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JUDGMENT INTRODUCTION 1. The claimant as 2nd claimant filed this suit on 27th March 2014 alongside another who by a ruling of this Court of 10th March 2106 was struck off this suit. An order for the parties to re-file fresh processes reflecting a single claimant was consequentially made. By the re-filed complaint and statement of facts filed on 18th March 2016, the claimant claims against the defendant for: (a) A declaration that the purported determination of the employment of the claimant in the defendant by a letter of termination dated the 20th of February 2014 issued to the claimant by the defendant is tainted with bias as same was done in persecution of the claimant on account of his trade union activities with the Association of Senior Staff of Banks, Insurance and other Financial Institutions (ASSBIFI) in the defendant’s unit and is therefore illegal, unconstitutional, null and void and of no effect whatsoever. (b) A declaration that it is unfair labour practice for the claimant who is a member of the Executive of the Association of Senior Staff of Banks, Insurance and other Financial Institutions (ASSBIFI) in the defendant’s unit to be terminated by the defendant owing to the defendant’s refusal to recognize the claimant’s union and the said letter of termination dated 20th of February 2014 is consequently illegal, null and void, and no effect whatsoever. (c) An order directing the defendant to reinstate the claimant to their posts in the defendant forthwith without any loss as to seniority, salaries, position and other emoluments. (d) An order directing the defendant to compute and pay to the claimant all his salaries, allowances and other emoluments due to him specifically from the 20th of February 2014 when the employment of the claimant was terminated from the office of the defendant up to the date of judgment. (e) Interest at the prevailing commercial banks’ rates on the sum arrived at in relief (e) (sic) above. 2. On 15th June 2016, the defendant field its amended defence processes; to which the claimant filed his reply. 3. At the trial, the claimant testified on his own behalf as CW. is frontloaded documents were admitted and marked as Exhibits C1, C1(a), C2, C3, C4, C5, C6, C7, C8, C9, C9(a), C9(b), C9(c), C9(d), C10, C11, C12, C13, C13(a), C13(b), C14, C15, C16, C16(a), C16(b), C17, C18, C19, C19(a), C19(b), C20 and C21. For the defendant, Akeem Adeyinka, an Accountant with the defendant, testified as DW. He tendered three documents i.e. Exhibits D1, D2 and D3, which were admitted and marked as such. At the close of trial, the defendant filed its final written address on 28th January 2019, while the claimant filed his on 14th June 2019. The defendant did not file any reply on points of law. THE CASE BEFORE THE COURT 4. The claimant was an employee of the defendant by its letter of 3rd July 2007 whose employment was confirmed by letter of 29th of February 2008. The claimant was until the time of his purported termination the General Secretary of Association of Senior Staff of Banks, Insurance and other Financial Institutions (ASSBIFI) unit in the defendant. To the claimant, he served the defendant meritoriously without any blemish and was subsequently promoted to Registration Executive III by a letter dated 30th April 2010 (Exhibit C2). That as a result of his positive contributions to the defendant, he was even commended for his good conduct (Exhibit C3, a letter dated 10th June 2011). 5. To the claimant, the facts prior to the events leading to the determination of his employment by the defendant on 20th February 2014 are that he was the General Secretary of ASSBIFI unit in the defendant. That he was vibrant in the discharge of union activities and was also in the forefront on negotiations between the Management of the defendant on union issues, referring to Exhibit CW 4, a letter dated 28th September 2012. That sometime in 2011, some staff members of ASSBIFI (the claimant’s union) in the employment of the defendant were suddenly terminated without recourse to the Collective Agreements entered between the Nigeria Employers’ Association of Banks Insurance and Financial Institutions (NEABIAI), an Association covering the defendant’s operations, and ASSIBIFI. That the said CBA is Exhibit C10, which was forwarded to the defendant upon unionization of its workers, even though the defendant sought to deny the existence of the CBA. However, Exhibit C11 is letter from the claimant forwarding both soft and hard copy of the CBA to the defendant. 6. The claimant in the capacity of the Executive member of the branch union immediately intervened in the crisis which angered the Management of the defendant. Exhibit C17 is the letter dated 16th June 2011 upon which the claimant co-signed as the General Secretary of the branch union on the termination of staff union members. That the defendant’s reactionary attack on the claimant’s intervention was to exit the claimant from the Lagos State Head office of the defendant to Ondo State as punitive measure for daring the Management. Exhibit C5, a letter dated 12th July 2011, is the defendant’s Letter re-deploying the claimant to Åkure, Ondo State. That while his redeployment was yet to be settled and he was still coming to work in the Lagos State Office of the defendant as he agitated that it is against the union’s Collective Agreement submitted to the defendant for serving Executive members of the union to be transferred from the Head Office in the course of his tenure, the defendant demobilized the claimant’s computer system and passwords. Exhibit C12 is the claimant's Internal Memo complaining of the disabling of his passwords. That on the intervention of the National Union leaders in line with the Collective Agreement the claimant’s transfer was resolved and the claimant was retained in Lagos but redeployed to a different department by the defendant. Exhibits C19, C19(a) and C19(b) are the letters of redeployment of the claimant, demand for the transfer allowance paid to the claimant and the cheque returning the same. 7. That after the incident, he was treated with contempt and hatred by the defendant and was denied benefits which were accorded to other staff. Exhibits C13, C13(a) and C13(b) are the claimant’s letter of 1st August 2011 complaining of his denial to health facility of the defendant by the defendant, the defendant’s response dated 2nd August 2011 and the claimant’s reply to the defendant’s response. The claimant continued that there was an instance in which productivity bonus was shared and he got the least due to his union activities. That the defendant was put on notice to produce the claimant’s Performance Appraisal Reports for 2011 to 2013, other staff’s Performance Appraisal Reports in the claimant’s ranking within the period and tabulation of the productivity bonus paid to all staff but the defendant failed to produce same. 8. It is also the case of the claimant that it was the date the branch union was to hold its Congress in the defendant’s premises, the defendant having been informed, that the defendant suddenly directed the claimant to go and do menial work at the defendant’s offsite archives office not within the defendant’s premises where the claimant’s Congress was to hold thereby denying the claimant attendance of the Congress. Howbeit, that the Congress was disrupted by Policemen brought in by defendant. Exhibit C14 is the claimant’s letter to the Management complaining of the use of the Police to disrupt the union’s Congress dated 14th November 2012. Moreover, that the claimant’s work experience at the defendant’s Archives Station was done without any protective apparatus provided by the defendant wherein the claimant fell sick. That the claimant was denied hospital treatment by the defendant at the defendant’s retainer hospital. Exhibit C20 is the letter dated November 7, 2012 seeking permission to attend the Congress, the defendant’s response to the letter dated 8th November 2012 and the claimant’s medical report of his ill-health after the duty. The General Hospital report and receipts of treatment paid by the claimant dated 23rd November 2012. More so, that the defendant in show of apathy and or dislike of the Management to union membership and activities, the Management on 16th November 2012 circulated an Internal Memo denouncing the claimant’s union and threatened membership of the union to all staff. Exhibit C15 is the Internal Memo circulated to all staff on 16th November 2012. The claimant went on that in 2013 the defendant tried to frustrate the activities of the union by claiming that the defendant is not a financial institution in order to disengage the claimant’s union members from the benefits of the Collective Agreement between (ASSBIFI) and NEABIAI and by extension, the defendant. 9. It is also the case of the claimant that as a result of series of events of the claimant’s victimization by the defendant, the claimant wrote a letter dated 15th July 2013 to the Lagos Zonal office of the Ministry of Labour and Productivity to prevail on the Management of the defendant to reverse its proscription of the claimant’s union. Exhibit C7 is the letter dated 15th July 2013 written to Ministry of Labour and productivity. That thereafter, the defendant in a bid to frustrate the claimant and union activities maintained that the defendant is not a financial institution and was not desirous in associating with the claimant’s union. That this led to disagreements between the claimant’s union and the defendant as their position was that the defendant is a financial institution and staff of the defendant are free to be members of their union and that the defendant was bound to collect check-off dues from its members of staff and remit to the claimant’s union. As a result of the controversy relating to the status of the defendant and union dispute, the defendant instituted an action against the claimant and others in Suit No: NICN/LA/28/2014 by way of an originating summons. Exhibit C8 is the originating summons dated 28th January 2014. The claimant was sued as 5th respondent in the said originating summons. Howbeit, that to the claimant’s greatest surprise and dismay, while Suit No: NICN/LA/28/2014 was pending in court, the claimant was issued letter terminating his appointment by the defendant. Exhibit C9 is the letter of termination of the claimant’s employment dated 20th February 2014. Upon the claimant’s termination and pendency of Suit No: NICN/LA/28/2014 the defendant paid the sum of N506,658.95 (Five Hundred and Six Thousand, Six Hundred and Fifty-Eight Naira, Ninety-Five kobo to the claimant’s account. The claimant upon receipt of his bank alert on the said amount, emailed the Human Resources Manager/Head of Administration challenging the alleged payment and basis of calculations. When the claimant did not get a reply to his email on the crediting of his account without his knowledge and on the pendency of NICN/LA/28/2014, the claimant on 22nd April 2014 wrote a letter to the defendant challenging the alleged payment and that it was not acceptable to him. Exhibits C9, C9(a), C9(b), C9(c) and C9(d) are the letters of 22nd April 2014 and attached documents earlier sent to the defendant’s Human Resources via email. 10. It is the case of the claimant that the Collective Bargaining Agreement between his union (ASSBIFI) and Nigeria Employers' Association of Banks, Insurance, and Allied Institutions (NEABIAI) was part of the working agreement forwarded to the defendant that governs the claimant’s union membership and the defendant. Exhibit C10 is the CBA. Contrary to the defendant denying the fact of the existence of the letter forwarding the CBA, the defendant had admitted the existence of the said letter in it earlier statement of defence dated 17th June 2014 at paragraph 28. More so, by Exhibit C11, the letter dated 20th July 2011, both soft and hard copy of the CBA were forwarded by the claimant. To the claimant, the termination of his contract of service in the defendant was done out of bad faith due to his union membership and union activities in the defendant and most worrisomely in the pendency of Suit No. NICN/LA/28/2014. That it was his disagreement with the defendant over the termination of six (6) members of staff of the defendant that were union members in breach of the Collective Bargaining Agreement that was the beginning of his persecution in the defendant. 11. That on above facts, the defendant’s Suit No: NICN/LA/28/2014 was struck out on the ground that the defendant lacked the locus standi to file the said suit in the manner constituted and the issues for determination thus robbing the Court of the jurisdiction to determine the same. Exhibit C18 is the judgment/ruling of the Court. The claimant maintained that the reason for the termination of his employment by the defendant was due to his trade union activities while in the employment of the defendant as he maintained unblemished working relationship with the defendant except for his union activities. To the claimant, the contents of the exhibits show clearly that there were internal wrangling and industrial dispute as to the acceptance of the claimant’s union by the defendant. That he pleaded that it was his intervention in the capacity of the branch union Executive as to the termination of some union members that his persecution in the employment of defendant started. That an analysis of the exhibits will give the Court an insight into the claimant’s claims and travails in the defendant on account of union struggles. 12. On its part, the defendant's case is that the claimant’s employment was terminated in exercise of the right of the defendant under law and that the claimant was paid a month salary in lieu of notice and gratuity. It is also the defendant’s case that the termination of the claimant’s contract of service has nothing to do with the claimant’s union activities. THE SUBMISSIONS OF THE DEFENDANT 13. The defendant submitted five issues for determination, namely: (1) Whether the termination of the claimant’s employment by the defendant was tainted with bias and done in persecution of the claimant on account of the claimant’s trade union activities. (2) Whether the claimant has established or proved that the termination of his employment allegedly because of defendant's refusal to recognise the claimant’s union amounts to unfair labour. (3) Whether the claimant is entitled to be reinstated to his position without any loss of salaries, seniority, and other emoluments. (4) Whether the claimant is entitled to an order of this Court directing the defendant to compute and pay his salaries, allowances and other emoluments from 20th February 2014 when his employment was terminated up to the date judgment is delivered in this suit. (5) Whether the claimant is entitled to interest at the prevailing commercial banks’ rates on the sum arrived at in relief (e) above 14. The defendant started with what it termed preliminary issues. To the defendant, the purpose of a reply to defence is not to enable the claimant re-plead his case. That our courts have stated the law in several decided cases that the purpose of a reply to defence is to respond to new issues raised in the statement of defence which were not dealt with in the claim. That Order 15 Rule 7 of the Rules of this Court is very explicit on this. It provides that the claimant shall have right to reply only to new issues raised by the defendant in the statement of defence. That the issues raised by the claimant in paragraphs 13, 15, 16, 17 and 26 of his reply to the amended statement of defence are issues that did not arise from the statement of defence. That the claimant raised the issues contained in the said paragraphs to overreach the defendant knowing that the defendant will not have an opportunity to react or response to those issues. Accordingly, the defendant urged the Court to discountenance the facts alleged in paragraphs 13, 15, 16, 17 and 26 of the claimant’s reply to the amended statement of defence. 15. Furthermore, that the claimant pleaded (referring to paragraphs 7, 9 and 14 of the statement of facts and paragraphs 7, 21 and 23 of the claimant’s reply to the statement of defence) and tendered in evidence a Collective Agreement (Exhibit C10) which he alleged was entered into by the defendant and the Association of Senior Staff of Banks, Insurance and other Financial Institutions (ASSBIFI). That the defendant’s case in paragraph 13 of the amended statement of defence is that the defendant is not aware of and was not a party to the alleged Collective Agreement. That contrary to the claimant’s allegation, the name of the defendant was not mentioned in the entire Collective Agreement and the claimant did not plead any fact in his pleadings or lead any evidence at trial to prove that the defendant was a member of either of the two associations that are parties to the Collective Agreement. In other words there is no nexus between the defendant and the alleged Collective Agreement. In arriving at a decision in this matter the claimant urged the Court to discountenance the said Collective Agreement. 16. Issue (1) is whether the termination of the claimant’s employment by the defendant was tainted with bias and done in persecution of the claimant on account of the claimant’s trade union activities. To the defendant, the law recognizes the right of an employer to determine the contract of employment of an employee, for good, for bad reasons or for no reason at all. Likewise, that the law also recognizes the right of an employee to leave the service of his master at will, without hindrance as a worker cannot be forced to continue in the service of a master against his will. On the right of a master to determine the contract of service of an employee, the defendant referred to Ajayi v. Texaco Nigeria Ltd [1987] 3 NWLR (Pt. 62) 577, Ziideeh v. RSCSC [2007] 3 NWLR (Pt. 1022) 554 at 577, NNPC v. Evwori [2007] All FWLR (Pt. 369) 1324 and NEPA v. Eboigbe [2009] 8 NWLR (Pt. 1142) 150 at 162. That there is nothing in our law that prevents an employer from termination or even dismissing a worker in accordance with the law and/or the terms of the contract of service between the parties. That sections 9(7) and 11 of the Labour Act also allow either party to a contract of service to determine the contract in accordance with the terms and/or provisions stated therein. 17. The defendant went on that it is settled law that he who alleges must prove. It is, therefore, for the claimant who alleged that the termination of his appointment by the defendant was tainted with bias and done in persecution of the claimant on account of the claimant’s trade union activities to prove same. That the letter of termination dated 20th February 2014 issued by the defendant to the claimant is very explicit and it states that: “We hereby notify you of the termination of your appointment with Union Registrars Limited on the ground that your services are no longer required”. That nowhere in the letter of termination was it stated that the claimant was terminated because of his union activities. It is the defendant's case in paragraphs 7 and 8 of the amended statement of defence that the defendant paid the claimant a month’s salary in lieu of notice and gratuity. That the contracts of service of many staff of the defendant were terminated before that of the claimant and many staff of the defendant have been terminated after the claimant’s contract of service was terminated. That this fact was confirmed by the claimant in paragraph 7 of the statement of facts. Likewise, many staff of the defendant have in exercise of their right to determine their contracts of service determined same by resigning from the employment of the defendant. 18. Continuing, the defendant submitted that the claimant tried as much as he could to link the termination of his employment by the defendant to all sorts of issues for which he claimed he was being persecuted by the defendant. However, that whether those issues or allegations have any bearing on the claimant's termination is for him to prove. That the claimant in paragraphs 7 and 8 of the statement of facts alleged that sometime in 2011 the defendant terminated the appointment of some staff who were members of ASSBIFI and that his intervention in the matter angered the defendant for which he was transferred to Ondo State as a punishment. That it is not within the right of the claimant or any worker of the defendant to insist on or determine the branch of the defendant where he or she will work. That although the claimant alleged in paragraph 9 of the statement of facts that his transfer was against the union Collective Agreement, the claimant failed in his testimony before the Court to speak to the Collective Agreement by testifying on the relevant portion of the Collective Agreement that supports his case. 19. To the defendant, the law on transfer of employees is well settled. That the right to transfer an employee from one department to another or from one part of an establishment to another or from one branch to another is the prerogative of the employer and the consent of the employee is not required in the exercise of such prerogative. That the claimant also failed to establish by evidence before this Court that he cannot be transferred by the defendant to Ondo State where the defendant has a branch. That the claimant in paragraph 9 of his statement of facts stated that although he was transferred to Ondo State he however “refused to go on the said transfer”. That it is settled that where a worker refused to obey lawful instruction or directive given by the employer such disobedience amount to an act of gross misconduct for which the worker can be dismissed. However, that in the instant case notwithstanding the refusal of the claimant to go on transfer for which the defendant could have been dismissed the claimant, the defendant condoled the claimant’s act of gross misconduct and resolved the matter amicably. That this shows that the defendant was not bias or after the claimant as alleged by the claimant. 20. The claimant also alleged that upon his transfer the defendant demobilized his computer system and passwords and used security agents at the office of the defendant to bar him from office. In response, the defendant in paragraph 14 of its amended statement of defence stated that when a staff is transferred the usual practice of the defendant is that the Information Technology Department of the defendant will alter the access privileges of the staff so that the staff can be assigned new access privileges in line with this job function at his new location. That assuming that the allegation of the claimant that the defendant demobilized his computer system and passwords is true, the implication of that is that the claimant was unable to work. That the claimant did not allege that he was not paid salary for the period his computer system and passwords were demobilized. To the defendant then, it is settled law that it is the duty of the employer to provide or assign work to a worker. So, where an employer did not provide work for a worker or made it impossible for a worker to do his work as in this case by demobilized computer system and passwords and the worker gets paid at the end of the day then the worker has not suffered any loss. 21. The claimant also alleged that there was an instance in which productivity bonus was shared and the claimant got the least because of his union activities. In response, the defendant in paragraph 17 of its amended statement of facts stated that productivity bonus is not a right of the defendant’s employees. That it is paid at the discretion of the Board of Directors and Management of the defendant and is a performance based allowance as it is paid based on the respective performance of each worker. That the claimant did not lead any evidence at trial to prove the instance or when he got the least productivity bonus or to prove that he in fact got the least. That the defendant could have since terminated the claimant’s employment but from the evidence before the Court the defendant instead approached the Court in Suit No. NICN/LA/28/2014, in which the claimant was one of the defendants for the Court to determine matters of trade union as it affects the defendant. That the claimant has been a unionist and/or union executive for many years and in those years his appointment was not terminated by the defendant. It is, therefore, wrong for the claimant to link his termination with his union activism. That the fact that the claimant is a unionist or union executive does not mean that his contract of service cannot be terminated just like any other staff of the defendant. 22. Issue (2) is whether the claimant has established or proved that the termination of his employment allegedly because of the defendant’s refusal to recognise the claimant’s union amounts to unfair labour. To the defendant, the law does not require that an employer confers any recognition on a union. That what the law requires is for an employer to deduct and remit the union dues of its staff to the union the staff subscribes to. Therefore, the sole obligation of the defendant when it is notified of a worker joining a union is to deduct the union dues and forward same to the union. That the claimant did not plead any fact in his pleadings or lead evidence at trial to the effect that the defendant failed in its duty to remit union dues as required. 23. The defendant then submitted that the claimant like any other staff of the defendant was employed under a contract of service and if the contracts of service of other staff of the defendant can be terminated or have been terminated as stated by the claimant then there is nothing unfair or that constitutes unfair labour practice if the claimant’s contract of service is terminated. That the claimant been a unionist does not make his contract of service undeterminable. That from the pleadings and evidence before the Court the claimant’s contention that the defendant refused to recognise the claimant’s union is untrue and incorrect. 24. The claimant had in paragraphs 2 and 5 of his statement of facts stated that until his appointment was terminated by the defendant on 20th February 2014, he was the General Secretary of the defendant’s unit of ASSBIFI. The claimant further stated in paragraph 6 of aforesaid statement of facts that he has “been in forefront on negotiation between the Management of the Defendant on union issues that affect members of ASSBIFI union”. Also in paragraph 11 of the statement of facts the claimant stated that “through the intervention of the National Union leaders the matter of transfer was resolved and the Claimant was restored to his duty post…” To the defendant, against the backdrop of the facts stated in paragraphs 2, 5 and I l of the statement of facts, contrary to the claimant’s contention that the defendant refused to recognise the claimant’s union, the defendant recognised, related with and negotiate with the claimant’s union. 25. The defendant continued that in paragraph 14 of the statement of facts the claimant stated that: “The Claimant avers that in 2013 the Defendant tried to frustrate the activities of the Union by stating…” Also in paragraph 16 the claimant stated that: “the Claimant avers that the Management of Defendant in a bid to frustrate the Claimant in the Claimant’s union activities maintained that the Defendant is not a financial institution and was not desirous in associating with the Claimant’s union”. That the claimant stated that the defendant “tried to frustrate”; that the claimant did not allege that the defendant frustrated. Also the claimant stated that “in a bid to frustrate”; and not that the defendant frustrated the union. Again, the claimant stated that the defendant maintained it was not desirous in associating with the claimant’s union; again this is mere expression of a desire by the defendant. Additionally, that the claimant alleged in paragraph 15 of the statement of facts that the defendant proscribed the claimant’s union; however, the claimant did not lead any evidence to establish the allegation. That there is nothing before the Court to show that the defendant proscribed unionism. The defendant went on that even in Suit No. NICN/LA/28/2014, in which the claimant was sued as the 5th defendant, the claimant was “sued as executive members and as representatives of all members of the Association of Banks, Insurance and Financial Institutions, Union Registrars Ltd Branch” in recognition of the fact that there was ASSBIFI defendant branch. Therefore, the allegation of the claimant that the defence proscribed or did not recognise the claimant’s union is untrue an incorrect. That in the proceedings of 24th January 2017, the claimant under cross-examination stated that: “The Defendant was unionized about 2009 and I was the pioneer General Secretary. The name of the union is ASSBIFFI. I remained the General Secretary of the union until I terminated. I accordingly remained in that capacity for 5 years, from 2009 to 2014”. Therefore, for five years from 2009 till 2014 when the claimant’s employment was terminated, the claimant’s union was operating in defendant as a branch of the ASSBIFI. The defendant then submitted that from the evidence before the Court there was never a time the defendant did not recognise the claimant’s union or that the union was proscribed by the defendant. 26. Issue (3) is whether the claimant is entitled to be reinstated to his position without any loss of salaries, seniority, and other emoluments. To the defendant, the success of this relief is dependent on the success of the claimant’s first relief. That as the saying goes, a worker is entitled to his wages. So, if the claimant’s relief one succeeds then he will be entitled to his salaries and emolument but not so with seniority or promotion. That the fact that a worker is in employment does not mean he is entitled to promotion as promotion is not automatic except where the worker can show by pleading and evidence that he is entitled to automatic promotion. That the claimant failed to plead and lead evidence on his entitlement to promotion. That there is nowhere in the pleadings filed by the claimant that the claimant pleaded facts on his entitlement to promotion. That whether the claimant’s entitlement to promotion is under the handbook, a Collective Agreement or circular, facts on such promotion guideline were not pleaded by the claimant. That there is no fact in the claimant’s pleading that supports the grant of the claimant’s reinstatement without loss of seniority, urging the Court to refuse the same. 27. Issue (4) is whether the claimant is entitled to an order of this Court directing the defendant to compute and pay his salaries, allowances and other emoluments from 20th February 2014 when his employment was terminated up to the date judgment is delivered in this suit. To the defendant, the nature of a claim for payment of salaries, allowances and emoluments is a claim for special damages and the law requires not only that the claimant must particularize the claim but must lead evidence at trial in strict proof of the claim. That it is for the claimant who alleges that he is entitled to salary, allowances and emolument to state how must he is entitled to as salary, allowances and emoluments and how he arrived at the amount claim. That there was no paragraph in the pleadings filed by the claimant before the Court and the claimant did not lead evidence at trial to the effect that it is the duty or responsibility of the defendant to compute his claim for salary, allowances and emoluments. That in a claim for special damages it is not the responsibility of the defendant to compute or particularize the claimant’s claim; it is for the claimant to compute and prove same with credible evidence. That it is settled law that for a claim for special damages to succeed the claimant must not only establish his right or entitlement to it but must particularise the claim and lead credible evidence in strict proof of the claim. That it is the law that an admission by the defendant of a claim for special damages will not suffice. For the claim to succeed the claimant must necessarily particularize the claim and lead credible evidence in strict proof of the claim without which the claim is bound to fail, citing NNPC v. Clifco Nigeria Ltd [2011] 10 NWLR (Pt. 1255) 209. In conclusion, the defendant urged the Court to dismiss this case. 28. The defendant did not address its issue (5) i.e. “Whether the claimant is entitled to interest at the prevailing commercial banks’ rates on the sum arrived at in relief (e) above”. It is understandable as Relief (e) itself is the claim for interest. So when the claimant himself stated in relief (e) that he is claiming interest for “the sum arrived at in relief (e) above”, this becomes incomprehensible since there is no other relief (e) than the one seeking for interest. THE SUBMISSIONS OF THE CLAIMANT 29. The claimant adopted the defendant’s five issues for determination although he altered the phrase “relief (e)” in the defendant’s issue (5) to read “relief (d)”. I address this issue in the decision part of the judgment below. The claimant, however, first addressed two preliminary issues: the preliminary issue raised by the defendant as to the competence of the claimant’s reply to the defendant’s statement of defence; and the claimant’s own preliminary issue as to the admissibility of the evidence led by the defendant. 30. On the competence of the claimant’s reply to the statement of defence, the defendant had argued that the claimant’s reply was not a response to new issues raised by the defendant; for which paragraphs 13, 15, 16, 17 and 26 of the reply should be discountenanced as it offends Order 15 Rule 7 of the Rules this Court. To the claimant, the arguments of the defendant are misconceived. That a reading of the paragraphs and how they were pleaded show a clear indication that the paragraphs were pleaded in a manner reactive to the defendant’s referred paragraphs of the statement of defence, which were pleaded evasively and or mere denials thereby raising issues requiring further prove and or answer thereto to the claimant’s case. That the reply was reactionary to the defendant’s statement of defence in furtherance of the claimant’s case. That the said paragraphs clearly emanated from the manner the defendant pleaded its statement of defence as raising new issues, urging the Court to discountenance the defendant’s argument on the preliminary issue and allow the paragraphs in Rreply as pleaded. 31. Besides, that on 10th March 2016 the Court ordered/directed that a claimant’s (Comrade Monday Itodo) name be removed from the suit, the suit was to proceed with the present claimant and parties are to re-file their processes to reflect the same. That this order/directive of the Court was complied with, without amendment to the content and or substance of the claimant’s case except where it was necessary to convert plural wordings to singular in the circumstances of the order/directive of the Court. However, that the defendant in response to the claimant’s re-filed General Form of Complaint and accompanying processes to reflect the present claimant only, filed what it titled “Amended Statement of Defence” dated 15th June 2016 and filed on the same date. That the defendant’s referred amended statement of defence totally changed the sequence of its pleadings, character, substance and reactions to the claimant’s case in the defendant’s earlier pleadings in its “Statement of Defence” dated 17th June 2014 howbeit filed on 10th June 2014 and not just the “name change” in compliance/non-compliance with the order/directive of the Court. The claimant then referred to paragraphs 23 - 36 of the statement of defence dated 17th June 2014 but filed on 10th June 2014 when this suit stood as two claimants, urging the Court to look at its records. That the claimant rather than make an issue out of it, filed a reply to the defendant’s “Amended Statement of Defence” dated the 15th June 2016 in reaction to the character and substance the amended statement of defence was pleaded and new issues raised therein. That the call by the defendant to the Court to discountenance some paragraphs of the claimant’s reply to the amended statement of defence is clearly borne out of bad faith upon discovery of the claimant’s reactions in accordance to its changed pleadings. That the amended statement of defence was done without an order of Court, urging the Court to look at its records and discountenance the defendant’s application as the reply to the amended statement of defence was pleaded accordingly. 32. As to the admissibility of the evidence led by the defendant, the claimant submitted that to start with on the faulty nature of the defendant’s defence, there is no competent evidence to substantiate the defendant’s pleadings. That the purported evidence of the defendant’s witness dated 15th June 2016 deposed to by one Mr Akeem Adeyinka is at best hearsay evidence which is not allowed in our laws. That the claim of the witness deposing to “being conversant with the facts of this case and having personal knowledge of the case” contradicts with the witness’ evidence under cross-examination of 27th November 2018. That except for the query of 19th August 2011 (Exhibit D1), the ASSBIFI letter of February 11, 2014 (Exhibit D2) and the originating summons of Suit No. NICN/LA/28/2014 (Exhibit D3), there are no other files or documents relating to the subject matter put forward before this Court by the defendant that the witness derived his knowledge of the case. The claimant accordingly urged the Court to discountenance paragraphs 8 - 34 of the defendant’s witness statement on oath as they are hearsay evidence and inadmissible in law; and if they were admitted, they should be expunged and no evidential value or weight should be attached to the same. 33. The claimant continued that a community reading of the defendant’s witness evidence under cross-examination shows that the witness was not well tutored on “the hearsay led”. That under cross-examination, the witness informed this Court that he was redeployed to the defendant in February 2016 from DN Meyer Plc. That, of course, in 2016 the claimant’s employment has been terminated over two years ago in 2014. Under cross-examination, the “Witness informed this Court that he was not aware that the Defendant sued the Claimant in 2014”. That this piece of evidence violently contradicts the witness hearsay evidence of the witness statement on oath of 16th June 2016 especially at paragraphs 25 - 26. Again, that this piece of evidence also puts the Court at a cross-road as to which evidence to believe. More so, the witness made wide allegations of threat to disrupt, picket and shutdown the defendant by the claimant both in the hearsay written statement on oath and under cross-examination, yet there is no single document substantiating this allegations, urging the Court to discountenance the same. That the implication of the defendant’s defence/case is clear and trite in our laws that pleadings unsupported by legally acceptable and creditable evidence go to no issue. In other words, the defendant has not presented before this Court any creditable evidence to substantiate its pleadings, citing Ibrahim Jimoh Ajao v. Michael Jenyo Ademola [2005] NWLR (Pt. 913) 636 at 663. That it is clear from the cross-examination exercise that the witness has no personal knowledge of the evidence presented to the Court. And where such was derived from source, same was not shown or led before the Court; as such, the defendant’s evidence led is hearsay evidence, which is inadmissible under the section 37 of the Evidence Act 2011, citing Gbenga Osho v. The State [2012] 8 NWLR 243 at 288 and Jacob A. Jolayemi & ors v. Alhaji Raji Alaoye [2004] 12 NWLR (Pt. 887) at 322 at 341. 34. To the claimant, while the personal knowledge of the defendant’s witness of this matter is false in all material facts, except for the files and documents read by the witness which is not before this Court, all that the witness deposed to is hearsay. There is no ground or foundation upon which such belief was premised or derived as required under section 115(3) and (4) of the Evidence Act, urging the Court to discountenance those paragraphs of the defendant’s witness statement on oath, citing FGN v. AIAC Ltd [2006] 4 NWLR (Pt. 970) 337 at 357. In the circumstances, the claimant urged the Court to discountenance and dismiss the pleadings of the defendant as it is unsubstantiated by any legally admissible evidence in law. 35. I pointed out earlier that the claimant adopted the defendant’s issues for determination. On the defendant’s issue (1) i.e. whether the termination of the claimant’s employment was tainted with bias and done in persecution of the claimant on account of the claimant’s trade union activities, the claimant submitted that the law until recently was that an employer could terminate the employment of an employee for good reason, or for bad reason or for no reason at all and that common law employees could not be reinstated. However, that the Court has now changed the law somewhat slightly. Thus, where a condition of service stipulates the grounds upon which an employment could be determined, an employer cannot go outside the confines of the provisions to determine the same and or simply claimed that “the services of the employee is no longer required”. That while common law principles seems to resist reinstatement in master-servant relationship, our courts have ordered reinstatement when it is shown that the termination of the servant’s employment was done as act of victim of trade union activities, citing Management of Dangote Industries Limited v. National Union of Food, Beverages & tobacco Employees [2009] 14 NLLR (Pt. 37) 25 and section 9(6)(b)(i) and (ii) of the Labour Act LFN 2004. 36. It is the claimant’s submission that no employer will issue a letter of termination to an employee and state therein that your services are no longer required as a result of your trade union activities. However, that circumstances will show the reasons behind the termination. referring to Exhibits C1, C1(a) - C1(c), which speak of the claimant’s offer of employment, letter of confirmation, letter of promotion and letter of commendation. That the letter of commendation speaks of the claimant’s good standing with the defendant. The claimant then asked where he went wrong in the services of the defendant as to deserve termination of his employment. That the defendant has not pleaded or shown the many inadequacies and or incompetence of the claimant deserving his termination of employment. That the defendant raised the issue of the claimant’s refusal to go on transfer as act of disobedience or gross misconduct deserving of the claimant’s termination. But, that this was not the reason stated for the termination, and thus the defendant cannot make this an issue having reversed the same and the claimant continued his services in the defendant. 37. However, that a community reading of the correspondence between the defendant and the claimant on the claimant’s re-deployment to Akure will easily show that the claimant did not actually refuse to go on transfer. Rather there were issues of the claimant’s health or sickness which started before the transfer letter was served on the claimant; there were issues of the claimant being scheduled for a training program which was to be commenced within the period and also a scheduled meeting between the defendant and the National Union Executives of the claimant’s union which stated the claimant’s attendance was relevant, referring to Exhibits C5, C13, C13(a) and C13(b). The claimant went on that while an employer reserves the right to transfer its workers, the aim of the transfer must be borne out of the known grounds for the purpose (a) on confirmed promotion, (b) for specified training, (c) as a disciplinary measure for an offence constituting serious misconduct, or (d) at the employee’s own request or consent, referring to Article 4(j)(i) - (iv) of the Collective Bargaining Agreement between NEABIAI and ASSBIFI. More so, that the letter of transfer did not state any reason for the transfer. That the said CBA (Exhibit C10) was forwarded to the defendant via Exhibit 11. Thus, the defendant’s argument of not being aware of the CBA and or not being a party cannot be correct, as it was on the strength of the provision of the CBA that the claimant and the National Executive informed the defendant that the claimant could not be transferred in the pendency of the claimant’s tenure as the branch union executive. 38. Eventually, that the transfer was reversed. However, to show the displeasure of the reversed transfer against the claimant, the defendant deployed the claimant to another department. To the claimant, the transfer was not made for any known purpose stated in the Collective Agreement and or out of true need of the claimant’s services in Akure. The claimant referred to Bakare v. CGC Nigeria Limited (unreported judgment in Suit No. NIC/ÅBJ/45/2012, where the employer had transferred the Chairman of the house union of the National Union of Engineering, Construction, Furniture and Wood Workers (NUECFWW) during a national strike declared by the Nigeria Labour Congress, a Federation to which the union was a member or affiliated. The evidence before the Court showed that the house union and the management had a trade dispute relating to the employees’ wages before the said transfer. The Court held that although the employer had the right to transfer its employees that the employees could not refuse to be transferred, the posting of the Chairman of the union was wrong and faulty having regard to its timing. The Court ordered the reinstatement of the Chairman of the house union on ground that the termination of his employment was as a result of his trade union activities. 39. The claimant continued that Exhibit C6 is a letter to the Ministry of Labour and Productivity seeking its intervention in the crisis raging in the defendant and its staff union members. At paragraph 5, page 2 of the exhibit, it was enumerated various acts of discrimination and vindictiveness practiced by the defendant and solely targeted at union members inclusive the claimant. At paragraph 5(iii) of the exhibit, the claimant was being advised by an executive staff of the defendant that he should forget about union struggles as it may lead to his being denied promotion. That paragraph 5 of the exhibit assured this Court of the threat of staff members’ connection with trade union activities. 40. That Exhibit C15 is an Internal Memo issued by the defendant to all staff. That the tone and content of the internal memo put doubts beyond peradventure that the defendant has a recalcitrant apathy to associate and or allow its staff membership of the union as there was an already undertone that any staff who insists on the membership may have his employment reassessed in the event of downsizing of staff by the defendant. Clearly, that there were constructive threats to termination of employment for staff that choose to continue membership of the union including the claimant. 41. That Exhibit C17 is a letter from the claimant to the defendant drawing the attention of the defendant to some anomalies in the termination of six members of the union, the need to adhere to the Collective Agreement and perhaps apply redundancy benefits in exiting the terminated staff from the employment of the defendant. The letter shows that the claimant was indeed in the forefront of the union struggle that also ended his own employment. 42. It is the claimant’s submission that a community reading of his exhibits will show that all the issues between him and the defendant center on his membership of a union, urging the Court to so hold. The claimant then asked: what exactly is the reason for the determination of the claimant’s services? And answered: None was given, except that the defendant stated that the claimant’s services were no longer required. That in Akinwale v. UBA (unreported judgment in Suit No: NIC/LA/210/2011 delivered on August 3, 2012, the employer’s argument that it was not bound to give reasons for the termination of the claimant’s services was rejected by this Court; and the Court held therein that this position of law was no longer modern in industrial relations jurisprudence and that the determination of the claimant’s employment was wrongful as the bank did not comply with the terms and conditions of the contract of service. Also that in PENGASSAN v. Schlumberger Anadrill Nigeria Limited [2008] 11 NLLR (Pt. 29) 164, this Court ordered the reinstatement of employees whose services were terminated without due procedure followed by the employer. The claimant then urged the Court to find and hold that the termination of his services by the defendant was tainted with bias and done in persecution of him on account of his trade union activities. 43. The defendant’s issue (2) is whether the claimant proved that the termination of his employment allegedly because of the defendant’s refusal to recognise his union amounts to unfair labour. To the claimant, given the manner this issue is couch, it is obvious that the defendant speaks from both sides of the mouth. That the defendant cannot claim an unhindered support of the staff member of the union, while in another breathe question whether its failure to recognise the claimant’s union amounts to unfair labour practice. That the refusal of an employer to accord recognition to a trade union is a valid ground for trade dispute. More so, an unfair labour practice is when an employer carries out acts that the practice does not conform to best practice in labour circles as may be enjoined by local and international experience, citing Mix and Bake Flour Mill Industries Ltd v. National Union of Food, Beverages and Tobacco Employees [2004] 1 NLLR (Pt. 2) 247. 44. The defendant had argued that the law does not require that an employer confers recognition on a union, rather what the law requires is that an employer deducts and remits check-off dues of its staff to the union the staff subscribes. To the claimant, a community reading of the submissions of learned counsel for the defendant shows clearly that there was internal disputing of management recognizing the union vis-à-vis the legal status of the defendant being a financial institution and the claimant’s claims that union members were being frustrated in continuing membership of the union. That the learned counsel’s argument for the defendant on this point is misconceived and erroneous in the light of the position of law, citing Mix and Bake Flour Mill Industries Ltd v. National Union of Food, Beverages and Tobacco Employees [2004] 1 NLLR (Pt. 2) 247 at 275 - 276 where this Court held thus: Given that by the virtue of section 5(7) Trade Unions Act and section 5(3) Labour Act, registration is deemed, recognition automatic and deduction of check-off dues compulsory for all unions listed in the Third Schedule to the Trade Unions Act, the only relevant question to be determine the issue of locus standi is whether the union exhibited enough intention to be so recognized by the employer. Once the trade union indicates its willingness to unionize workers who are eligible to be its members, an employer is obliged to accord recognition and not pose obstacles in the way of such unionization. 45. It is the claimant’s submission that the exhibits speak for themselves to the effect that the defendant was vehemently opposed to staff membership of the union and that the union members were target of termination of employment. That this Court held in Management of Dangote Industries Limited, PASTA Plant Ebute Ikorodu, Lagos v. National Union of Food, Beverages & Tobacco Employees (NUFBTE) NLLR (Pt. 37) 25 at 46 thus: Recognition of eligible members of a trade union is compulsory and automatic. Once a trade union indicates its willingness to unionize workers who are eligible to be its members, an employer is obliged to accord recognition and not post obstacles in the way of unionization. The employer is expected to avail the workers the smooth take off the branch union. That in the referred Dangote case (supra) this Court held further at page 46 on when termination of employment can be said to be due to union activities: Once an employer is intimated of the intention to establish a branch workers’ union (with competent jurisdictional scope) amongst its workers, the termination of employment of the workers in the forefront of establishing the union can be held to be due to union activities. Additionally, that this Court held also at page 46 on the duty of an employer where a trade union is formed: An employer who is intimated of existence of a trade union must create the enabling environment for the already existing trade union to function. 46. The claimant went on that the defendant’s claim of recognition of the branch union was pseudo; and the defendant’s various acts of vindictiveness were clearly targeted at union members leading to their termination of employment which eventually edged out the President and the General Secretary of the branch union. Furthermore, that the act of the defendant is ultra vires its power in industrial relations and against section 9(6)(a) and (b) of the Labour Act 2004 which clearly provides thus: No contract shall - (a) make it a condition of employment that a worker shall or shall not join a trade union or shall or shall relinquish membership of a trade union; or (b) cause a dismissal of, or otherwise prejudice, a worker (i) by reason of trade union membership; or (ii) because of trade union activities outside working hours or, with the consent of the employer, within working hours. 47. To the claimant, the act of the defendant in terminating the claimant’s appointment was done in persecution of the claimant being a member of a union and involvement in trade union activities in vehement violation of section 9(6)(a) and (b) of the Labour Act. On the combined effects of section 9(6)(b)(ii) of the Labour Act and section 42(1)(b) of the Trade Disputes Act, that this Court in Nestle Nig Ltd v. NUFBTE held that the combined effect of these provisions is that an employee is entitled to be reinstated where his or her employment has been terminated because of union activities, urging the Court to so hold. 48. The defendant’s issues (3), (4) and (5?) were taken together by the claimant. They respectively deal with the claimant’s prayers for reinstatement, payment of salaries and emoluments, and interest. It is the claimant’s submission that he is entitled to all the reliefs sought. That he was able to establish that his persecution and eventual termination of his employment was done out of vindictiveness of his trade union activities. That the action of the defendant in the termination of his employment being an executive of the branch union and other staff union members being inconsistent with the provision section 9(6)(a) and (b) of the Labour Act and ILO Convention No. 89 must be declared by this Court as unlawful, illegal, null and void and the defendant be ordered to reinstate him without loss of salary, allowances and seniority of service. That the course of justice would be served if the order of reinstatement is made in order to demonstrate the legitimacy of trade union membership and uphold the fundamental rights of the claimant under section 40 of the Constitution to belong to trade union of his choice in order to further his interest. That to do otherwise would amount to an invitation to chaos and industrial crisis which will run counter to the reasons why this Court was established in the first place. That an order of reinstatement is the appropriate order to make in the circumstances of this case where the termination of employment is connected with the employee’s trade union membership and activities, citing National Union of Food, Beverages and Tobacco Employees v. Cocoa Industries Ltd, Ikeja [2005] 3 NLLR (Pt. 8) 206 at 218, Mix and Bake Flour Mill Industries Ltd v. National Union of Food, Beverages and Tobacco Employees [2004] 1 NLLR (Pt. 2) 247 and The Management of Nestle Nigeria Plc llupeju, Lagos State v. National Union of Food, Beverages and Tobacco employees [2009] 15 NLLR (Pt. 40) 42 at 76 - 77. To the claimant, this Court is endowed with both inherent and judicial powers in appropriate cases, as a remedy for the termination of employment based on trade union activities, to order the reinstatement of the affected union officials as in this instance the claimant together with the consequential order as to payment of salaries and emoluments due to the claimant. That this Court has held that in cases of wrongful dismissal/termination, the measure of damages is prima facie the amount the plaintiff would have earned had the employment continued according to the contract of employment, citing Comrade Onah v. NLC [2013] 33 NLLR (Pt. 94) 104 at 171 - 172 and Industrial Cartons Ltd v. NUPAPPW [2006] NLLR (Pt. 15) 258. 49. The claimant continued that he has not lost sight of the fact that the defendant had argued that the claimant was paid gratuity and one month salary in lieu of notice. However, that Exhibits C9, C9(a) - C9(d) are documents relating to the payment of a certain sum of money alleged to be gratuity paid to the claimant by the defendant, something the claimant indicated was unacceptable. That it is on record that the said money was paid during the pendency of the defendant’s originating summons. Interestingly, that the defendant’s witness under cross-examination informed this Court that the claimant challenged the alleged gratuity and one month salary in lieu of notice. More so, the alleged gratuity and one month salary in lieu of notice was not paid contemporaneously with the date of the termination of the claimant’s employment, referring to Comrade Onah v. NLC (supra). 50. On whether payment of terminal benefits to an employee extinguishes the employee's right to reinstatement, that this Court in Dangote v. NUFBTE (supra) held at pages 49 - 50 thus: Where employee is compelled to accept terminal benefit, court will order reinstatement, it does not lie within the whims and caprices of an employer to determine when, which, and how a union should be formed by the workers. Payment of terminal benefits when workers are compelled to take will not prevent order for reinstatement. In conclusion, the claimant submitted that it is compulsory and automatic for an employer to recognize workers union; and workers right to unionize needs to be protected and not allowed to depend on the likes or dislikes of an employer, urging the Court to grant the reliefs he claims. 51. Like I pointed out earlier, the defendant did not file any reply on points of law. COURT’S DECISION 52. I have carefully considered the processes filed and the submissions of the parties. I must start with the claimant’s incomprehensible relief (e), which is a claim for “Interest at the prevailing commercial banks’ rates on the sum arrived at in relief (e) above”. As can be seen, relief (e) itself is the claim for interest; and is the last of the reliefs the claimant is claiming for. So when the claimant himself stated in relief (e) that he is claiming interest for “the sum arrived at in relief (e) above”, this becomes incomprehensible since there is no other relief (e) than the one seeking for interest. I indicated earlier that the defendant did not address this issue in its final written address; and that this is understandable. The claimant decided to play smart by altering the phrase “relief (e)” in the defendant’s issue (5) to read “relief (d)”. This is rather late in the day and cannot be as it goes to the pleadings of the claimant. 53. Gabriel Ativie v. Kabelmetal (Nig.) Ltd [2008] LPELR-591(SC); [2008] 10 NWLR (Pt. 1095) 399; [2008] 5 - 6 SC (Pt. II) 47 has it thus: A claim is circumscribed by the reliefs claimed. The duty of a Plaintiff therefore is to plead only such facts and materials as are necessary to sustain the reliefs and adduce evidence to prove same. He may, at the end of the day obtain all the reliefs claimed or less. He never gets more. Nor does he obtain reliefs not claimed. A court is therefore bound to grant only the reliefs claimed. It cannot grant reliefs not claimed. The point is that incomprehensible reliefs cannot be granted as the Court can only grant that which it understands. As His Lordship Tur, JCA puts it in Chief James Onyewuke v. Modu Sule [2011] LPELR-9084(CA) on the issue of pleadings, a trial Judge should not embark on a voyage seeking to repair the damage caused by counsel in failing to plead material facts necessary to obtain judgment in the temple of justice since Courts are not carpenter’s workshops where Judges toil to mend defects in pleadings. Accordingly, it is not the duty of this Court to repair relief (e) for the claimant. Relief (e) shall accordingly be discountenanced. I so hold. 54. The claimant would in paragraph 1.62 of his final written address rely on “Suit No: IAP/HB/3859/2013 between National Union of Food, Beverages and Tobacco Employees v Stammark Cocoa Company Limited decided in 2014”, an Industrial Arbitration Panel (IAP) case, in support of his assertion that reinstatement can be ordered in the circumstances of his case. The claimant’s counsel is a lawyer. Does he think that this Court is bound by an IAP award? 55. The defendant had urged the Court to discountenance the facts alleged in paragraphs 13, 15, 16, 17 and 26 of the claimant’s reply to the amended statement of defence on the ground that the claimant was not responding to any new issue(s) raised by the defendant. Instead, the claimant was re-pleading his case. Paragraphs 13, 15, 16, 17 and 26 of the claimant’s reply to the amended statement of defence were relations to paragraphs 15 and 18 - 20 of the amended statement of defence. I read through these paragraphs of the amended statement of defence. In them, the defendant denied using security agents to bar the claimant from office or from using medical facility, denied frustrating the activities of any union and that the defendant was not a party to any alleged collective agreement between it and ASSBIFI, denied victimizing the claimant or proscribing the claimant’s union, and denied frustrating the claimant and the fact of being a financial institution. The defendant ended each of these pleadings by putting the claimant to the strictest proof. The claimant in reaction pleaded in terms of his paragraphs 13, 15, 16, 17 and 26 of the reply that the defendant’s security agents disrupted the branch union congress, the defendant gave him work on congress day so that he will attend the said congress, and the defendant circulated an internal memo denouncing the claimant’s union. All of this, the claimant had to do because the defendant denied victimizing the claimant and doing anything against the union interests of the claimant. I am satisfied that the claimant was not re-pleading his case. He merely answered to the pleadings of the defendant. I so find and hold. The said paragraphs 13, 15, 16, 17 and 26 of the claimant’s reply shall accordingly not be discountenanced by this Court. 56. The defendant had also argued that it is not a party to Exhibit C10, the collective agreement between the Nigerian Employers’ Association of Banks, Financial and Allied Institutions (NEABIAI) and the Association of Senior Staff of Banks, Insurance and other Financial Institutions (ASSBIFI). The argument of the defendant going by paragraphs 18 and 20 of its amended statement of defence is that since it is not a financial institution, it cannot be bound by this collective agreement as it is not a party to it. Already in paragraph 1 of the statement of facts re-filed on 18th March 2016 as well as paragraph 1 of the claimant’s witness statement of 18th March 2016, the claimant pleaded and deposed that the defendant is a registered financial institution in Nigeria. Aside from denying being a financial institution, the defendant in paragraph 2 of its amended statement of defence (supported by paragraph 7 of the DW’s deposition of 15th June 2016) stated that it is registered by Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to conduct share registration business. The defendant will be bound by Exhibit C10 if it is a financial institution even if it is not a signatory to it as it claims. But we cannot ascertain whether the defendant is a financial institution unless we understand the scope of the trade unions provided for under the Third Schedule to the Trade Unions Act (TUA) 2004 to cater for the financial sector. 57. Now, ASSBIFI is the trade union for senior staff, while National Union of Banks, Insurance and Financial Institutions Employees (NUBIFIE) is the trade union for junior staff in the financial sector. NEABIAI is the umbrella and counterpart trade union body of the employers in the financial sector. To understand the jurisdictional scope of these trade unions, it is to NUBILE we must go. Under item 7 of Part B of the Third Schedule to the TUA, the jurisdictional scope of NUBILE is put thus: Workers in banks and closely related institutions, such as mortgage companies, industrial loan institutions, agricultural credit agencies, cooperative credit societies, investment companies, holding companies, insurance carriers of all kinds; insurance agents and brokers; organizations servicing insurance earners; consultants for policy holders; adjusting agencies; other closely related institutions not otherwise mentioned, all types of dealers in real estate. 58. The point to note here is that NUBIFIE, ASSBIFI and NEABIAI are trade unions meant to cater for the financial sector. This Court has long recognized that the design of trade unions based on the 1978 restructuring exercise was fashioned according to industry and so can be said to be industry based with the senior staff and employers’ associations following after the industrial unions made up of essentially junior staff. See Air Transport Services Senior Staff Association of Nigeria (ATSSSAN) v. Senior Staff Association of Statutory Corporations and Government Owned Companies (SSASCGOC) unreported Suit No. NIC/8/2005, the judgment of which was delivered on 27th June 2007 and Precision, Electrical & Related Equipment Senior Staff Association (PERESSA) v. Senior Staff Association of Statutory Corporations and Government Owned Companies (SSACGOC) & 2 ors unreported Suit No. NIC/25/2007, the judgment of which was delivered on 11th February 2009. 59. In determining the jurisdictional scope of these trade unions, the key phrase is: “Workers in banks and closely related institutions”. The types of related institutions are then mentioned prefaced by the words “such as”. This means that the list is not exhausted. This is followed by the phrase “other closely related institutions not otherwise mentioned”. The question which presently arises is whether a company registered by SEC to conduct share registration business is not in the financial sector as to be deemed a member of NEABIAI. I am of the firm belief that it is; and I so find and hold. This being so, the argument of the defendant it is not a financial institution is lame and unsustainable. I reject it and so will discountenance it. The defendant is a financial institution within the context of the jurisdictional scope of the trade unions set up to cater for the financial industry. As such, having to be a signatory to Exhibit C10 before it can be bound by it is not a requirement; and the claimant is not thereby required to prove the defendant’s membership of NABIAI, that being assumed in virtue of the defendant being a financial institution. If the defendant chose not to participate in the activities of NEABIAI, that is its concern, for that has nothing to do with its deemed membership of the association. I so find and hold. 60. The claimant had on his part urged the Court to discountenance paragraphs 8 - 34 of the defendant’s witness statement on oath as they are hearsay evidence and inadmissible in law; and if they were admitted, they should be expunged and no evidential value or weight should be attached to the same. To start with, because the defendant did not file any reply on points of law, which would have afforded it the opportunity to react to this submission of the claimant, it must be taken that the defendant acceded to the claimant’s submission. In paragraph 4 of DW’s deposition, he deposed that the facts deposed to are based on his personal knowledge and facts gathered from the files and documents relating to the subject matter of the suit which he had read. The argument of the claimant is that the claim of DW “being conversant with the facts of this suit” (paragraph 2 of DW’s deposition) and having personal knowledge of the case (paragraph 4 of DW’s deposition) contradicts with the witness’ evidence under cross-examination. That except for the query of 19th August 2011 (Exhibit D1), the ASSBIFI letter of February 11, 2014 (Exhibit D2) and the originating summons of Suit No. NICN/LA/28/2014 (Exhibit D3), there are no other files or documents relating to the subject matter put forward before this Court by the defendant that the witness derived his knowledge of the case from. 61. Under cross-examination, DW testified that he was redeployed to the defendant in February 2016 from DN Meyer Plc; and for a good number of the questions posed to him under cross-examination, DW answered that he was not aware. Now, given that the claimant’s employment was terminated vide a letter of 20th February 2014, and DW joined the defendant, in February 2016, is the evidence of DW hearsay? The claimant thinks so. The defendant did not file any reaction. As such, like I pointed out earlier, it must be taken to have conceded to this point. While an artificial entity acts through its human agents and so reserves the right to choose wherever it wants to testify on its behalf, the truth is that it takes a huge risk if it calls someone as a witness such as DW who was not privy to the facts upon which evidence is given. This Court had cautioned employers on this point. See Pastor (Mrs) Abimbola Patricia Yakubu v. Financial Reporting Council of Nigeria & anor unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/673/2013, the judgment of which was delivered on 24th November 2016 and Mr Charles Ughele v. Access Bank Plc unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/287/2014 the judgment of which was delivered on 10th February 2017. At paragraph 56 of Ughele, this is what this Court said: I have often lamented and cautioned employers for refusing to call as witnesses those who were actually involved in the facts leading to the dispute in issue. No doubt, an employer reserves the right to call whoever it wants as a witness. However, an employer who simply calls anyone to testify stands the risk that if the claimant’s testimony is more believable, that defence witness who was not involved in the facts leading to the case but is called as a witness, would end up an unbelievable witness. This is exactly the scenario playing out in the instant case. 62. DW in the instant case joined the defendant in 2016, two years after the claimant’s employment was terminated. There is no way he can have any personal knowledge of the facts as he claims in paragraph 4 of his deposition. As argued by the claimant, an argument I agree with, except for DW’s evidence as to Exhibits D1, D2 and D3, which documents are before the Court, every other piece of evidence of DW fits the hearsay rule and so will be discountenanced by this Court. What this means is that the narration of events by the claimant up to 20th February 2014 when his employment was terminated is largely uncontroverted as the quality of the evidence of DW in that regard cannot match that of the claimant. I so find and hold. I, therefore, agree with the claimant that he was involved in trade union activities for which the defendant terminated his employment. The only question left is whether the claimant satisfied the requirements of the law needed for him to be said he was exercising his lawful right to trade unionism, in respect of which the defendant is now being sought to be held liable as canvassed in this suit. I shall return to this point shortly. 63. I need to first resolve certain misconceptions held by the defendant. The defendant had argued that there is nothing in our law that prevents an employer from termination or even dismissing a worker in accordance with the law and/or the terms of the contract of service between the parties. Here, it seems like the defendant is not aware of section 43 of the Trade Disputes Act (TDA) Cap T8 LFN 2004 and section 9(6)(b)(ii) of the Labour Act Cap L1 LFN 2004. Section 43(1)(b) of the TDA provides that notwithstanding anything contained in the TDA or in any other law where any employer locks out his workers, the workers shall be entitled to wages and any other applicable remuneration for the period of lock-out and the period of the lock-out shall not prejudicially affect any rights of the workers being rights dependent on the continuity of period of employment. Section 9(6)(b)(ii) of the Labour Act on its part provides that “no contract shall cause the dismissal of or otherwise prejudice a worker because of trade union activities outside working hours or with the consent of the employer, within working hours”. This Court in a number of cases have interpreted the combined effect of these provisions, which is that an employee is entitled to be reinstated where his or her employment has been terminated because of union activities. See Management of Dangote Industries Limited, Pasta Plant, Ebute Ikorodu, Lagos v. National Union of Food, Beverages & Tobacco Employees (NUFBTE) unreported Suit No. NIC/2/2008, the judgment of which was delivered on 28th January 2009. But for this to happen, the employee must bring his case within the ambit of section 43 of the TDA and section 9(6)(b)(ii) of the Labour Act. See NUFBTE v. Cocoa Industries Ltd [2005] 3 NLLR (Pt.8) 206 at 218 – 219. Of course, the question remains whether the claimant brought his case within the ambit of section 43 of the TDA and section 9(6)(b)(ii) of the Labour Act. I shall return to this shortly. 64. In answer to the claimant’s position that he was transferred by the defendant to Ondo State as punishment for union activities, the defendant submitted that it is not within the right of the claimant or any worker of the defendant to insist on or determine the branch of the defendant where he or she will work. The defendant even stressed that the right to transfer an employee from one department to another or from one part of an establishment to another or from one branch to another is the prerogative of the employer and the consent of the employee is not required in the exercise of such prerogative. The unfortunate thing is that the defendant made this submission without any supporting authority even when he prefaced it with the refrain: “…the law on transfer of employees is well settled”. I agree that in general it is not for an employee to determine where he is to work; and that transfers may be justified. But in appropriate cases, transfers may be unjustified; and the law frowns on such especially where they are punitive or mala fide as where the transfer is a product of and a punishment for trade activities or to distrust trade union activities or to harass the employee. See generally Chapter 3 on “Unjustified Transfers” of H. L. Kumar’s Transfers of Employees Under Labour Laws (Universal Law Publishing Co. Put. Ltd: Delhi), 2005, 3rd Edition. The question for present purposes is whether in the instant case the claimant has made a case for any of these to make the transfer he complains of unjustified. 65. The defendant had submitted that assuming that the allegation of the claimant that the defendant demobilized his computer system and passwords is true, the implication of that is that the claimant was unable to work; and that the claimant did not allege that he was not paid salary for the period his computer system and passwords were demobilized. This argument of the defendant assumes that demobilization of the claimant’s computer thus making the claimant not to be able to work is immaterial as the claimant’s salary was not stopped. The argument is not only patronizing but also laughable as the defendant seems to forget that employee rights are not just about salary alone but include the right to work itself. The International Labour Organization’s (ILO’s) concept of decent work is not just about salary but includes the content and decency of the work itself. It is from this that the notion of dignity of labour derives. An employer cannot treat an employee shabbily and turn around to justify same by merely arguing that salary was not thereby stopped. Such an employer should not expect a pat on the back from this Court. Accordingly, the submission of the defendant in this regard is unsustainable. It reveals the defendant’s ignorance, as an employer, of what today’s labour law is all about. The defendant’s submission is accordingly rejected. I so hold. 66. The defendant had submitted that the law does not require that an employer to confer any recognition on a union; the only requirement being an employer to deduct and remit the union dues of its staff to the union the staff subscribes to. Even the logic of the defendant’s argument here is self-defeating; and again shows the ignorance of the defendant. Or is it a deliberate feigning of ignorance? The duty to deduct and remit check-off dues is inherent in the rule as to recognition. Deduction and remittance of check-off dues is only possible upon the recognition of a trade union by an employer. The defendant itself in paragraph 4.34 of its final written address submitted “that from the pleadings and evidence before the court the Claimant’s contention that the Defendant refused to recognise the Claimant’s union is untrue and incorrect”. Is this an instance of doublespeak? Here is an employer saying that the law does not require it to confer any recognition on the claimant’s union; yet is now saying the assertion by the claimant that the defendant refused to recognize the claimant’s union is untrue and incorrect. In paragraph 4.35 of the final written address, the defendant would even be categorical that it “recognise, related with, and negotiated with the Claimant’s union”; and in paragraph 4.40, that “there was never a time the Defendant did not recognise the Claimant’s union or that the union was proscribed by the Defendant”. 67. The argument of the defendant that nowhere in the letter of termination was it stated that the claimant was terminated because of his union activities is self patronizing and laughable. Is there an employer who would ever write that he is terminating an employee’s employment due to trade union activities? The claimant succinctly made this point, which I agree with. 68. I now turn to the key question: whether the claimant brought his case within the ambit of section 43 of the TDA and section 9(6)(b)(ii) of the Labour Act. This Court has long recognized that as a matter of principle there are two main instances where the courts generally order re-instatement. The first instance is where employment is statutory and the statutory process for disengagement was not followed; here re-instatement has always been ordered by the courts. The second is where a worker was disengaged for embarking on trade union activities. See Management of Dangote Industries Limited, Pasta Plant, Ebute Ikorodu, Lagos v. National Union of Food, Beverages & Tobacco Employees (NUFBTE) unreported Suit No. NIC/2/2008, the judgment of which was delivered on 28th January 2009, The Management of Nestle Nigeria Plc llupeju, Lagos State v. National Union of Food, Beverages and Tobacco employees [2009] 15 NLLR (Pt. 40) 42 at 76 - 77, National Union of Food, Beverages and Tobacco Employees v. Cocoa Industries Ltd, Ikeja [2005] 3 NLLR (Pt. 8) page 206, Mix and Bake Flour Mill Industries Ltd v. National Union of Food, Beverages and Tobacco Employees [2004] 1 NLLR (Pt. 2) page 247, Chemical and Non-metallic Products Senior Staff Association v. Benue Cement Co. Plc [2005] 2 NLLR (Pt. 6) 446 and Hotel & Personnel Services Senior Staff Association v. Owena Hotels Ltd, Åkure [2005] 3 NLLR (Pt. 7) 163. 69. For the claimant to succeed in the instant case, he must bring his case within the ambit of section 43 of the TDA and section 9(6)(b)(ii) of the Labour Act. There is no problem with section 43 of the TDA because the termination of the claimant’s employment is tantamount to lock-out since thereby he cannot report to work. The issue is with section 9(6)(b)(ii) of the Labour Act, which requires that for the trade union activities of the claimant to be lawful and valid, for which the defendant can be held liable, it must have been carried out outside working hours or if carried out within office hours, with consent of the defendant. Exhibit C20 dated 12th November 2012 is letter from the claimant as Unit General Secretary to the defendant referring to a request to close work at 4pm to enable the union receive the National Officers of the union in general congress, which request was turned down - to which the claimant then informed the defendant that the union was, however, willing too meet after close of work. Section 9(6) of the Labour Act allows union activities so long as they outside working hours. So by Exhibit C20, the claimant acted within the law when he indicated to the defendant that the union would meet after office hours. 70. The defendant’s reaction, however, was Exhibit C21 dated 8th November 2012, wherein the defendant told the claimant that his union has no permission to meet “whatsoever, no matter the time, anywhere within the premises at No. 2, Burma Road, Apapa, Lagos”. Here is a defendant who submitted that it recognized the claimant’s union first saying in Exhibit C21 that it is not bound to recognize ASSBIFI as a trade union until all issues are clarified. This is where the defendant crossed the line and infringed on the claimant’s trade union rights. The defendant cannot stop the claimant and his members from meeting outside of office hours. Section 9(6)(b)(ii) of the Labour Act did not talk of premises of the employer, only about employer’s hours of work. I have no doubt in my mind that the defendant breached the trade union rights of the claimant in terms of section 43 of the TDA and section 9(6)(b)(ii) of the Labour Act. I so find and hold. 71. This Court has always held termination on grounds of trade union activities to be an act of unfair labour practice not just because it infringes ILO injunctions as to freedom of association in terms of the requisite Conventions 87 and 98, but also because it infringes on the constitutional guarantees as to freedom of association as provided under section 40 of the 1999 Constitution. I have no doubt whatsoever that the action of the defendant in this matter was accordingly an unfair labour practice. I so find and hold. The claimant is accordingly entitled to be reinstated to his work without loss of salary and other perquisites of his office. The length of time he has been away from work is immaterial in this regard as this Court has ordered reinstatement even when the employee stayed away from work for a much longer period. See The Management of Nestle Nigeria Plc llupeju, Lagos State v. National Union of Food, Beverages and Tobacco employees [2009] 15 NLLR (Pt. 40) 42. 72. On the whole, I find for the claimant. His case accordingly succeeds but only in terms of reliefs (a), (b) and (c). Relief (e) has already been discarded; and relief (d) is encapsulated in relief (c). In any event, as per relief (d), the claimant did not tell this Court the quantum of salaries and allowances that he wants this Court to order payment of. So that specific order cannot be made. Accordingly, I make the following declarations and order: (1) It is declared that the purported determination of the employment of the claimant in the defendant by a letter of termination dated the 20th of February 2014 issued to the claimant by the defendant was done in persecution of the claimant on account of his trade union activities with the Association of Senior Staff of Banks, Insurance and other Financial Institutions (ASSBIFI) in the defendant’s unit and is therefore illegal, unconstitutional, null and void and of no effect whatsoever. (2) It is declared that it is unfair labour practice for the employment of the claimant, who is a member of the Executive of the Association of Senior Staff of Banks, Insurance and other Financial Institutions (ASSBIFI) in the defendant’s unit, to be terminated for trade union activities. (3) The defendant is hereby ordered to reinstate forthwith the claimant to his post in the defendant forthwith without any loss as to seniority, salaries, position and other emoluments. 73. Judgment is entered accordingly. I make no order as to cost. …………………………………… Hon. Justice B. B. Kanyip, PhD