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RULING. This deals with ruling in respect of two motions, one of the rulings filed by the Defendant and the second filed by the Claimant. The First Motion on Notice. Upon being served with the originating processes commencing this suit, the Defendant after entering a conditional appearance, vide motion on notice dated 7/2/18 and filed on the same day, is praying for an order of this Honourable Court setting aside the originating processes i.e the complaint (AND/OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE), setting aside the service of the Claimant’s originating process on the Defendant) for being improper, incompetent and failure to comply with the extant provisions of the Sherriff and Civil Process Act; The grounds for this application are as follows:- 1. The Claimant instituted the instant suit by a complaint filed on 16th November 2018 at the Registry of this Court. 2. The Defendant’s address for service on the complaint as endorsed thereon by the Claimant is as follows: Standard Alliance, Plc Providence Street, Lekki Scheme 1, Lagos, Lagos State. 3. The Defendant was served with the complaint and originating processes at the aforesaid address endorsed for service by the claimant viz: Standard Alliance Insurance Plc, Providence Street, Lekki Scheme 1, Lagos, Lagos State in November 2017. 4. The complaint however is not properly endorsed with the mandatory endorsement as required under section 97 of the Sheriff and Civil Process Act, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria. 5. Failure to endorse the complaint with the mandatory endorsement is fatal to these proceedings, being an issue of substantive law. 6. It is in the interest of justice for the Honourable Court to entertain the instant application and grant the relief(s) sought by the instant application. The application was brought pursuant to Order 17 of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria, (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2017, section 97 of the Sheriff and Civil Process Act, and under the inherent jurisdiction of the Court. The application is supported by a 7 paragraphs affidavit sworn to by one Friday John, a Litigation Assistant in the law firm of the Counsel representing the Defendant/Applicant. In compliance with the Rules of this Court a written address was filed along with the motion on notice. Oluwaseun Ben-Omotehinse, Esq; Counsel for the Defendant/Applicant/Respondent in making oral submissions before the Court relied on all the paragraphs of the affidavit in support of the motion on notice. Counsel also adopted the written address as his argument. In the written address Counsel submitted lone issue for determination, to wit: ‘‘Whether the reliefs sought in the instant application ought to be granted by the Honourable Court’’. ARGUMENT. In arguing the issue for determination, Counsel submitted that the Claimant/Respondent/Applicant has failed to comply with provisions of section 97 of Sheriff and Civil Process Act, which is an existing and substantive law and which takes effect as law enacted by the Federal Legislature applicable to Courts established by the Constitution or the National Assembly. Counsel submitted that this law is applicable to all High Courts and Courts of Coordinate jurisdiction to the High Court, which includes this Honourable Court. It is the submission of Counsel that the complaint was issued at Federal Capital territory meant for service at Lagos outside the federal Capital territory, Abuja, the complaint ought to comply with mandatory provisions of section 97 of the Sheriff and Civil Process Act. It is the submission of Counsel that there is consensus of judicial opinions that failure to comply with the provision of section 97 of Sheriff and Civil Process Act renders the writ commencing the action void, and the Defendant who complains of such non-compliance is entitled to ex-debito justiae to have same set aside. On this submission Counsel relied on the cases of OWNERS OF MV ‘ARABELLA’ V NAIC (2008) ALL FWLR (PT.443) 1208 @ 1229 and DREXEL ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES LIMITED & ORS. V T. I. B. LTD (2009) ALL FWLR (Pt.456) 1823 @ 1850. It is the contention of Counsel that the failure to endorse the complaint in line with section 97 of the Sheriff and Civil Process Act, which is fundamental statutory prescription renders the instant proceedings incompetent. Counsel urged the Court to grant the application. RESPONSE BY THE CLAIMANT/RESPONDENT/APPLICANT. In reaction to this application the Claimant/Respondent/Applicant, filed a 10 paragraphs counter-affidavit deposed to by the Claimant himself. The counter-affidavit was accompanied with a written address. Ani Remigius, Esq; Counsel for the Claimant/Respondent/Applicant in his oral adumbration before the Court place reliance on the entire averments contained in the counter-affidavit. Counsel also adopted the written address as his argument. In the written address Counsel distilled three issues for determination, to wit: 1. ‘‘Whether Lagos State is an ‘‘out of jurisdiction’’ within the meaning of the Rules of this Honourable Court under which the complaint in this case was issued and served on the Defendant’’. 2. ‘‘Whether the Sheriff and Civil Process Act operates independently of and/or above the Rules of this Honourable Court with respect to the issue and service of processes of the Court’’. 3. ‘‘Whether Section 97 of the Sheriff and Civil Process Act applies to the National Industrial Court of Nigeria, or to Courts of states and Federal Capital Territory’’. ARGUMENT ISSUE ONE In arguing issue one, Counsel submitted that Lagos State is not an out of jurisdiction within the meaning and intendment of the Rules of this Court under which the complaint in this case was issued and served on the Defendant. Counsel referred to Order 1 Rule 10(2) of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria, (Civil Procedure) Rules 2017 and submitted that ‘‘out of jurisdiction’’ means ‘out of the Federal Republic of Nigeria’’. It is also submitted that under the same Rule within jurisdiction means ‘‘within the Federal Republic of Nigeria’’. Counsel submitted that by the interpretation of this Rule Lagos State is not out of jurisdiction within the meaning and intendment of the Rules of this Honourable Court under which the complaint in this case was issued and served on the Defendant. Counsel further submitted same Rule 10(2) of Order 1 of the Rules of this Court clearly state that all judicial divisions of the Court shall be one for the purpose of instituting, commencing and proceeding on any matter within the jurisdiction of the Court’’. Counsel submitted with the express provisions of the Rules of this Court Lagos State is not out of Jurisdiction of this Court as to warrant making endorsement required by section 97 of the Sheriff and Civil Process Act. Counsel submitted the cases of THE OWNERS OF MV ARABELLA (Supra) and DREXEL ENERGY RESOURCES LTD (Supra) relied by the Defendant to call for setting aside complaint and/or service of complaint on the defendant on the ground on non-endorsement is misconceived. Counsel contended that the two cases relied on by the Defendant are distinguishable with the present case because the rules of Court considered in those cases are not same with the rules of this Court. Counsel submitted that in the case of THE OWNERS OF MV ARABELLA (Supra) the Supreme Court applied section 97 of Sheriff and Civil Process Act after finding that there was non-compliance with Order 10 Rule 14 of the Federal High Court. The same with DREXEL Case (supra) the Supreme Court considered Order 5 Rule 6 of Oyo State High Court Civil Procedure Rules which requires leave to issue writ of summons. Counsel submitted the above scenarios are not same as in the case at hand. ISSUE TWO In arguing issue two, Counsel submitted that Sheriff and Civil Process Act does not operate independently of and/or above the Rules of this Honourable Court with respect to the issue and service of processes of the Court. Counsel submitted that Sheriff and Civil Process Act as can be seen from the long title does not apply to the Courts throughout Nigeria. Counsel referred to section 94(e), (f) and (g) of the Sheriff and Civil Process Act, which provides (inter alia) as follows:- ‘‘…. The Chief Judge of the Federal Capital Territory Abuja, with the approval of the President, and the Chief Judge of a State, with the approval of the Governor, may make rules of Court in respect of any or all of the following matters; (e) the conditions precedent to the issue of any process; (f) the issue of process to or against any person or class of persons; (g) anything to be done by any person in respect of the issue or execution of process…’’. Counsel contended that from the above provisions, it follows that where the Act applies to National Industrial Court of Nigeria, NICN, the President of NICN can make rules of court in respect of the said above enumerated matters of issuance of processes. Counsel also contended the National Industrial Court of Nigeria (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2017, in which president of the Court has made provisions in respect of matters of the condition precedent to the issue of any of the Court processes, the issue of the processes to or against any person or class of persons and/or anything to be done by any person in respect of the issue or execution of processes of the Court, is effective and/or applicable under the said provisions of section 94 (e), (f) and (g) of the Sheriff and Civil Process Act. Counsel further submitted that section 96(2) of the Sheriff and Civil Process Act, made service of writ of summons subject to rules of court that issued the writ. Thereby placing rules of over and above the Act, in determining how service should be effected out of jurisdiction. Counsel submitted that service of complaint is subject to rules of court, thereby making the rules above the Act. ISSUE THREE It is submitted by Counsel that section 97 of Sheriff and Civil Process Act does not apply to the National Industrial Court rather it applies to Courts of States and Federal Capital Territory. It is also submitted that from the heading of the Part VII of the Sheriff and Civil Process Act, under which section 97 of the Act is provided, would show clearly that the entire said Part VII of the Act applies solely to Courts of States and Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, the said heading reads:- PART VII ‘‘Service of process and enforcement of judgments of the Courts of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja and the States throughout Nigeria …’’. Counsel also submitted that section 97 of the Sheriff and Civil Process Act does not have a blanket application and does not apply absolutely to every Court in Nigeria, hence the section itself clearly limited its application, it provides: Section 97 ‘‘Every writ of summons for service under this part out of the State or Capital Territory in which it was issued …’’ It is contended by Counsel that it is clear that Part VII applies to service and enforcement judgments of the Courts of the Federal Capital Territory Abuja and of the States, this means it does not apply to this Court which has the whole Country as its jurisdiction. Counsel also submitted that section 97 applies to writ of summons and not complaint. Counsel also referred to Order 1 Rule 10(2) of the Rules of this Court on the meaning of ‘out of jurisdiction’ which means out of Federal Republic of Nigeria’. Counsel also submitted that the affidavit in support of the motion on notice is fundamentally defective having been altered in fresh ink without any attestation of the alteration at all by the Commissioner for oaths, counsel referred to paragraph 3 of the affidavit. It is submitted that there is no valid alteration to the affidavit in support of the application. Counsel relied on section 117(2) of the Evidence Act 2011. It is also submitted that by the mandatory provisions of Order 17 Rules 5 of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria, (Civil Procedure) Rules 2017, every motion shall be supported by an affidavit setting out the facts upon which the application is made. Counsel urged the Court pursuant to section 114 of the Evidence Act to reject the affidavit for having not been re-sworn before Commissioner for Oaths. It is the submission of Counsel that the objection of the Defendant on endorsement falls within the realm of technicality. Counsel submitted that the law is settled as our courts have long moved beyond the old era of technicality. Counsel urged the Court to do substantial justice in this case as against the myopic technicality which the Defendant is harping on. On this Counsel relied on INAKOJU V ADELEKE (supra). REPLY ON POINTS OF LAW The Defendant filed further and better affidavit and a written reply on points of law. In the reply on points of law, Counsel submitted that the submission of Counsel for the Claimant to the effect that the country is one jurisdiction when it comes to National Industrial Court of Nigeria, is grossly misconceived on many fronts as the applicant shall espouse. Counsel contended that the law emphasises that every writ of summons for service out of a state or the capital territory shall have endorsed thereon a notice to the following effect, ‘this summons (or as the case may be) is to be served out of the …….. State (or as the case may be) is to be served out of the ………… state (or as the case may be) is to be served out of the (or as the case may be) and in the ………………….. State (or as the case may be). Counsel submitted that the issue of within or out of jurisdiction is completely irrelevant to the current issues placed before the Court. It is also submitted that the distinguishing of cases relied on by the Applicant by the Claimant goes to no issue. Counsel submitted any service without endorsement provided for by section 97 is not mere irregularity. Counsel submitted that the current National Industrial Court of Nigeria, (Civil Procedure) Rules 2017, have not abolish, excuse or waive and in fact cannot, abolish, excuse or waive compliance with the mandatory provisions of section 97. On submission that the Sheriff and Civil Process Act does not operate independently of and/or above National Industrial Court of Nigeria, (Civil Procedure) Rules 2017, Counsel submitted that section 94 and 96 deals with service which section 97 deals with mandatory endorsement of writ when such writ is to be served outside the state of issue. The rules of court do not deal with this and cannot excuse this. Counsel submitted that the construction of section 96(2) cannot subject section 97, it is the contention of Counsel that Rules of Court are inferior to statute, if there is conflict between Rules and statute, statute prevail. On the submission that Sheriff and Civil Process Act, does not apply to the National Industrial Court of Nigeria, but rather to the High Courts and High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, Counsel submitted that the National Industrial Court of Nigeria, is a Court whose jurisdiction covers and extends to all the federating States including the Federal Capital Territory. In the same vein, the Federal High Court is Court of similar status with the National Industrial Court of Nigeria, in the sense that the Federal High Court’s Territorial jurisdiction is the entire federation of Nigeria. In view of this and extrapolating settled precedents dealing with the Federal High Court to the instant case involving National Industrial Court of Nigeria, it would become apparent that indeed section 97 is applicable to this Court, since the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court have all held that section 97 applies to Federal High Court, there is no reason why the section should not apply to this Court On technicality, counsel submitted that the claimant is only drifting from the substance. Counsel submitted failure to comply with clear statutory provisions cannot be put down as technicality. Such non-compliance is a breach of law which must be meted with consequences FIRST BANK OF NIG. V MAIWADA (2013) 5 NWLR (Pt.1348) 444. The Second Motion by the Claimant. Vide motion on notice dated 28/3/18 and filed on the same day, brought pursuant to Order 5 Rule 1, Order 17 Rule 1 and Order 26 Rule 1, 2 & 9 of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria, (Civil Procedure) Rules 2017, Section 97 of the Sheriff and Civil Process Act, Section 36(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and under the inherent jurisdiction of the Court, the Claimant Is praying for:- 1. An order of this Honourable Court granting leave to the Claimant/Applicant to amend the Complaint in this case by deleting the Defendant’s alternate address thereon to wit or No. 5, Danbatta close Opposite Eco Bank Plc, Area 7 Garki, Abuja. 2. An order of this Honourable Court granting leave to the Claimant/Applicant to amend the complaint in this case by inserting the new words ‘‘Amended Complaint’’ and the endorsement ‘This Amended Complaint is to be served out of the federal Capital Territory Abuja and in the Lagos State’ all in the manner disclosed and/or appearing on the Proposed Amended Complaint attached to the affidavit in support of this application exhibit ‘1’. 3. And for such further order or orders as this Honourable Court may deem fit to make in the circumstances of this case. The application is supported by a 10 paragraphs affidavit and a written address. Ani Remigius, Esq; Counsel for the Claimant in advancing oral argument in support of this application relied on all the averments contained in the affidavit in support. Counsel also adopted the written address as his argument for the application. In the written address Counsel identified single issue for determination, to wit: ‘‘Whether it is in the interest of justice and fair hearing to grant this application’’. Counsel submitted that it is in the interest of justice and fair hearing to grant this application. Counsel referred to Order 26 Rules 1, 2 and 9 of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria, (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2017 and submitted that a party may at any time but not more than twice with leave of Court alter, amend or modify the parties Originating and/or other processes. Counsel relied on THE SHELL PETROLEUM DEVELOPMENT COMPANY OF NIGER IA LIMITED V KWAMEH AMBAH (1999) 3 NWLR (Pt.593) 1, where it was held by the Supreme Court that amendment can be granted at any stage of proceedings provided it does not introduce a new cause of action or will over-reach or is prejudicial to the other party. Counsel also relied on the case of CHIEF EMMANUEL EYO ITA AND ANOR. VS ELDER CHIEF OKON H. A. DAZIA (2013) ALL FWLR (Pt.683) 1880. Counsel submitted that this is an application which this Honourable Court ought to grant in the interest of justice as the amendment sought would facilitate the hearing of this case without injustice to the Defendant/Respondent and without calling of additional evidence or the changing of the character of this case. Moreover, there is no prejudice or injustice that can be said to result from the amendment sought as the Defendant/Respondent is not over-reached in any way whatsoever. Counsel submitted that mistake of Counsel should not be visited on his client. It is also submitted that by the provisions of Order 5 Rule 1 of the Rules of this Court a failure to comply with any of the rules of Court may be treated as irregularity and the court may give any directives as it thinks fit. Counsel urged the Court to grant application in the interest of justice. In reaction to this application the Defendant filed a 5 paragraphs affidavit and a written address. Counsel adopted the written address as his argument. A lone issue was formulated for determination, to wit: ‘‘Whether the Honourable Court can grant the reliefs sought in the instant application’’. In arguing the issue for determination, Counsel submitted that on proper examination of the extant laws and judicial decisions, this application is misconceived and ought not to be granted as there is nothing empowering the Court to grant the reliefs sought in the application. According to Counsel what the Applicant is asking the court to do is to put something on nothing, and expect it to stand, that would definitely be standing the law on its head. Counsel submitted that the Applicant has in the affidavit in support admitted non-compliance with the provisions of section 97 of the Sheriff and Civil Process Act, hence the instant application. According to counsel the effect is that the said complaint issued in violation of the relevant laws is void and a nullity. Counsel relied on SKENCONSULT NIG. LTD V SECODY UKEY (1981) 1 SC. Counsel also submitted the amendment is in capable of curing the defect in this proceedings. Counsel relied on ADETONA V OBAOKU & ORS. (2016) LPELR-41931 (CA). Once a process is invalid, no amount of ingenuity by way of amendment can be employed to save it. Similarly, in NWAIGWE V OKERE (2008) ALL FWLR (PT.431) 843, it was held a fundamentally defective document such as a notice of appeal, so as to infuse life into it. It cannot be cured by any amendment. Counsel submitted that Applicant should not be allowed to come through the back door to effect amendment. Counsel urged the Court to refuse the application. COURT’S DECISION I have carefully and painstakingly perused the content of the two motions, as well as the affidavits in support and the counter-affidavits filed in opposition to the two motions on notice. I have equally read the written addresses of Counsel for both sides and listened to oral submissions of Counsel for and against the grant of the two applications before the Court. In my view two issue arises for determination in respect of the two motions on notice. The two issues calling for resolution are: 1. ‘‘Whether or not the provisions of sections 97 of the Sheriff and Civil Process Act can operate to deny this Court competence to entertain this suit’’ 2. ‘’Whether the Claimant’s application for amendment is grantable’’. RESOLUTION OF ISSUE ONE In his submission before the Court as well as contained in the written Address, Oluwaseun Ben-Omotehinse, Esq; Counsel for the Applicant contended that the complaint before the court has been rendered void and liable to be set aside due to non-compliance to have endorsement in line with sections 97 of the Sheriff and Civil process Act. Counsel contended that the provisions are mandatory. Non-compliance has rendered the Complaint in competent and deprived this Court of jurisdiction to entertain same. While Ani Remigius, Esq; Counsel for the Claimant contended that the provisions of sections 97 of the Sheriff and Civil Process Act, are not applicable in this case. Counsel insisted that this Court has jurisdiction throughout the Federation, consequently, section 21 of the National Industrial Court Act, 2006 has created this Court with jurisdiction throughout the federation. Consequently, the complaint issued for service in Lagos was in order. Lagos is not outside jurisdiction. Counsel also contended that all judicial Divisions of the Court shall be one for purpose of instituting or commencing proceeding on any matter within the jurisdiction of the court. It is also contended that section 97 of Sheriff and Civil Process Act, does not apply to National Industrial Court of Nigeria, rather the section applies to Court of State and Federal Capital Territory, Abuja. With the position taken by Counsel for both parties, the issue for determination by the Court has been Zeroed down to the issue of whether the National Industrial Court of Nigeria is one of the Courts cognizable to apply the provisions of section 97 of the Sheriff and Civil Process Act. This can be ascertained by proper interpretation of the word ‘‘Court’’ envisaged by the Sheriff and Civil Process Act. To this end I turn to the meaning given to the word ‘Court’ in the Sheriff and Civil Process Act. Therefore, the starting point in resolution of this issue is to look at the interpretation as provided in the Act itself, to see to which Court the Act applies. What comes to mind are sections 2 and 19 of the Sheriff and Civil Process Act, which are relevant in resolving the issue? In section 2 the word ‘court’ is defined in the section to include ‘a High Court and a Magistrate Court’’. The definition given of the word ‘‘Court’’ is very clear and unambiguous. In interpretation, it is well settled principle of construction of statutes that where a section names specific things among many others possible alternatives, the intention is that those not named are not intended to be included. This is expressed in latin maxim ‘Expression uniius est exclusion alterius’. See AG BENDEL STATE V AIDEYAN ((1989) 4 NWLR (PT.646). the express mention of one thing in a statutory provision automatically excludes any other which otherwise would have applied by implication with regard to the same issue. See also MILITARY GOVERNOR ONDO STATE V ADEWUNMI (1988) 3 NWLR (Pt.82) 280. It is clear the unambiguous provision of section 2 of the Sheriff and Civil Process Act has recognized High Courts and Magistrates Court as the Courts to which the entire provisions of the Act applies to. To bring the National Industrial Court of Nigeria within the definition given by section 2 of the Sheriff and Civil Process Act will do violence to the section and Court are enjoined not impute or expand the provisions of a statute which is not part of the Court function. That will amount to legislation or amendment of law that is within the province of the Legislature, it should be left to the legislature alone. The Court’s function is only to declare and expound the law. It is well established principle of interpretation of statutes, and indeed the Constitution that where the definition section, therein has defined a particular word or expression, the meaning so given to the word, unless the context otherwise requires, shall be used throughout that statute. KALU V ODILI (1992) NWLR (Pt.340), OLARENWAJU V GOVERNOR OYO STATE (1992) NWLR (Pt.265) 335. It is pertinent to point out here that section 19(1) of the Sheriff and Civil Process Act also defined ‘’court’’ to includes the High Court and a Magistrate’s Court’’. In the same section ‘’the High Court’’ means the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory Abuja or of the State. It is without any doubt that the interpretation of the word ‘’Court’’ as given in sections 2 and 19(1) of the Sheriff and other Process Act does not include National Industrial Court of Nigeria. This view is strengthened when the caption of the heading of Part VII of the Sheriff and Civil Process Act, which read; ‘‘Service of the Process and Enforcement of the Judgments of the Courts of the Federal Capital Territory Abuja and the States throughout Nigeria’’. This heading under which the provisions of sections 97 of the Sheriff and Civil Process Act, was provided clearly and unambiguously, shows that the provisions were meant to apply to Courts of the Federal Capital Territory and State High Courts. The application of the provisions of sections 97 of the Sheriff and Civil Process Act does not extend to the National Industrial Court of Nigeria, having regard to the NICN’s territorial Jurisdiction which is throughout the Federation. To buttress this point a State High Court is suffixed by the particular state where it is situated, e.g. High Court of Kaduna State, High Court of Imo State etc. while the National Industrial Court of Nigeria is suffixed by the entity ‘Nigeria’ thus, why it is called National Industrial Court of Nigeria. See also 254A, of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, (as amended). To this extent the provisions of the Sheriff and Civil Process Act is not intended by the legislature to apply to National Industrial Court of Nigeria, in view of the Court’s federal territorial jurisdiction. See ONAGORUWA V ADENIJI (1993) 5 NWLR (PT.293)317 @ 334-335. The Defendants Counsel place heavy reliance on the case of OWNERS OF MV ARABELLA V NAIC (supra) and that of DREXEL ENERGY RESOURCES LTD (supra) in pressing for this Court to hold that the provisions of sections 97 of the Sheriff and Civil Process Act, applies to this case. I agree with learned Counsel for the Defendants that the doctrine of stare decisis require this Court to be bound by the decisions of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeal, respectively. This a duty imposed without discretion. In fact I am bound by these decisions. But, in the case at hand the two cases are distinguishable with this case, in that in those cases it was the Federal High Court Rules 2000 and those of the Oyo State High Court that were considered along with provisions of Sheriff and Civil Process Act. It is to be noted here that the Rules of Court considered in the two cases are not the same with the Rules applicable to this Court. By order 7 Rule 15(1) of the National Industrial Court (Civil Procedure) Rules 2017, the Court has one jurisdiction throughout the Federal Republic of Nigeria and the judicial Divisions were created only for adjudicatory and administrative convenience, to ease access to the Court. Consequently, any originating process issued by the Court can be served on any party anywhere in Nigeria. The provisions of Order 7 Rule 15(1) & (2) of the Rules of this Court were made to compliment the provisions of section 21(1) of the National Industrial Court Act 2017. It is pertinent to refer to Order 7 Rule 16, which provides that all originating processes or other processes filed by any party before the Court which are to be served on any other party outside the Federal Republic of Nigeria shall be with leave of the Court. From the provisions of this Rule it is undoubtedly clear that that the phrase ‘‘out of jurisdiction’’ means out of Nigeria not out of Division in a State where processes were issued. This also affirmed the position that the Court has one jurisdiction that is the whole Federation. To maintain that a process issued out from one Division of the Court for service on a party at another State within Nigeria must comply with the provisions of section 97 of the Sheriff and Civil Process Act is akin to insisting that an originating process issued from one Division of a State High Court meant for service on a party in another Division of the same High Court within the same State must also comply with the provisions of sections 97 of the Sheriff and Civil Process Act. It is also clear that the Supreme Court in the above cases being relied by the Applicants, the provision of section 21 of the National Industrial Court Act 2006, was never in issue nor was it considered. The provision of section 21 is a special provision peculiar to the National Industrial Court of Nigeria. Furthermore, the National Industrial Court Act is latter statute enacted by the National Assembly to delineate the entire country to serve as the territorial area of jurisdiction of this Court. Consequently, it supersedes the provisions of Sheriff and Civil Process Act in so far as it is valid in respect of National Industrial Court of Nigeria. Therefore, I have no doubt in my mind that the two cases in which provisions of sections 97 of the Sheriff and Civil Process Act were considered by the Supre e Court are not applicable to this case, since the definition section of Sheriff and Civil Process Act did not contemplate or include the National Industrial Court of Nigeria. Furthermore section 21 of the National Industrial Court Act which deals with territorial jurisdiction of the National Industrial Court was never considered in those cases. See also ONAGORUWA V ADENIJI (1993) 5 NWLR (PT.293)317 @ 334-335, where Tobi, JCA (of blessed memory, as he then was) extensively consider the definition of the word ‘court’ in the Sheriff and Civil Process Act. RESOLUTION OF ISSUE TWO Due to the nature of the issue raised under issues two, resolution of the issue will depend on the resolution of issue one. That is to say resolution of issue one will determine the way issue two will be resolved. Having held that section 97 of Sheriff and Civil Process Act is not applicable to this case, the question to be determine by this application has been over taken by event the issue has become moot and academic. Courts are established to try live issues and never to engage in academic discourse. Since this Court has held that section 97 of the Sheriff and Civil Process Act is not applicable this means that the application for amendment to insert endorsement required by section 97 has no basis, It has become otiose. In view of the reasons advanced above, I hold that section 97 does not apply to this case. In the circumstance, the Defendant’s application is hereby refused and same dismissed for lacking in merit. Likewise the Claimant’s application for amendment is discountenanced for being an academic exercise. Sanusi Kado, Judge.