FRANCIS ADESEGUN KATTO V CENTRAL BANKOF NIGERIA (1999) 6 NWLR PG.393. Where the court held that an employee who claims that his employment has been wrongfully terminated has the onus on him to prove how he was wrongfully dismissed. Defendant’s counsel submitted that the claimant has failed to prove how her dismissal by the Defendant was wrongful and unlawful. Counsel urged the court to uphold the dismissal of the claimant, as the Defendant has successfully made out its case. 29. In arguing issue 3; Whether due process based on Public Service Rules and the principle of fair hearing was adhered to in dismissing the claimant. In arguing issue 3 counsel for the Defendants argued that the claimant throughout her career had experienced an unenviable track record of misconducts some of which were reproduced in the letter of dismissal EXHIBIT CLD and that the said acts were brought to her notice at different times as contained in her queries, and at other times verbal warnings were given to her and noted against her in her official file. Counsel argued that a disciplinary committee had been set up to hear the allegations against the claimant and she was given the opportunity to defend herself according to the provisions of the Public service rules (Right to fair hearing), which she failed to do and hence her termination thereafter. Counsel argued that while reviewing Rules 04302 to 04306 as it applies to this case, it is clear that the stipulated procedure was complied with, vis-avis query, response and disciplinary panel where necessary. Counsel further argued that DW1 gave evidences as to claimant’s acts of misconducts which were contrary to Rules 0440(xiii) and 04301(i) and claimant had been severely verbally warned for the said acts and DW2 also corroborated the testimony of DW1, and that DW2 was a member of the disciplinary committee of 25th July, 2005 that recommended her dismissal. 30. Counsel submitted that given the plethora of documentary evidences against the Claimant and the compliance with the laid down procedures by the Public Service Rules, 2000, He urged the court to so hold that claimant was given fair hearing and her dismissal was lawful. 31. In arguing issue 4; Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any benefit whatsoever from the Defendants. Counsel for the Defendants contended that by the provisions of Rules 04406(a) the ultimate penalty for misconduct is dismissal and that claimant has failed to show how her contract of service was violated or breached. Counsel submitted that claimant had failed to prove that her dismissal was unlawful and contravened the provisions of the Public Service Rules and hence she was not entitled to any benefit whatsoever. Counsel urged the court to uphold the dismissal of the claimant and hold that the claimant’s action is frivolous and vexatious and that substantial cost be awarded in favour of the defendant for time, energy and resources spent over the years in diligently defending this case. 32. THE SUBMISSION OF THE CLAIMANT. 33. The Counsel for the Claimant formulated four issues for determination. They are:- 34. Whether by virtue of the provisions of Order 30 Rules 8 and 9 of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2017 the Defendants can raise for the first time, the plea of statute of limitation in their Final Written Address and whether the plea can be sustained by the Defendants considering the positions of pleadings and laws in this regard. 35. Whether the purported dismissal of the claimant was not based on grounds outside the dictate of the Civil Service Rules. 36. Whether the principles, fundamentals and all elements of fair hearing was adhered to and accorded the Claimant by the defendants in all the processes and procedures adopted by the defendants in terminating the appointment of the claimant whose employment enjoys protection by statute. 37. Whether from the pleadings, evidence led and the provisions of Section 36(5) of the Constitution, the public service rules and decided authorities, the Claimant is not entitled to the reliefs sought to wit: immediate reinstatement to work without loss of seniority, payment of all accrued emoluments and other entitlements. 38. ISSUE ONE: in arguing issue one; Whether by virtue of the provisions of Order 30 Rules 8and 9 of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2017 the defendants can raise for the first time, the plea of statute of limitation in their Final Written Address and whether the plea can be sustained by the Defendants considering the positions of pleadings and laws in this regard. Counsel for the Claimant contended that the defence of statute of limitation is a defence in law that must be specifically pleaded as a defence in the pleadings with specific details/grounds and never to be sprung up as a surprise after close of pleadings, close of trial and especially as in this case, when the case of the Claimant has already been presented with proof. The implication of this rule of pleading is that once waived or breached, it is no longer available to the Defendant and the suit must be considered on its merit. 39. According to counsel the Defendants for the first time purportedly raised the issue of this suit being statute barred by virtue of Section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act, 2004 only in their Final Written Address filed on 2nd July, 2019. It is imperative to state at this juncture that this suit was instituted since 2006 (13) years old case) and has swam through the shores of two Courts to the point of adoption respectively i.e. this Court and the Federal High Court, Abuja before the Defendants woke up from their slumber and purported to raise this special defence. Counsel contended taking into consideration the time this suit had been in court the Defendants are estopped by the principles of estoppel from now wanting to seize the opportunity of the failure of the Federal High, Abuja to deliver judgment within the time prescribed by law and arrogate to itself an advantage of springing a surprise which both parties were already foreclosed from. In support of this contention counsel relied on section 169of the Evidence Act 2011which provides thus: 40. “when one person has, either by virtue of an existing judgment, deed or agreement, or by his declaration, act or omission, intentionally caused or permitted another person to believe a thing to be true and act upon such belief, neither he or his representative in Interest shall be allowed, in any proceedings between himself and such person or such person’s representative in interest, to deny the truth of that thing.” 41. Counsel also relied on the case of MRS. T. C. CHUKWUMA V MR. BABAWALE IFELOYE (2008) 18 NWLR PART 1118 PG 238 PARA C-F the Supreme Court stated on the doctrine of estoppel thus: a. “The doctrine of estoppel is a defensive doctrine preventing one party from taking unfair advantage of another when, through false language or conduct, the person to be estopped, has induced another person to act in a certain way, with the result that the other person has been injured in some way. The doctrine is founded on the principle of fraud. There are five essential elements: 42. That there was a false representation or concealment of material facts; 43. That the representation must have been known to be false by the party making it or the party must have been negligent in not knowing its falsity; 44. That it was believed to be true by the person to whom it was made; 45. That the party making the representation must have intended that it be acted on or the person acting on it must have been justified in assuming its intent; and 46. That the party asserting estoppel acted on the representation in a way that will result in substantial prejudice unless the claim of estoppel succeeds. 47. Counsel also contended Defendants are by the rules of this court estopped from bringing up new issues, the Defendants cannot raise any new ground of defence at this stage, as this is contrary to the provisions of Order 30 Rules 8(1)(2) and 9 of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2017. 48. ORDER 30 RULES 8(1)(2)and 9 OF THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA (CIVIL PROCEDURE) RULES, 2017 provides as follows: a. “8(1) All grounds of Defence or Reply which make an action unmaintainable or which if not raised will take the opposite party by surprise or will raise issues of facts not arising out of the pleadings SHALL be specifically pleaded. b. (2) Where a party raises any ground which makes a transaction void or voidable or such matters as limitation law, release, payment, performance, facts showing insufficiency in the contract of employment or illegality either by any enactment or by common law, the party SHALL specifically plead same. c. 9.No pleading, not being a petition or summons, shall, except by way of amendment raise any new ground of claim or contain any allegation of fact inconsistent with the previous pleadings of the party pleading the same.” 49. It is the contention of counsel that Rules of Courts are not made for fancy but are in essence made to the force of law which MUST be obeyed. In OYEGUN v NZERIBE [2010] 7 NWLR (Pt. 1194) 577 SC; (2010) LPELR - 2870 SC 15, paras D - G, the Supreme Court, per ADEKEYE, JSC, while considering the essence of Rules of Court in proceedings, held: a. ".... I consider it of paramount importance at this stage to explain the essence of Rules of Court is proceedings under our civil procedure. The proceedings of the Courts are guided by the Rules of that Court. They are regulations made by the Courts to assist them in their efforts to determine issue or controversies before them. They provide the support in administration of Justice. They regulate matters In Court and help parties to present their cases within a procedure made for the purpose of a fair (sic) to present their cases within a procedure made for the purpose of a fair and quick trial. It is the strict compliance with the rules that makes for quicker administration of Justice." (Underlining ours) 50. On the consequence of non-compliance with the Rules of Court, it is argued that the Supreme Court in DINGYADI v INEC (No. 2) [2010] 18 NWLR (PT 1224) 154 SC, per l. T. MOHAMMAD, JSC, echoed: a. "... It must be appreciated that where the exercise of a right is circumscribed or limited by a rule of practice and except where it is satisfactorily shown that compliance with such a rule has been waived, then that rule must be complied with. Court Rules are to be obeyed ... Where there is non-compliance, such non-compliance may result into any step taken to be a nullity..." See also EZEGBU v FATB LTD [1992] 1 NWLR (PT 216) 197." 51. Counsel contended that by virtue of Order 30 Rules 8(1) & (2) of the Rules of this Honourable Court, the Defendants cannot raise new grounds of defence at this stage even on “such matters as limitation law”. The Rules of Court must be obeyed. 52. It is also the contention of counsel that this suit was filed within time and is not statute barred from the facts, position of pleadings and law in this regard, this suit as presently constituted is not caught by the statute of limitation. From the pleadings volunteered by the Claimant, it is clear that the transaction that led to the unlawful termination of the appointment of the Claimant ran through a period of time until the right to approach a court of law became the only step left to the Claimant to take. In other words, just like the Defendants who are public servants are bound by the provision of public service rules and the decided authorities in this regard, the Claimant is equally under duties to exhaust the condition precedence as provided by the statute before activating her right to sue in this regard. On this note counsel referred to the case of ADHEKEGBA OVO V THE HON MINISTER OF DEFENCE (2013) 17 NWLR (pt. 1382) 126: 53. Counsel contended that it is on record that the Claimant was unlawfully dismissed from service on 19th September, 2005. After the unlawful dismissal, the Claimant who is not indolent, wrote several appeal letters to the 2nd Defendant for the reversal of the dismissal. See among others Exhibits CLT and CLU 1-6 respectively. Counsel urged the Court to hold that in the circumstances of this case, this suit is not statute barred. 54. It is also the submission of counsel that without prejudice to the foregoing arguments, the position of the Claimant is more strengthen by the provisions of Section 12 of the National Industrial Court Act 2006. It is our most humble submission that if the complaint of the Claimant is justiciable and worthy of consideration, then the applicable principles of Ubi jus ibi remedium applies to the extent that if the act of the Defendants are adjudged to have breached a fundamental right of the Claimant to fair hearing, then the statute of limitation will not apply to take away such right especially in the face of the provisions of Section 12 (1), (2) (a) & (b) of the NICN ACT. For ease of reference, the said provision is hereby reproduced as follows: a. 12 (1): a. “The Jurisdiction vested in the court shall, so far as practice and procedure are concerned, be exercised in the manner provided by this Act or any other enactment or by such rules and orders of court as may be made pursuant to this Act or in the absence of any such provisions, in substantial conformity with the practice and procedure of the Court existing immediately before the commencement of this Act. b. 12(2): a. “Subject to this Act and any rules made thereunder, the Court- 55. may regulate its procedure and proceedings as it thinks fit; and 56. Shall be bound by the Evidence Act but may depart from it in the interest of justice. 57. It is the contention of counsel that assuming but not conceding that the provisions of the limitation law can be interpreted in the guise of challenge to the jurisdiction of the Court to deprive the Claimant her rights under Chapter 36 of the Constitution, the above provisions has been passed to empower the Court to decline the application of the Evidence Act on computation of time by virtue of Section 12 of the NICN Act which is sui generic to this honourable Court alone. 58. In arguing issue two; WHETHER THE PURPORTED DISMISSAL OF THE CLAIMANT WAS NOT BASED ON GROUNDS OUTSIDE THE DICTATE OF THE CIVIL SERVICE RULES. Counsel submitted that though the question and or issue of the appointment of the Claimant in the services of the Defendants carrying a contract of service garnished with statutory flavors is not in contention or doubt whatsoever, but the Claimant herein did not waste time in stating for the record or sake of emphasis both in her pleadings and oral evidence that her Letter of Appointment as Tourism Officer II dated 1st September 1994 is regulated by Civil Services Rules and other government Regulations and instruction. 59. It is the case of the Claimant before this Honourable Court that her appointment carries statutory flavor covered by the Civil Service Rules and other government regulations and as such, her purported dismissal was wrongful having not been done in accordance with the relevant Rules and been guided by the principles of fair hearing. 60. In the letter of purported dismissal, Exhibit CLD, the following were given as grounds thereof: 61. Habitual late coming/absenteeism – 04401(iii) 62. Unauthorized disclosure of official information – 04401 (x) 63. Insubordination and negligence of duty – 04401 (xix) 64. Disobedience of lawful order – 04401 (iv) 65. False claims against Government – 04401 (vii) 66. It is the submission of counsel for the Claimant that the Defendants were magnanimous enough to link each count of the allegations to relevant provisions of the Civil Services Rules but they woefully failed to fix any of them to the acts and or person of the Claimant. 67. It is therefore the contention of the Claimant that the allegations contained in the letter of dismissal were desperately couched in their frustrated bid to ease the Claimant out of service due to personal issues and grudges not capable of being described as misconduct under the Rules. Counsel contended that all the allegations levied against the Claimant are baseless and therefore urge the court to exercise its discretion in this regard, doing justice and fairness by setting aside the purported dismissal of the Claimant and awarding her claims accordingly. 68. In arguing issue three; Whether the principles, fundamentals and all elements of fair hearing was adhered to and accorded the Claimant by the defendants in all the processes and procedures adopted by the defendants in terminating the appointment of the claimant whose employment enjoys protection by statute. Counsel contended that the Claimant’s contract of service enjoys statutory flavor. The law is well settled that where a contract of service enjoys statutory flavour, an employer wishing to terminate the contract must be meticulous in complying with the procedure set out in the relevant statute or rules thereunder. Any deviation from the stipulated procedure would render any acts done in respect thereof invalid and liable to be set aside. See IDERIMA V. R.S.C.S.C. (2005) 16 NWLR (PT. 951) P.378 AT P.385; UNION BANK OF NIG. LTD. V. CHARLES OGBOH (1995) 2 NWLR (PT. 380) 647 AT 653 PARAS. A-E; AND BAMIGBOYE V. UNIVERSITY OF ILORIN (1999) 10 NWLR (PT.622) P.290 AT 298-299. 69. It is the contention of counsel that in terminating an employment carrying such status, the provisions of the applicable regulations must be followed to the letter as any breach would render the exercise of termination null and void. In support of this contention counsel relied on the case of OLORUNTOBA OJU V. ABDUL-RAHEEM (2009) 13 NWLR (PT. 1159) pg. 83 @ 137 G-H. 70. Counsel for the Claimant contended that fair hearing is a constitutional provision under Section 36(1) 1999 Constitution (as amended), which provides thus: 71. "36(1) In the determination of his civil rights and obligations, including any question or determination by or against any government or authority, a person shall be entitled to a fair hearing within a reasonable time by a Court or other tribunal established by law and constituted in such manner as to secure its independence and impartiality." 72. It is the Claimant’s case that she was not accorded fair hearing in all the disciplinary committees set up by the Defendants that recommended her dismissal from service. 73. At the Disciplinary Committee meeting of 27th April, 2004, Exhibit DWD1-4, the minutes of meeting shows that the Claimant was not invited, not to talk of been heard or allowed to call witnesses or cross examine her accusers. In other words, her accusers were equally made to be the final Judge, since the parent body acted on the Committee’s recommendation without more. See NWANEGBO VS OLUWOLE (2001) 37 WRN 101, DAWODU VS N.P.C. (2000) WRN 116. It is particularly not in dispute that all personnel that sat in trial and judgment of the Claimant are management and staff of the defendants. 74. In prove of the Claimant’s case, she gave evidence that she only appeared once before the disciplinary committee and was not afforded any right and opportunity to say a word or defend herself before the disciplinary committee or to give evidence by herself; call witnesses if she likes, and make oral submission personally or cross examined the witnesses of the Defendants. She was basically in a pseudo appearance staged-managed by the defendants to make it appear as though they had fulfilled the conditions imposed by law, whereas the claimant was there helpless, powerless, more like a statute whose issue was already concluded and determined before the purported meeting. In fact DW2 specifically answered in cross examination that there was no reason whatsoever to call witnesses to determine her issue as reiterated yonder. 75. The 1st Defendant’s Special Disciplinary Committee of 25th July 2005, Exhibit DWE1-8 corroborated the position of the Claimant that she was not afforded any right to defend herself or call witnesses or cross-examine witnesses of the Defendants. The report merely stated, without more, under the heading MRS. NGOZI ILLOAKANAM (GL.09) – PF 789, that “Mrs. NgoziIlloakanam was invited and she honoured the invitation”. 76. In other words, the dismissal was sanctioned by Nigerian Tourism Development Corporation purely on recommendations of the Committee without more. This constitute an admission in law and admission against the defendants interest. It is trite that where a fact or issue is admitted by the adverse party, same has been resolved and laid to rest and needs no proof. We rely on the case of F.U.T MINNA VS OLUTAYO (2018) 7 NWLR PT 1617 Page 176 at 189 paragraph G-H where the court held as follows: a. “The law is trite, facts not disputed are taken as admitted and/or established. They accordingly require no further proof. Admitted facts are, usually regarded as the best evidence” 77. Counsel contented that on whether there was fair hearing the Supreme Court PerOputa JSC in Garba vs. University of Maiduguri (1986) 1 NWLR (pt. 18) 550. stated: 78. " .....fair hearing mean much more than hearing the appellant's testifying before the Disciplinary Investigation Panel. It implies much more than summoning the appellant before the panel. It implies much more than being given a chance to explain their own side of the story. To constitute fair hearing, whether it is before the regular Court or before tribunals and Boards of Inquiry, the person accused should know what is alleged against him. He should be present when every evidence against him is tendered and he should be given a fair opportunity to correct or contradict such evidence. How else is this done if not by cross examination. It is therefore imperative in any proceedings set up to determine the fate of a person in his employment especially those with a statutory flavour that the person being inquired into or being proceeded against should know the charge or allegation against him." 79. In Ridge vsBalwin (1963) 2 ER 66 at 144, three important attributes of fair hearing were given as: (a) The right to be heard by an unbiased tribunal. (b) The right to have notice of charges of misconduct. (c) The right to be heard in answer to those charges." 80. My Lord, it was once observed by the Supreme Court in Obot vs. CBN (1993) 8 NWLR (pt. 310) 140 at 161 that: a. "One of the essential elements of fair hearing is that the body investigating the charge against a person must not receive evidence or representation behind the back of the person being investigated. Where it does, the Court will not inquire whether such evidence or representation did not work to the prejudice of the person being investigated. It is sufficient that it might. The risk is enough. It is a clear violation of natural justice in this case for the disciplinary committee to permit witnesses to testify against the appellant without giving him the opportunity to cross-examine them." 81. In U.C.H.B.M. V. MORAKINYO (2014) 16 NWLR (PT. 1434) 589 at 619-620, para E-A, the Court held: a. “To constitute a fair hearing whether it before the regular court or before tribunal or boards of inquiry, the person accused should know what is alleged against him. He should be present when any evidence against him is tendered and should be given a fair opportunity to correct or contradict such evidence. If tribunals or boards of panels know that they cannot do all these, then they should leave the trials to the law court. Where the rules of natural justice are properly applicable, the violation of the rules will result in the nullification of the proceedings.” 82. The Court further held in U.C.H.B.M. V. MORAKINYO (Supra) at p. 618, paras A-F: a. “A citizen under investigation cannot be said to have received fair hearing if he was selectively invited to confront some, and not all his accusers. It is not the duty of the person under investigation to recall such witnesses who testified in his absence…. A person under investigation has the right to elect to cross examine any of the witneses who appear before the panel. To deny him of such right of choice is an act of impartiality…. The argument of Appellant that respondent elected not to recall the witnesses was a confirmation that the entire procedure was a breach of the fair hearing under the constitution.” 83. It is the contention of counsel that as held in the case of OLOHUNTOBA OJU, particularly on page 145, B-H that: a. “Whereas the recommendation of the panel will not affect the civil rights and obligations of the person whose act or omission is being investigated, the implementation of the recommendation by the statutory body must comply strictly with the rules of natural justice.” 84. It is argued by counsel that a decision given without due regard to the principles of natural justice is void or nullity or defective and cannot be the basis of foundation of any right. Such proceedings cannot be acquiesced in but could be set aside without much ado. It is as if such decision was never made and never achieved any result. However, sometimes, it is expedient to have a proper court declare it void. 85. Counsel contended that with emphasis that the fair hearing provision applies not only to courts of law or tribunals but also to administrative bodies that exercise judicial functions in the sense that they have to decide on materials before them "between an allegation and a defence". Such bodies are required to act fairly. See LEGAL PRACTITIONERS DISCIPLINARY COMMITTEE v. FAWEHINMI (1985) 7 SC 178, 251 and ADIGUN v. ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF OYO STATE (1987) 1 NWLR (53) 678." 86. It is the contention of counsel that the Claimant has by the acts of the Defendants been denied all elements of fair hearing and as such, the only proper order is to declare the purported termination of appointment null and void and to reinstate the Claimant back to the services of the Defendants with all accrued benefits thereto. 87. In arguing issue four; whether from the pleadings, evidence led and the provisions of Section 36(5) of the Constitution, the public service rules and decided authorities, the Claimant is not entitled to the reliefs sought to wit: immediate reinstatement to work without loss of seniority, payment of all accrued emoluments and other entitlements. 88. It is submitted the Claimant's evidence, both in chief and under cross-examination, was that her services with the Defendants were wrongfully and/or unlawfully terminated and she was denied fair hearing by the Disciplinary Committees of the Defendants and that such denial of fair hearing was a breach of Section 36(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) and in consequence to reinstate her employment with the Defendants. It is the Claimant’s contention that due to the denial of fair hearing in the proceedings of the Disciplinary committees, the proceedings area nullity. In support of this contention counsel placed reliance on the case of U.C.H.B.M. V. MORAKINYO (Supra) at Pp. 616-617, para F-A, where the Court held: a. “The fact of a thing or proceeding being a nullity semantically means emptiness, not having legal force. It is void in the sense that it, in the eye of the law never existed. In this case, it means the proceedings of the Panel of Inquiry of the appellant in so far as the appellant is concerned, never existed, its recommendations were never made and decisions of the appellant founded upon the recommendations of the Board of Inquiry was built on nothing and so also collapses into emptiness. If the recommendations and the decisions founded thereon are nullities, it means the appellant was never removed from his employment and that he (appellant) remained (in the eyes of the law) in his employment as though nothing ever happened. See Shitta-Bay vs Federal Civil Service Commission (1981) 1 SC 26; Tolanivs. Kwara State Judicial Service Commission (2009) ALL FWLR (pt. 487) 880 at 922." 89. It is the contention of counsel that the Claimant is a staff of an institution established and financed principally by the Government of the Federation and so is a Public Officer or a person employed in the Public Service of the Federation pursuant to the definition of that term in Section 318(1) of the 1999 Constitution. The 1st Defendant is a Public Institution, a governmental body or agency or authority and is principally the kind of body contemplated by the 1999 Constitution in its Section 36 (1) dealing with fair hearing. 90. It is the contention of counsel that the proper order to make in a situation of wrongful dismissal from employment is the reinstatement of the Claimant. Since the master here is the "rule of law. As a Public Institution is expected to comply with the law and regulation and not act according to the whims and caprices of their human elements. This is why employments of the kind specified are said to be of a statutory flavour because the Statutes regulate such employment. The rule of law and not the rule of men is the new master. 91. Counsel urged the court to resolve issue four in favour of the claimant due to breach of her fair hearing. 92. In concluding his submission counsel urged the court to grant all the reliefs of the claimant. Set aside the purported dismissal and reinstate the Claimant back to her employment with all accrued benefits paid to her. 93. The Defendants filed reply on points of law. COURT’S DECISION 94. I have considered all the processes filed in this suit, as well as given through consideration to the written and oral submission of counsel made before the court. From the pleadings and evidence adduced by both parties what this court is to determine is whether the claimant is entitled to the reliefs being sought. 95. However, before proceeding to determine the claimant’s entitlement or otherwise to the reliefs being sought, it behoves on me to first and foremost resolved certain issues that are germane to the resolution of the dispute between the parties. 96. Both parties are at ad idem that the claimant’s employment with the defendant is that with statutory flavour meaning that the claimant employment enjoyed protection of the law or has security of tenure. 97. In law employment is said to be that with statutory flavour when the terms and conditions of a contract of employment or service are specifically provided for by statute or regulations made there under. In that respect employment is said to be a contract protected by statute or in other words an employment with statutory flavour. It invests an employee with a status higher than the ordinary one of master and servant; See OLANIYAN V UNIVERSITY OF AGOS (1985) NWLR (Pt.9) 599, EPEREKU V UNIVERSITY OF LAGOS (1986) 4 NWLR (Pt.34) 162, BAMGBOYE V UNIVERSITY OF ILORIN (1999) 10 NWLR (Pt.622) 290, UNIVERSITY OF MAIDUGURI TEACHING HOSPITAL MANAGEMENT BOARD V DAWA (2007) 16 NWLR (Pt.739) 424, SHITTA-BEY V FPSC (1981) 1 SC 41, UNTHMB V NNOLI (1994) 8 NWLR (Pt.363) 376, IMOLOME V WAEC (1992) 11/12 SCNJ 121; F.C.S.C. v. LAOYE (supra), OLPRUNTOBA-OJU V ABDURAHEEH (2009) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1157) 83; IDONIBOYE-OBU V NNPC (2003) NWLR (Pt. 805) 589; PHCN PLC. V OFFOELO (2013) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1344) 380; DUDUSOLA V N. G. CO. LTD (2013) 10 NWLR (Pt.1363) 423. 98. The question on whether a contract of employment is governed by statute or not depends on the construction of the contract itself or the relevant statute. The duty to construe is the exclusive preserve of the Courts. See OLORUNTOBA-OJU V ABDURAHEEH (supra). In the case at hand it can be gathered from the letter of appointment of the claimant dated 1st day of September 1994, exhibit CLA, which in paragraph 1 (d) it provides: ‘’That, you will be subject, in all respect, to all conditions of service stipulated in the civil service Rules and other Government Regulations and instructions.’’. 99. The above quoted paragraph of the letter of appointment has said it all, that, the employment of the claimant in this case is governed by the provisions of Public Service Rules. Therefore, the employment of the claimant is invested with statutory flavour, since it is governed by the Public Service Rules. This is because Public Service Rules was made pursuant to the provision of the Constitution, making the rules to have Constitutional flavour. See F.C.S.C. v. LAOYE (supra), OLANIYAN V UNILAG (Supra), EPEROKU V UNILAG (Supra). In the circumstances, I agree with counsel for both parties that the claimant’s employment has statutory flavour since it is subject to the Public Service Rules. 100. There is also the issue of the relevant applicable Public Service Rules to this case. There is the need to resolve this issue due to the fact that the claimant was making reference to Public Service Rules 2008. While the defendants are making reference to Public Service Rules 2000. Therefore, the correct applicable Public Service needs to be ascertained in the circumstances. 101. It is beyond any dispute that the law applicable to a cause of action is the law prevailing at the time the cause of action arose notwithstanding that the law had been repealed at the time the action is being tried. See THE GOVERNOR OF OYO STATE & ORS. V OBA OLOLADE FOLAYAN 1995B 8 NWLR PT.413 292 1995 LPELR-3179SC, FATOLA V MUSTAPHA 1985 2 NWLR PT.7 438, ALAO V AKANO 1988 I NSCC 329, 1988 1 NWLR PT.71 431, UWAIFO V ATTORNEY GENERAL OF BENDEL STATE (1982) 7 SC 124, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE FEDERATION V SODE & ORS (1990) LPELR-601, SC, (1990) NWLR (PT.128) 500. This means the applicable law to a cause of action is the law prevailing at the time the cause of action arose and not the law when the suit is being tried. In the case at hand going by the decisions of the courts, the Public Service Rules 2000 which was the law in force as at the time cause of action in this suit arose is the relevant and correct rules to govern this suit and not the Public Service Rules 2008. 102. From the pleadings and evidence adduced before the court the claimant is contesting the validity of her dismissal from service vide letter of dismissal dated 19th September 2005, which is exhibit CLD. It is clear that as at the time the cause of action arose in this case that is to say 19/9/2005, the Public Service Rule 2008 has not come into effect. As at September 2005 when the claimant was sacked from service the applicable Public Service Rules are the Public Service Rules 2000. In the circumstance, I have come to the conclusion that the Public Service Rules 2000 are the applicable Public Service Rules for the purpose of this suit as it was the rules, that is applicable as at the time the claimant was dismissed from service. This is because the law applicable to cause of action is the law in operation as at the time the cause of action arose. See OLANIYI AROYEHUN V UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN (1968) NWLR 253, UWAIFO V AG BENDEL STATE (1982) 7 SC 124, ROSSEK & ORS. V ACB LTD & ORS. (1993) 10 SCNJ 20, (1993) NWLR (PT.312) 382, (1993) LPELR-2955(SC). 103. The counsel for the defendants has in his final written address raised preliminary objection to this suit saying that the suit as it is presently constituted is statute barred by virtue of section 2(a) of the Public Officers (Protection) Act. The counsel for the claimant devoted most of his final written address in replying the preliminary objection contending that it is most inappropriate to raise issue of statute bar at address stage. 104. Complaining on an action being statute barred or suit being caught by statute of limitation is contesting the competency of the suit and right of the court to entertain same, which borders on jurisdiction. Jurisdiction being a threshold issue that is fundamental to the suit can be raised at any time at any state at the trial or on appeal or for the first time at the Apex court. See OKWONKWO V INEC (2003) WRN 93, (2004) 1 NWLR (PT.854) 242, OLOBA V AKEREJA (1988) 7 SCNJ 56, COTECNA INTERNATIONAL LTD V IVORY MERCHANT BANK LTD (2006) 5 SCM 17, (2006) 26 NSCQR 528, MOZI V MBAMALU (2006) 12 SCM (PT1) 306, ALAWIYE V OGUNSANYA (2012) LPELR-19661 SC, OWIE V IGHIWI (2005) 5 NWLR (PT.917) 184, ELELU-HABEEB V AG FEDERATION (2012) 13 NWLR (PT.1318) 423, ADA V NYSC (2004) NWLR (PT.891) 639. Therefore, issue of statute barred being an issue of jurisdiction was properly raised, I so hold. The counsel for the defendant contended that the claimant’s suit is statute barred as it was not instituted within three months required by section 2(a) of the Public Officers (Protection) Act, for action against public officers. Counsel contended that the claimant’s employment was terminated on 19/9/2005 and this suit was instituted at federal high court on 16/3/2006. This shows that the suit was instituted 5 months after accrual of cause of action, which shows that it is beyond three month period prescribed by Public Officers (protection) Act. Counsel urged the court to dismiss this suit for being statute barred. 105. In response counsel for the claimant contended that this suit is not statute barred as the issue is being raised at address stage to surprise the claimant and also having regards to the antecedent of the case. 106. From the reliefs being sought by the claimant there is no disputing the fact that this action is contesting the validity of termination of appointment and is asking for reinstatement of the claim back to her employment, this clearly shows that this action is one on contract of employment. The law is now is well settled that the provisions of section 2(a) of the Public Officers (Protection) Act are not applicable to contract of employment. See REVENUE MOBILIZATION AND FISCAL COMMISSION & ORS. V JOHNSON & ORS. (2019) NWLR (pt.1656) 274, Per Ariwoola, JSC. By this decision the apex court has settled that the provisions of section 2(a) of the Public Officers (protection) Act is not applicable to employment cases. In the circumstances the objection of counsel for the claimant has no basis and same is hereby overruled. 107. Having resolved the preliminary issues begging for resolution, I shall now turn to the determination of the appropriateness or otherwise of the dismissal of the claimant from the service of the defendants. I shall from the onset for proper appreciation, reproduce the content of exhibit CLD, the letter of dismissal of the claimant from service, which is being challenged by the claimant as per this suit. The letter of dismissal of the claimant from service read like this: NIGERIAL TOURISM DEVELOPMENT CORPORATON Old Federal Secretariat, Area 1 Garki, P. M. B. 167, Abuja. Ref. No. NTDC/PF.798/VOL.1/129 Date: 19th September 2005 Mrs. Ngozi Alex Illookanam Admin Officer 1 NTDC Enugu. DISMISSAL FROM SERVICE I am directed to refer to the queries issued to you, nos. NTDC/PF.798/Temp. NTDCPF798/EZO/Vol.1/8 dated 5th April 2004 and May 11th 2005 respectively and your appearance before the Special Disciplinary Committee of 25th July 2005 and to inform you that you have not exonerated yourself from blame. Based on the available records, you have had a very long history of general and serious misconduct bordering on a. Habitual late coming/absenteeism -04401(iii) b. Unauthorised disclosure of official information -4401(x) c. Insubordination and negligence of duty -04401(xix, v) d. Disobedience of lawful orders -04401 (iv) e. False claims against Government -04401 (vii) Which had earned you numerous queries, warnings and suspension. There is no iota of doubt that the various cases of misconduct would have earned you summary dismissal from the service, but the management had always tempered justice with mercy with the hope that you would repent and turn a good leaf. However, you have shown that you are not prepared to change by your recent actions. The management has therefore directed that you should be dismissed from the services of the Corporation with immediate effect. You are hereby dismissed from the service of the Nigerian Tourism Development Corporation (NTDC) with immediate effect 04406. You are to surrender your official identity card and all corporation property in your custody to the Zonal Coordinator, Please. SGN M. U. Ukpan For: Director-General. 108. The above quoted letter of dismissal of the claimant from the service of the defendants is what triggered the institution of this suit by the claimant to contest the validity of her dismissal from the service of the 1st defendant. 109. The case of the claimant is that she was employed in 1994 vide exhibit CLA and her appointment was confirmed vide letter dated 1st June 1998, exhibit CLB, which is to take effect from 17th of December 1997. According to the claimant in further acknowledgement of her dedication to duty she was promoted to the post of tourism officer 1 on salary GL 09 vide letter of 1st June 1998 with effect from 1st January 1998, exhibit CLC. She stated that her commitment to duty got her on the black book of some of her colleague /contemporaries. Thus several of her accrued benefits were denied her for no reasons or on endless flimsy grounds. She also claimed to have faced several victimisation, discrimination and injustices in the hands of the officials of the defendants coming under the guise/auspices of discipline. 110. The main grouse of the claimant is that the 1st defendant deliberately failed and refused to accord the claimant fair hearing in all ramifications. As the defendants sat as prosecutors and judges in their own cause and the claimant was not allowed the opportunity and platform to put forward a case in her defence nor cross examined persons and documents upon whose evidence her purported suspension and eventual termination of appointment was based. 111. The defendants on their parts maintained that the claimant committed acts of misconduct which were proved to be contrary to public service rules, thus why she was dismissed with immediate effect. 112. It has long been settled that when an office or employment has a statutory flavour in the sense that its conditions of service are provided for by the statute or regulations made there under, any person in that office or employment enjoys a special status over and above the ordinary master and servant relationship. In the matter of discipline of such an employee, the procedure laid down by such statute or regulations must be fully complied with. If not, any decision affecting the right or reputation or tenure of office of that employee will be declared null and void. When a statute has conferred on anybody the power to make decisions affecting individual, the Court will insist that the procedure prescribed by the statute to be followed. Therefore where contract of service enjoys statutory protection, Like in the case at hand it can only be terminated in the manner prescribed by the governing statutory provisions, or regulations a breach of which renders the act ultra vires and void. Even agreement of parties to end the contract cannot discharge it, without compliance with the enabling statutory provision or regulations governing the employment. See OLORUNTOBA-OJU V ABRRUHEEM (Supra). 113. It is the law that there is a presumption that when the Legislature confers a power on an authority to make a determination it intends that the power shall be exercised judicially in accordance with the rules of natural justice. See Olaniyan v. University of Lagos (1985) pt 9 NWLR pg.599 Eperokun v. University of Lagos (1986) 4 NWLR pt 34 pg. 162 Bankole v. N.BC (1968) 2 All NLR, pg. 372 Shitta-Bey v. Federal Public Service Commission (1981) 1 SC pg. 40 Olatubosun v. NISER Council (1988) 3 NWLR pt 80 pg.25 Aiyetan v. N.I.F.O.R (1987) 3 NWLR Pt 59 pg. 48 Garba v. University of Maiduguri (1986) 1 NWLR pt 18 pg. 550 Adeniyi v. Governing Council of Yaba College of Technology (1993) 6 NWLR (pt 300) 426. 114. Therefore, in order to justify the dismissal or termination of appointment of an employee, the employer must be in a position to prove to the Courts satisfaction. (a) That the allegation was disclosed to the employee; (b) That he was given a fair hearing; (c) That the board/council believed that the claimant committed the offence after hearing witnesses. Bamgboye v. University of Ilorin (1990) 10 NWLR pt 622 pg 290 SC. 115. As pointed out earlier in this judgment a contract of employment enjoys statutory flavour where its conditions are governed by provision of Statute or regulations derived from Statute. The statute or regulations in its own rights, guarantees an employee's right to fair hearing before the termination of his employment. See Olaniyan v. University of Lagos (supra); LPDC v. Fawehinmi (1985) 2 NWLR (Pt. 7) 300; F.C.S.C. v. Laoye (supra); Iderima v. R.S.C.S.C. (supra); Ziideeh v. F.C.S.C. (2007) LPELR-3544(SC), (2007) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1022) 554. The settled position in such employment is that it must be terminated in the way and manner prescribed by the relevant statute or regulations. This is as a result of the general rule that a statute direct that a certain procedure be followed before a person can be deprived of a right, such a procedure must be strictly followed otherwise the court will declare void any act done not in accordance with the prescribed procedure. 116. Having found the employment of the claimant enjoys statutory flavour, the question that needs to be answered is has the dismissal of the claimant’s employment followed due process. 117. The whole essence of the claimant’s case is that her dismissal did not follow due process. laid down in the Public Service Rules 2000. The issue to be determined is not whether or not her conduct amounted to misconduct warranting dismissal from service, but whether due process was followed before decision to terminate her appointment was reached. The parties agreed claimant employment is governed by public service rules. My duty is not to find whether or not there is justification for dismissal of the claimant. Rather this court is concerned with whether the procedure laid down in the public service rules has been followed or not strictly complied with. 118. The defendant vide exhibit CLD clearly shows that the dismissal of the claimant was based on her inability to exculpate herself from the allegations levelled against her in exhibits CLJ and CLH, which are two letters of query issued to the claimants on 5th April 2004 and 11th May 2005, respectively. The defendants contended that following the issuance of the two query and replies from the claimant. Vide exhibits DWD1-4 AND DWE1-8, minute of senior Staff Committee Meeting and Special Disciplinary Committee, recommended dismissal of the claimant and she was accordingly dismissed. The counsel for the defendants has argued before the court that issuance of query answer to the query and appearance of the claimant before the committees shows that claimant was given fair hearing. 119. For the claimant she insisted under cross examination that she appeared before only one committee and she was not even allowed to say anything she was not given opportunity to cross examine or put questions to her accusers. 120. A combined reading of the provisions of section 13 of the Nigerian Tourism Development Board and that of section 11 of the Interpretation Act, will revealed that the 1st defendant in this case is the appropriate agency to discipline the claimant since her employment was not directly made by the Federal Civil Service Commission, the Public Service Rules only applies to the case because it was incorporated in the claimant’s letter of appointment as the rules and regulations governing the claimant’s employment with the defendant. She is also a public officer, which makes her to be bound by the Public service Rules. 121. This means that the disciplinary control over officers in the service of the defendant is vested in the supervisory organs of the 1st defendant i.e the Board of the 1st defendant. The power of discipline of members of staff of defendant since they are not employed in the core civil service, the Civil Service Commission will not be involved in taking disciplinary measures against the claimant. 122. From the letter of dismissal exhibit CLD, it is clear that the allegations based on which the claimant was dismissed from service are allegations that falls within the categories of serious misconduct as contained in Section 4 of Chapter 4 of the Public Service Rules 2000. 123. Rule 04402, provides that disciplinary procedure for serious misconduct shall be in accordance with rules 04302 to 04306. In order to see whether the procedure laid down in these rules have been followed in determining the Claimant’s employment by the 1st Defendant, I shall at this juncture reproduce the provisions of Rules 04302 to 04306, which are the relevant rules governing disciplinary action in respect of serious misconduct. They are:- Rule 04302- As soon as a superior officer becomes dissatisfied with the behaviour of any officer subordinate to him, it shall be his duty to inform the officer in writing giving details of unsatisfactory behaviour and to call upon him to submit within specific time such written representation as he may wish to make to exculpate himself from disciplinary action. After considering such written representations the officer may make within specified time the superior officer shall decide whether; a. The officer has exculpated himself in which case, he shall so informed in writing and further action shall be necessary, or b. The officer has not exculpated himself but it is considered that he should not be punished in which case an appropriate formal letter of advice shall be issued to him and he shall be required to acknowledge its receipt in writing, or c. The officer has not exculpated himself and deserves some punishment, in which case Rule 04304v shall apply, Rule 04303 – where a tribunal of inquiry are set up by the government makes recommendations of a disciplinary nature on an officer, the federal civil service commission shall not act on such recommendations until it has called upon the affected officer to reply to the allegations made against him by the Tribunal of Inquiry. If the officer refuses or neglects to reply to allegations within a reasonable time or at all, the federal civil service commission or its agents shall proceed to accept and enforce the recommendations of the tribunal of inquiry and take each disciplinary action against the officer as it shall deem appropriate. Rule 04304 – a. it shall be the duty of every officer to report any case of misconduct that comes to his notice to an officer superior to the officer involved. b. When an officer’s conduct is brought to the notice of his superior officer, it shall be the duty of that superior officer to report to the permanent secretary head of extra ministerial department without delay. If he considers it necessary that the officer should be interdicted, such recommendation shall be made in the report. c. On receiving the report the permanent secretary head of extra ministerial deapartme4nt shall take action in accordance with rule 04306 as appropriate and if necessary shall interdict the officer. d. At the appropriate point in the investigation, the officer may be suspended in accordance with rule 04405. Rule 03405 – If it is represented to the Federal Civil Service Commission that an officer has been guilty of misconduct and the commission does not consider the alleged misconduct serious enough to warrant proceedings under Rule 04306 with a view to dismissal, it may cause an investigation to be made into the matter in such manner as it considers proper and the officer shall be entitled to know the whole case made against him, and shall have adequate opportunity of making his defence. If as a result the commission decides that the allegations is proved, it may inflict any other punishment upon the officer such as reduction in rank, withholding or deferment of increment or otherwise. Rule 04306 provides the procedure to be followed in taking disciplinary action against an officer it reads: "unless the method of dismissal is otherwise provided for in these rules, an officer in the Federal Public Service may be dismissed by the Federal Public Service Commission only in accordance with this rule: i. The officer shall be notified in writing of the grounds on which it is proposed to dismiss him. The query should be precise and to the point. It must relate the circumstances of the offence, the rule and regulation which the officer has broken and the likely penalty. In serious cases which are likely to result in dismissal, the officer should be given access to any such document (s)or report(s)used against him and he should be asked to state in his defenc4 that he has been given access to such document. The officer shall be called upon to state in writing, within the period specified in the query any grounds upon which he relies to exculpate himself. ii. The query, or preliminary letter, shall be in the format shown below; To …………………………………………………………………………. iii. If the officer submits his representations and the Federal Civil Service Commission is not satisfied that he has exculpated himself and considers that the officer should be dismissed, it shall take such action accordingly. Should the officer however fails to furnish any representations within the time fixed, the Commission may take such action against the officer as it deems appropriate. iv. If upon considering the representations of the officer the Commission is of the opinion that the officer does not deserve to be dismissed from the service but deserves some other punishment, it shall impose on the officer such punishment as it considers appropriate; v. Where necessary the commission may set up a board of inquiry which shall consist of not less than three persons one of whom shall be appointed chairman by the commission. The members of the board shall be selected with due regard to the status of the officer involved in the disciplinary case and the nature of the complaint which is the subject of inquiry. The head of officer’s department shall not be a member of the board. vi. The officer shall be involved that on specific day, the question of his dismissal shall be brought before the board and he shall be required to appear before it to defend himself and shall be entitled to call witnesses. His failure to appear shall not invalidate the proceedings of the board. vii. Where witnesses are called by the board to give evidence before it, the officer shall be entitled to put questions to the witnesses and no documentary evidence shall be used against the officer unless he has previously been supplied with a copy thereof or given access thereto; viii. If during the course of inquiry further grounds for dismissal are disclosed, and the federal civil service commission thinks it fit to proceed against the officer upon such grounds, the officer shall, by the direction of the commission be furnished with a written statement thereof and the same steps shall be taken as prescribed above in respect of the original grounds. ix. The board having inquired into the matter shall make a report to the commission. If the commission considers that the report should be amplified in any respect or that further inquiry is desirable, it may refer any matter back to the board for further inquiry or report. The commission shall not itself hear witnesses. x. If upon considering the report of the board together with the evidence and all material documents relating to the case, the commission is of the opinion that the officer should be dismissed, such action shall immediately be taken. xi. If the commission does not approve the officer’s dismissal and does not consider that any penalty should be imposed, the officer shall be reinstated forthwith and entitled to the full amount of salary denied him if he was interdicted or suspended. xii. If upon considering the report of the board the commission is of the opinion that the officer does not deserved to be dismissed but that the proceedings disclosed grounds for requiring him to retire, the commission shall, without further proceedings direct accordingly. 124. From the content of the above quoted provisions of the Public Service Rules 2000, governing disciplinary action bordering on serious misconduct three methods of initiating disciplinary proceeding are discernable. They are:- a. Vide Rule 04302, disciplinary action are commenced by first issuing query to the officer by superior officer who is dissatisfied with the behaviour of the officer. If in reply to the query the officer could not exculpate himself, then the provisions of Rule 04304 is called to aid and guide the process. A report is submitted to permanent secretary, Head of extra ministerial department, who shall act in accordance with Rule 04306 by notifying the officer in writing of the allegations and request for explanation in exculpation within a specified period of time. Upon receipt of the representation by the officer the appropriate authority here the Board of the 1st defendant if not satisfied that the officer has exculpated himself and consider that the officer be dismissed, it shall take such action accordingly. If however the officer does not deserve to be dismiss but deserves some punishment such sanction as it is deemed appropriate should be imposed. Or where necessary set up a board of inquiry consisting not less than three persons. The officer is then informed of on a specific day the question of his dismissal shall be brought before the board and he shall be required to appear before it to defend himself and shall be entitled to call witness. When witnesses are called by the board to give evidence the officer shall be entitled to put question to the witnesses and no documentary evidence shall be used against the officer unless he has previously been supplied with a copy thereof or given access thereto. The board at the end of its assignment shall submit report to the Board of the 1st defendant. Upon consideration of the report of the board together with the evidence and all material document relating the case, the board of 1st defendant is of the opinion that the officer should be dismissed, such action shall immediately be taken. b. The second method of taking disciplinary action is provided under Rule 04303, this is a situation where a tribunal of inquiry set up by the government makes recommendations of a disciplinary nature on an officer, the federal civil service commission shall not act on such recommendations until it has called upon the affected officer to reply to the allegations made against him by the Tribunal of Inquiry. If the officer refuses or neglects to reply to allegations within a reasonable time or at all, the federal civil service commission or its agents shall proceed to accept and enforce the recommendations of the tribunal of inquiry and take each disciplinary action against the officer as it shall deem appropriate. c. The third method of taking disciplinary action against an officer is as contained in Rule 04305 of the Public Service Rules 2000, which is to the effect that If it is represented to the Federal Civil Service Commission that an officer has been guilty of misconduct and the commission does not consider the alleged misconduct serious enough to warrant proceedings under Rule 04306 with a view to dismissal, it may cause an investigation to be made into the matter in such manner as it considers proper and the officer shall be entitled to know the whole case made against him, and shall have adequate opportunity of making his defence. If as a result the commission decides that the allegations is proved, it may inflict any other punishment upon the officer such as reduction in rank, withholding or deferment of increment or otherwise. 125. It is clear to me having regard to exhibit CLD the letter of dismissal that the appropriate procedure to be followed that will lead to dismissal of the claimant in this case is the first method which is as contained in the provisions of Rules 04302, 04303, 04304 and 04306 of the Public Service Rules. 126. From the rules stated above the first step is to notify the claimant in writing of the grounds on which the claimant is proposed to dismiss him, and he shall be called upon to state in writing, before a day to be specified (which day must allow a reasonable interval for the purpose) any grounds upon which he relies to exculpate himself, see MRS. AKINYOSOYE YEMISI V FIRS [2012] LPELR-7964(CA); [2013] All FWLR (Pt. 693) 1992 at 2012. Exhibits CLJ and CLH are query letters issued to the claimant, the claimant reacted by exhibit CLI whereby she stated that her absence was due to ill-heath and being on official assignment. If the response to the query was unsatisfactory, a report is to be sent to the Head of the 1st defendant who shall immediately take action in line with Rule 04306. 127. Vide rule 04306, the claimant shall be notified in writing of the grounds on which it is proposed to discipline her. The query shall contain the rules broken by the claimant and likely penalty. Upon receipt of response to the query the board of the 1st defendant if not satisfied that claimant has not exculpated herself and deserves to be dismissed such action will be taken accordingly. 128. However, where the board of 1st defendant consider it necessary, the rule required that the matter shall be investigated by setting up board of inquiry, as per sub-rules iv, v, vi, vii, viii, ix, x, xi and xii of Rule 04306. 129. In the case at hand what we have is that the claimant was queried as per exhibits CLJ and CLH. Upon receipt of response to exhibits CLJ and CLH, a Special Disciplinary Committee exhibit DWE1-4 was set up by the Ag: Chief Executive of the 1st Defendant, for the purpose of examining and making recommendations on some disciplinary cases against three senior staff one of which was that of the claimant in the case at hand. See exhibit Exhibits DWE1-8, the report of Special Disciplinary Committee. According to exhibit DWE1-8, the Special Disciplinary Committee was set up on 25th day of July 2015. The committee commenced and concluded its assignment on the same 25th day of July 2015. It also submitted its report to the Ag. Chief Executive Officer of the 1st Defendant on the same 25/7/15. It is interesting to note that the committee did its work by reviewing relevant files, documents and briefs relating to each of the cases, this is in addition to interviewing all officers concerned (for fact finding) purposes and to avail them the opportunities of defending themselves accordingly. The report claimed that all documents relating to the cases were made available to each respondent for the avoidance of any doubt. In its recommendation the committee recommended dismissal of the claimant from service 130. In their observations the committee noted various disciplinary actions and measures taken against the claimant and concluded since she has remained unrepentant, she is a problematic officer who has no regard for constituted authority and has exhausted all avenues for leniency, and therefore they recommended her dismissal from service. 131. The claimant has averred that she did not appear before this committee, the Committee she appeared was that of 27/4/2004 and not the Special Disciplinary Committee, set up by the Ag; Chief Executive of the 1st Defendant. 132. However, the report exhibit DWE1-8 stated that the claimant appeared before the Committee and she was interviewed. What we now have is two different assertions. One negatives in nature the other positive. The law is trite the burden of proof is on he who asserts the positive and not on he who asserts the negative. The claimant by denial of appearing before the committee and the report of the committee asserting her presence, the burden of proof is on the defendant that asserts the positive. The Rules requires the claimant to be notified in writing of the allegations, the rules broken and the likely penalty there was no such evidence before the court to show that the claimant before she appeared before the Special Disciplinary Committee was served with any allegations apart from exhibit CLH the query issued to claimant by her superior at her station in Enugu before sending report to the Head of the 1st Defendant in Abuja, who upon the receipt of the report from her superior, is enjoined to comply with provisions of Rule 04306 of the Public Service Rules 2000. Instead of complying with Rules 04306, the 1st defendant set up a Special Disciplinary Committee. The evidence before me clearly shows that there was no compliance with rule 04306 by the Head of 1st Defendant who was mandated to notify the claimant of the allegations against her. The defendants have harped on the claimant admitting being queried as enough to justify dismissal. This argument does not seem to be in accord with the trite position of the law that require strict compliance with disciplinary procedure in respect of employment with statutory flavour. The claimant’s employment having been one that enjoys statutory flavour must be determined in line with extant rules and regulations. See OLANIYAN V UNILAG (supra), EPERKU V UNILAG (supra), BAMGBOYE V UNILORIN (supra). 133. In view of the clear and unambiguous provisions of the Public Service it is my view that the failure by the Head of 1st defendant who receive the report in respect of the claimant on her absence from duty to notify her of the allegations against her in line with Rules 04306, he has failed in his duty, before setting up a Special Disciplinary Committee for fact finding, the recommendation of the fact finding committee cannot be used to dismiss a member of staff of the claimant when there was no compliance with Rule 04306. It is to be noted that the claimant in her evidence under cross examination vehemently denied ever appearing before this Committee. DW2 under cross examination also testified that the committee based its findings and recommendation on the review of files. Having regard to the entire circumstances of this case and the fact that the claimant is based in Enugu I am inclined to believe the story of the claimant that she never appeared before this committee I took this view not being unmindful of the fact that the report of the Committee stated that the claimant honoured their invitation and appeared and they interviewed her. As I said the story of the claimant is more believable considering the fact that the claimant is based in Enugu and the Committee was set or constituted or established on 25/7/15 and it commenced its work, considers files and other documents and interviewed the three officers whom they considered their cases and make recommendations. The committee concluded and submitted report the same day it was set up by the 1st defendant and it is the recommendation of this Committee that the defendants used in dismissing the claimant from service. What a clear failure of natural justice. This is incredible; the speed with which the committee conducted its affairs in a very serious source for concern, that a case that the punishment involved depriving a citizen of his livelihood is treated with such dispatch, much needs to be desired from the Committee. The whole exercise does not represent transparency and clearly shows lack of reasonableness. 134. The counsel for the Claimant has devoted substantial time and space in arguing that the defendants violated section 36 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, (as amended) by not according the claimant fair hearing. 135. Let me say this the reference to section 36(1) of the 1999 Constitution by the claimant cannot be of any help to him, as breach of a fundamental right under section 36(1) of the Constitution arises only where the denial of fair hearing has been charged against a Court or tribunal established by law and not before a domestic or standing ad-hoc tribunal raised departmentally by head of an organization for fact finding. See REV. PROF. PAUL EMEKA V REV. DR. CHIDI OKOROAFOR & ORS. [2017] 14 NWLR (Pt.1577) 410, which relied on BAKARE V LSCSC [1992] 8 NWLR (Pt. 266) 641 at 699 - 700 and EKUNOLA V CBN [2013] 15 NWLR (Pt. 1377) 224 at 262 – 263. See also the case of MRS. CONFORT E. BASSEY V CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION CROSS RIVER STATE & ORS. [2010] LPELR-3858(CA). 136. It is clear that an administrative tribunal is not bound to follow the procedure and practice of the court of law; never the less it is bound to observe and comply with the principles of natural justice, that a person who may be adversely affected by its decision is entitled to be given adequate opportunity not only to know the case against him/her but also to answer it. The Special Disciplinary Committee has by the way it conducted its shown that the claimant was not accorded adequate opportunity to defend the allegations level against her. 137. This finding has put to lie the claim and findings of the committee. The law required the claimant to be invited and be given reasonable time to prepare her defence. With the speed with which the assignment was carried out by the committee I am of the strong view that the claimant was not treated fairly and was denied fair hearing. It must be understood that my findings is not concerned with whether the claimant truly did what she was alleged to have done all my decision is based on the method and procedure adopted by the defendant in dealing with the case and not the merit or otherwise of the allegations levelled against the claimant. 138. In view of the foregoing, I have no choice than to nullify the claimant dismissal from service this is due to the 1st defendant’s failure to follow due processes in dismissing the claimant from service. 139. Taking into consideration the entire facts and circumstances of this case, it is apparent that the way and manner the Defendants handle the employment of the Claimant has greatly contributed to the ordeal and reaction of the Claimant to the behaviour at work place environment. The non-refund of 25% deductions on rent, which it was found the Claimant is entitled to, the three Months suspension of the Claimant without pay which is clearly in violation of Public Service Rules, and transfer without payment of transfer allowance in line with extant rules and regulations in the Public Service all point to the fact that the actions of the Defendant have immensely contributed to the imbroglio between the Claimant and the Defendants. 140. In view of the foregoing, I am of the view that the punishment of dismissal meted on the claimant is very harsh and must be redress. In the circumstance I hereby ordered the conversion of the dismissal of the Claimant from service to Retirement from service with effect from today, the 6th day of February 2020. The claimant is also entitled to her pension and gratuity in line with extant rules and regulation. 141. There are other several infractions against the claimant raised or contained in the letter of dismissal the five items spelt out in the letter were infractions that have been dealt with by the 1st defendant and sanctions by way of verbal warning, written warning and suspension for 3 Months without pay were meted on the claimants. Therefore they cannot form the basis upon which another disciplinary action can be taken to disciplined the claimant when she had been punished for those infraction to allowed the defendant to base their disciplinary action on those infraction which sanctions had been meted on the claimant, it will amount to punishing the claimant twice which is against all known principle of justice and equity. 142. I have had a hard look at exhibit DWD1-4, the minute of meeting of Senior Staff Committee of 27/4/2004, this document is supposed be signed by two people but it was only signed by one person. the second signatory one Omotayo Omotosho, Chairman Chief Executive, did not sign as the column for signature is empty. The law is trite unsigned document carry no weight is worthless document. See OMEGA BANK V OBC LTD 2005 1 SCNJ 150, GARUBA V KWARA INVESTMENT COMPANY LTD 2005 NWLR PT.917 160, unsigned document has no eventual value is worthless does not have efficacy of law, the court will not attach probative value. In the absence of the signature of Omotayo Omotosho there is no way the authenticity of exhibit DWD1-4 can vouched. Therefore I discountenance the said exhibit due to lack of evidential value. 143. The claimant has also sought for an order directing the 1st defendant to pay all the salaries and emoluments of the claimant from 19/9/2005 till the day of reinstatement. The law is that a claim for salaries and other entitlements are in nature of special damages which must be specifically pleaded and proved. See NITEL V OSHODIN (1999) 8 NWLR (PT.616) 528, DANIELS HOLDING V UBA PLC (2005) 11 MJSC 69. The claimant has not particularised his claims and has not tendered and documents to establish the claim. The claimant should have tendered pay slips or statement of accounts showing the salary and allowances that has not been done so how can the court know what the claimant is entitled to. The claimant has failed to prove this head of claim and same is hereby refused. UNIVERSITY OF JOS V DR. M. C. IKEGWUOHA (2013) 9 NWLR (Pt.1360) 478. 144. Before I conclude my judgment I would like to state that the poor way and manner the officers of the 1st Defendant handled disciplinary action against the Claimant is highly deprecated. This case has exposed and portrayed the 1st defendant as an organisation that condones indiscipline with reckless abundance. The humongous documentary evidence adduced in this case shows clear proof of abdication duty by the top echelon of the 1st defendant and decadence in the old cherished discipline and loyalty in the public service. Those concerned must take conscious effort to restore the expected discipline in the service by doing what is right. I cannot put much blame on the claimant for her actions as there are traces of actions of the defendant that also fuelled the antagonistic attitude displayed by the claimant. It is never the law that an officer in the public service is denied payment of his transfer allowance. This is not in the Public Service Rule or Financial Regulation that an officer will be transferred and expect him to report without payment of his transfer allowance. How will you expect an employee to use his meagre salary to sponsor his trip to his newly duty post, for which he did not lobby to be transferred to. An officer transferred out of his station is entitled to payment of his due transfer allowance. There is no justification to deny an officer transfer allowance when he had already been punished for the alleged wrong doing that warranted him to be transferred. Transfer of officer is not to be used as punishment for employee’s misconduct. There are adequate rules in the Public Service that prescribed punishment for acts of misconduct. I shall stop here. A word is enough for the wise. 145. In view of the above for avoidance of doubt the order of the court is as follows:- The claimant’s dismissal from the service of the 1st defendant as contained in the letter dated 19/9/2015, exhibit CLD is hereby declared null and void and of no effect whatsoever for having been issued in violation of public service rule and same is hereby set aside. The dismissal of the Claimant from the services of the 1st Defendant is hereby ordered to be converted to retirement of the Claimant from the services of the 1st Defendant with effect from today the 6th day of February 2020. The Defendant shall pay the Claimant all her retirement benefit including pension in line with extant rules and regulation in the Public Service. The Defendants shall pay to the claimant cost in the sum of N300,000.00. 146. This Judgment is with immediate effect. 147. Judgment entered accordingly. Sanusi Kado, Judge. Olufunke Soleye, Esq; for the defendants appearing with Mrs. Temitayo Abodunrin, Esq; and Mr. Andrew Adeuya, Esq;