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The claims of the claimant as per the complaint, statement of facts and the accompanying originating processes (list of witnesses, written statement on oath of the claimant, list of documents and copies of the documents), all filed in this Court on 11th June 2014, are for the following reliefs – 1. A Declaration that the purported termination of the employment of the claimant is illegal, null, void and of no effect as the said termination was done without following due process/procedures laid down in Defendant Bank’s Handbook and the Collective Agreement in terminating an employee’s employment. 2. An Order of this Honourable Court compelling the Defendant Bank to reinstate the claimant to its employment which was terminated without due process/procedure laid down in the Defendant Bank’s Handbook and Collective Agreement. 3. An Order of this Honourable Court compelling the Defendant Bank to pay the salary and other allowances due to the claimant from the date of the purported termination to the date of judgment. 4. An Order that the Defendant pay the sum of N20,000,000 (Twenty Million Naira) to the claimant as damages for the emotional trauma and other setbacks suffered as a result of the purported termination of employment. 5. An Order that the Defendant pay to the claimant the sum of N5,000,000 (Five Million Naira) being the cost of litigating this matter. It is the claimant’s case that she was an employee of the defendant. She stated that she was employed by the defendant by virtue of an employment letter dated the 26th day of April, 1993 which she relies on in proof of her case. Claimant averred that she signed a contract of service drafted by the defendant in the defendant’s standard form upon resumption of duty. She went on to aver that this serves as the contract between her and the defendant together with the collective agreement in the industry which has been incorporated into the claimant’s contract of employment. That in the course of her employment with the defendant, she worked at several branches of the defendant including Oshodi branch where she worked as Head Teller Operations until 24th of June 2013 when she was transferred to Oil Estate Branch as Head of Customers’ Service. She continued that she was at the Oil Estate Branch before her dismissal from employment. To the claimant, the dismissal was wrongful and unlawful. That while she was still at the defendant’s Oshodi Branch as Head Teller Operations, on the 21st December 2012 and 2nd January, 2013, one Mr. Stephen Adekunle Oyafemi (Customer) a savings account holder came to the defendant bank to withdraw the sum of N200,000.00 and the sum of N250,000.00 respectively via a teller. She went on that the amount was paid to the said customer by one Mrs. Oluremi Adubiagbe Comfort, a teller in the defendant’s bank upon her authorisation of the transaction. She stated that she verified the signature of the customer as the true mandate and passport photograph on the said account was the true resemblance of the customer standing before it before she gave her authorisation to the transaction. Claimant went on to state that she received a memo via a mail from one Oni Kolade, Head of Operations of the Defendant Bank Branch at Oshodi on the 9th of July, 2013 stating that an investigation is being carried out on the two transactions stated above. She averred that the Head of Operations also demanded to know who she paid the monies to, measures taken to exercise care in the payment to avoid paying to the wrong person and whether Regis Cop Picture of the person was taken. Claimant stated that she replied the said memo accordingly via an e-mail dated 10th July, 2013 which she tendered as evidence. She pleaded that the regiscope camera was not used as at the date of the transaction because its usage has not been introduced to withdrawal from savings account by the account holder. According to her the memo which introduced the use of the said camera on withdrawals from savings account outside the domiciled branch was only issued on April, 2013 after the transactions. Moreover, the use of the regiscope camera is the duty of the paying teller or cashier and not hers which is in line with Volume 2 pages 22 to 25 of the defendant’s handbook. Claimant pleaded the photocopy of the said handbook and gave notice to produce the original to the defendant. Claimant averred that she had never worked at the customer’s branch before nor the defendant’s signature sever. Claimant further stated that on the 8th of January, 2013, one Mr. Okachi Philips, Head of Operations at Tinubu Branch of the bank sent a report via a mail titled “Preliminary Report on fraudulent withdrawals from account Oyafemi Stephen Adekunle''. That on the 13th day of October, 2013, she travelled to the United States for her annual leave only for her to resume work on 14th of November, 2013 to discover that the defendant bank through its Head of Human Resources issued her a letter of termination of employment dated 24th October, 2013. Claimant stated that she then wrote a letter of appeal to the defendant bank through its Head of Human Resources on the 3rd of December, 2011 against her termination. She went further to aver that the defendant bank replied her letter on the 11th day of December, 2013 wherein it was stated that her appeal was time barred and as such cannot be considered. Claimant stated that she caused a letter dated 7th of April, 2014 to be written through her solicitor for the review of her case and therewith attached a fresh letter of appeal. No reply was however made by the defendant. Continuing, claimant averred she had not been accused of any act of irregularity nor queried for the past 20 years since her working with the defendant. She stated that she had not been queried in line with Article 4 paragraphs (ii) a, b & c of the Collective Agreement between the Nigeria Employees’ Association of Banks, Insurance and Allied Institution (NEABIAI) and the Association of Senior Staff of Banks, Insurance and Financial Institutions (ASSBIFI) and the Defendant Bank. Also, that by virtue of Volume 4, page 21 of the defendant’s handbook captioned ‘Contract of Service’ every member of staff is mandated to sign a contract of service agreement and is bound by the conditions thereof in addition to the provision of relevant Collective Agreement. She contends that having exercised diligence in carrying out her duties, to the claimant, the defendant acted in bad faith in the termination of her employment coupled with the fact that she was not granted a fair hearing and that the defendant did not act in accordance with its Handbook and Collective Agreement. Claimant also averred that termination of employment in the financial sector carries a consequential effect of not securing another job in that sector in future. She stated that this bar is in line with the Central Bank of Nigeria Circular No. BSD/3/2004 and dated 16th July, 2004. Claimant therefore stated that the termination of her appointment had caused her untold hardship, since her salary is the only source of her livelihood and that of her dependants. At trial, the Claimant testified for herself as CW and her testimony is as stated in her Witness Statement on Oath. She adopted the facts therein which are in tandem with her Statement of Facts and documents tendered and admitted as exhibits RS1-RS11. The claimant under cross-examination stated that her appointment was terminated on the ground that her services was no longer needed. She added that she has received one month salary in lieu of notice and her gratuity. Also, that she admitted also that she signed a contract of service with the defendant. Defendant tendered the contract of service in evidence through the claimant and same was marked as Exhibit RS12. The defendant in the course of the trial amended its statement of defence and filed same on 10th of April, 2015 while admitting Paragraphs 2, 4, 6, 7, 10, 11, 12, 13, 16 and 17 of the claimant’s statement of facts. The defendant averred that the claimant was offered employment with the defendant via a letter dated 26/04/1993. That the claimant however resumed duty on 12/07/1993 which is the effective date of her employment. The defendant stated that the claimant remains the same person as Rekiat Bukola Akinboro as contained in the contract of service agreement between her and the defendant. Defendant stated further that the claimant’s appointment was not wrongfully terminated but rather she got dismissed because her services were no longer required. Continuing in its averments, the defendant stated that by virtue of Clause 7 of the said Contract of Service, either party can determine the Contract of Service by giving to the other party a month notice or one month salary in lieu of notice. In line with this provision, the defendant averred that it paid to the claimant one month salary in lieu of notice and gratuity. The defendant went further to aver that the memo dated 9th July, 2013 via mail from one Oni Kolade, Head of Operations of the defendant bank branch, Oshodi as stated in the claimant’s statement of fact was issued based on the directives from the internal audit department of the defendant. That the directive was given in the course of its investigation into the alleged fraud. The defendant stated that it had no knowledge of the claimant’s trip to the United States as it approved the claimant’s annual leave for the year 2013 to commence on 14/10/2013 and to terminate on 18/11/2013. The defendant in its statement of defence confirmed that the claimant was issued a termination of employment letter which was in line with her contract of service. Defendant further reiterated that the claimant’s employment was not terminated as a result of her reply to the stated memo above nor because of the outcome of the investigation of the fraudulent deduction from one of its customer’s account but for the reason that her services were no longer required. The defendant averred that the claimant had up to one month from the date of termination of her appointment to appeal which she has failed to do. The defendant also stated that the claimant had been told the fate of her appeal via a letter written to the claimant dated 11/12/2013 in reply to her appeal. The defendant went further to state that Article 4 Paragraphs (ii) a, b and c of the Collective Agreement pleaded by the claimant in her statement of facts is inapplicable to the case at hand due to the reason stated for the termination of her appointment. That the claimant’s appointment was not terminated because of any complained act of misconduct. It is further the averment of the defendant that the alleged Collective Agreement pleaded by the claimant is not applicable to master/servant relationship and that the agreement and the defendant’s Handbook are not part of the claimant’s contract of service with the defendant and was not incorporated into the claimant’s contract of service. The defendant also stated that the Central Bank of Nigeria circular pleaded by the claimant does not in any way affect the claimant negatively as the said circular is applicable only to employees of banks whose employment had been terminated, dismissed or convicted on grounds of fraud or dishonesty. Defendant averred that the letter of termination issued to the claimant did not state that her appointment was terminated on the grounds of fraud, dishonesty or forgeries and that the claimant’s right to fair hearing has not in any way been breached. To the defendant, the claimant’s termination of employment has not deprived her of her entitlement to gratuity and Pension from her Pension Fund Administrator. The defendant in the light of the above stated facts therefore averred that the claimant is not entitled to any of the reliefs sought against the defendant and urged the court to dismiss the suit with substantial cost in favour of the defendant. That the suit is in bad faith, frivolous and an abuse of court process. The defendant on its part gave evidence through its Human Resources officer one Anthony Nsoro. Who adopted his written statement on oath as his evidence in this case which is on all fours with the facts contained in the defendant's amended statement of defence. The defendant tendered in evidence the defendant’s contract of service with same being marked as Exhibit AN and AN1. He stated under cross-examination that Exhibit RS1 (letter of offer of employment) that other contract of service of the claimant are as stated in the collective agreement and the contract of service Agreement. DW said he was not sure if the claimant was given any notice of variation. He also stated that the defendant did not discontinue the payment of gratuity to its employees in the year 2013 and that he had been in the employment of the defendant for only six years. The claimant subsequently filed a reply to the defendant’s amended statement of defence on the 27th of May 2015 wherein she admitted Paragraphs 2 and 4 of the defendant’s statement of defence. Claimant stated that she was employed by the defendant on the 26th day of April, 1993 and that her employment was wrongfully and unlawfully terminated on 24th October, 2013. Claimant went on to state that her termination of employment was done without due regard to the provisions of Article 4 (ii) (a), (b) and (c) of the Collective Agreement. Claimant further stated that she did not request for one month salary in lieu of notice and the gratuity which was credited into the claimant’s account was in breach of the collective agreement. To the claimant the collective agreement supercedes the claimant’s contract of service dated 12th July, 1993 having been incorporated into the claimant’s letter of employment dated 26th April, 1993. Claimant averred that the provisions of collective agreement usually supercedes an existing conditions of service of a company where the latter has not provided for a better condition. Claimant stated that she resumed from her annual leave on the 14th of November 2013 and that the termination of her employment was done in violation of the Collective Agreement. Claimant reiterated on the fact that her termination of employment has to do with the fraudulent transaction made on one of the defendant’s customer, Mr. Stephen Adekunle Oyafemi, a savings account holder with Account No. 0001660024. Claimant also stated that she could not appeal her termination of employment immediately because she was on her annual leave. At the close of trail, the defendant filed its final written address on the 20th of January, 2016. However, before same was adopted as the defendant’s argument, a copy of the defendant’s Handbook was brought to court and sought to tender same in evidence. Based on the order of this court on 17th May, 2016, the defendant re-opened its case and recalled its witness in order to tender the Handbook in evidence. The defendant tendered the Handbook in evidence with same marked as Exhibit AN1 with no objection from the claimant’s counsel. DW2 under cross examination stated that the defendant’s handbook has only four volumes. The defendant in his final written address formulated five issues for determination of the court as follows: 1. Whether the termination of the claimant’s employment by the defendant was wrongful? 2. Whether the alleged Collective Agreement and the Defendant’s Handbook form part of the claimant’s Contract of Service and thus binding and enforceable against the defendant. 3. Whether the claimant is entitled to be reinstated? 4. Whether or not the claimant, having been paid a month’s salary in lieu of notice and her terminal benefits and having accepted same, can be treated to complain that her contract of employment was not properly determined. 5. Whether the claimant is entitled to the damages for alleged emotional trauma and other setbacks. On issue one, counsel argued that an employer under an ordinary master and servant relationship such as this instant case has the right to determine the contract of employment of an employee, for good, for bad reasons or no reason at all. Likewise, counsel argued that the law permits an employee to leave the service of his/her employer at will without any hindrance. In support of his case, he cited the case of AJAYI V TEXACO NIGERIA LTD (1987) 3 NWLR (PT 62) 577; ZIIDEEH V R.S.C.S.C (2007) 3 NWLR (PT 1022) 554 AT 577; NNPC V EVWORI (2007) ALL FWLR (PT 369) 1324; ATIVIE V KABELMETAL (NIG) LTD (2008) 10 NWLR (PT 1095) 399. On the basis of the cited judicial authorities, counsel submitted that the defendant in this case as rightly exercised its right to hire and fire to which the claimant has no remedy. He made further reference to Clause 7 of the claimant’s Contract of Service with the defendant (Exhibit RS12) wherein it was stated that either party may determine the contract of service agreement at any time giving to the other a month’s notice in writing or a month salary in lieu of notice. The defendant’s counsel argued that the claimant under cross-examination stated that she signed a contract of service agreement with the defendant which was identified by her and admitted in evidence as Exhibit RS12. Defendant argued that the claimant in this case can only be said to have discharged the burden of proof on him when: a. The claimant has placed before the court the terms of the contract of employment b. The claimant has proved how the defendant breached the terms of the contract of employment. To buttress his argument, counsel referred to the case of UNIVERSITY OF CALABAR V. ESSIEN (1996) 10 NWLR (PT 477) 225. To the defendant’s counsel, the claimant has not shown how her contract of employment was breached by the defendant to justify her employment termination being termed as wrongful. He referred to the case of IDONIBOYE-OBU V NNPC (2003) 2NWLR (PT 805) 589 AT 630 PARAS A-B; OLORUNTOBA-OJU V ABDUL-RAHEEM (2009) 13 NWLR (PT 1157) 83; OGUMKA V CAC (2010) LPELR-4891 The learned defence counsel argued that the defendant merely exercised its right as stated in the contract of service of the claimant with the defendant and that the claimant’s employment was terminated in line with the terms of the contract of service between the parties. Counsel submitted that the claimant has only placed her contract of service before the court (Exhibit RS12) but has failed to establish how her termination was carried out in breach of the terms of Exhibit RS12. In consequence of this, counsel submitted that the claimant has not been able to establish her case. In the event of the claimant having not established her case, counsel sought that the claimant’s relief 1 be dismissed as same is speculative, frivolous and lacking in merit. On issue two, counsel to the defendant contended that the claimant from the documents tendered in evidence by her seek to rely on an alleged Collective Agreement made between the Nigeria’s Employers’ Associate of Banks Insurance and Allied Institutions (NEAABIAI) and the Associate of Senior Staff of Banks Insurance and Financial Institutions (ASSBIFI) 2005. Counsel relying on the case of GBEDU V ITIE (2010) 10 NWLR (PT 1202) PG 28;2-283 (PARAS B-B) in resolving issue two argued that Collective Agreements are generally unenforceable. He argued that though collective agreements are made for the best interest of an employee but that however, there is no privity of contract between the employer and employee. In support of his argument, counsel cited the case of CHUKWUMAH V SHELL PETROLEUM DEVELOPMENT COMPANY OF NIG. LTD (1993) 4 NWLR (PT. 288) 512. He contended further that for collective agreements to be enforceable, it must be established by a party seeking to rely on same that it was expressly incorporated into his/her contract of service and that the party is a member of the union which signed the collective agreement on behalf of its members. Counsel submitted that this position is supported by the court in the case of U.B.N V CHINYERE (2010) 10 NWLR (PT. 1203) PAGES 471-472 PARA H-C; TEXACO NIG. PLC V KEHINDE (2001) 6 NWLR (PT. 708) PAGES 224 PARA D-F. Counsel submitted further that an individual cannot bring an action on the enforceability of collective agreement because of the absence of privity of contract between such an individual and the employer. In support of his argument, he cited the case of RECTOR KWARA POLY V ADEFILA (2007) 15 NWLR (PT. 1056) 42; N.N.B PLC V EGUN (2001) 7NWLR (PT. 711) PG 1 AT 18-19; UNITY BANK PLC V ADEMILUYI (2013) LPELR-21984 CA Moreover, counsel argued that the only document before the court which made mention of Collective Agreement is the claimant’s letter of employment dated 26th April, 1993. Counsel drew the attention of the court to the last paragraph thereof which stated as follows: “Other Conditions of Service will be laid down in the Contract of Service Agreement and also in the Collective Agreement currently in force” and argued that same issue on the interpretation of this paragraph as contained in the claimant’s offer of appointment came up in the case of UNION BANK OF NIGERIA PLC V EMMANUEL ADEREWAJU SOARES (2012) 11 NWLR (PT 1312) 550wherein the same and exact clause were used in the claimant’s letter of appointment. He argued that the learned counsel to the respondent in this case interpreted the paragraph to mean that the collective agreement has been incorporated into the contract of service agreement which therefore makes same binding on parties. However, he argued that the Court of Appeal took a different view that the documents are two sets of agreements. According to counsel, the court was of the view that if the collective agreement has been incorporated into the contract of service by that clause, it should be stated in the latter that the former has been so incorporated therein. It is further the contention of the defendant’s counsel that the alleged collective agreement is between the Nigeria Employers Association of Banks, Insurance and Allied Institutions on the one part, and the Association of Senior Staff of Banks, Insurance and Financial Institutions and that neither the defendant nor the claimant were a party to the agreement and as such cannot be bound by it. Furthermore, counsel argued that the claimant has not led any evidence to establish that she is a member of the union that allegedly signed the Agreement. Counsel therefore on the strength of the above cited case urged the court to adopt the Court of Appeal’s decision and to hold that the Collective Agreement does not form part of the claimant’s contract of service. On the binding force of the defendant’s handbook, counsel argued that the handbook is simply a guideline regulating the duties of staff and does not form part of the claimant’s contract of service with the defendant. Continuing, counsel to the defendant argued that the Union Bank of Nigeria Plc Handbook as the name suggests is the defendant’s handbook not an employee’s handbook or staff handbook. She argued that the handbook is not incorporated into the claimant’s contract of service and that it is only an administrative document that contains policy guidelines of the defendant on how it is to be managed. She argued that the Defendant’s Handbook is not a contract document and it was not intended to create any contractual relationship between the claimant and the defendant. To the counsel, the purport of the defendant’s handbook according to its preface is as follows: “The Handbook contains the basic rules of the Book relating to office routine and security and also provides guidelines for the staff on most aspects of their work. It is intended to help all members of the staff in learning and understanding branch routine, but the Handbook is not intended to replace the standard text books on banking practice.” Counsel argued further that the intention of the maker is explicit as there are no parties to the Handbook and that it has no portion for signatures and unsigned. Counsel in the light of the foregoing urged the court to hold that the Defendant’s Handbook is not incorporated into the claimant’s contract of service, hence not binding and enforceable against the defendant. On issue three- whether the claimant is entitled to be reinstated, counsel argued that having submitted under issue one above that the claimant’s employment is rightly terminated in line with the terms of her contract of service and having established that the employment relationship is that of an ordinary master/servant, the claimant cannot rightly seek for reinstatement. In support of his argument, counsel referred to the case of UNION BANK OF NIGERIA PLC V EMMANUEL ADEREWAJU SOARES (2012) 11 NWLR (PT. 1312) 550 Counsel argued further that since the employment of the claimant is not governed by a statute, it is exempted from the employment relationships in which an order of reinstatement could be made. Reference was made to the case of NEPA V ANGO (2001) 15 NWLR (PT. 737) 627. She contended further that since the defendant rightfully exercised its right to terminate the claimant’s employment, the remedy of reinstatement cannot be applicable in the instance. In her argument that an order of reinstatement cannot be made applicable in the instance, counsel referred the court to the case of B.C.K OJILERE V CLEMESSY (NIG) LTD (2007) LPELR-8999 CA and submitted that the court cannot impose an employee on an unwilling employer; OSISANYA V AFRIBANK (NIG) PLC (2007) 6 NWLR (PT 1031) 565 Counsel urged that the claim for reinstatement be dismissed for lacking support in law and for the claimant’s failure to lead any evidence in establishing her case. He argued that the grant of such relief is not automatic relying on the case ABDULRAHEEM V OLUFEAGBA (2007) ALL FWLR (PT 360) 1502 @ 1530 PARAS D-E On issue four, counsel referred the court to the defendant’s pleadings and evidence before the court which stated the facts that the claimant has been paid one month salary in lieu of notice and her gratuity. Counsel also relied on the fact that the claimant did not controvert or challenge this evidence. Counsel therefore submitted that since the claimant has refused to controvert same, it is deemed admitted and that an admitted fact needs no further proof. Counsel also referred to the testimony of the claimant under cross-examination wherein she stated that she received one month salary in lieu of notice and her gratuity. Counsel further contended that the acceptance of one month salary in lieu of notice by the claimant properly determines the contract of employment. He referred to the case of MOROHUNFOLA V KWARA TECH. (1990) 4 NWLR (PT. 145) 506 AT PARAS G-H. Counsel argued that the acceptance of payment by an employee after termination of employment renders the determination mutual. In support, she relied on the case of EKEAGWU V NIGERIA ARMY (2006) 11NWLR PG 382 AT 397 PARAS E-F; DR O. AJILORE V KWARA STATE COLLEGE OF TECHNOLOGY (1986) 2 SC P. 374. Counsel in the light of the claimant’s admission of the receipt of payment of gratuity and one month salary in lieu of notice argued that she cannot again complain of a wrongful termination having acceded to it by accepting her terminal benefit. Sequel to the foregoing, counsel urged the court to dismiss the claimant’s claim for wrongful termination. On issue five- which is whether the claimant is entitled to damages for alleged emotional trauma and other setbacks. Counsel argued that the claimant cannot possibly be entitled to damages sought as a result of alleged wrongful termination of employment having failed to establish same. Counsel argued further that the law recognizes the right of either party in a master-servant relationship to determine the contract after giving reasonable notice to the other party. It was further contended by counsel that the defendant has it as its case that the contract of service between it and the claimant gives either party the right to determine the contract at anytime by giving one month notice or payment of a month’s salary in lieu of notice. Furthermore, that the defendant in its pleadings and statement on oath had stated that the claimant was paid a month’s salary in lieu of notice and her gratuity. On this note, counsel contended that the claimant’s employment was terminated in line with his contract of service and that the above facts were neither challenged nor controverted. To the defendant’s counsel, the claimant is therefore not entitled to any sum in damages. He referred the court to the case of OSISANYA V AFRIBANK (NIG) PLC (2007) 6 NWLR (PT 1031) 565. Claimant submitted that the claimant having been paid all that the claimant is lawfully entitled to upon her termination did not suffer any damages that can be remedied by the court. Counsel argued further that the court can only order damages in the event of wrongful termination of employment and since she has failed to establish this, her claims for damages must fail. In support of her argument, she cited the case of SOKWO V KPONGBO (2008) ALL FWLR (PT. 410) 680 Counsel to the defendant argued that the claimant has failed to lead any evidence in support of her claim that her employment was wrongfully terminated and therefore the claim is liable to be dismissed. Counsel in his argument that the claimant is not entitled to damages submitted that the claimant did not lead any evidence to establish the trauma that she suffered as a result of the termination of her appointment. She argued further that what the claimant meant by “other setbacks” in her pleadings is vague and uncertain. He urged the court to hold on the basis that the claimant having failed to establish wrongful termination, and the recognition by law that the defendant has the right to terminate the claimant’s employment that the defendant has the right to terminate the claimant’s employment. On the whole, counsel urged that the claimant’s claims be dismissed with substantial cost for lack of merit. The claimant in her final written address filed on the 29th of February, 2016 formulated four issues for determination as follows: 1. Whether the Collective Agreement has been incorporated into the claimant’s contract of employment 2. If the above question is answered in the affirmative, whether the defendant can lawfully terminate the employment of the claimant without due process as entrenched in the collective agreement. 3. Whether the termination of the employment of the claimant accords with international best practice. 4. Whether the claimant is entitled to all the reliefs. In his argument on issue one, counsel made reference to the case of NNB PLC V SOLOMON OWIE (2010) LPELR-4591 CA on the guidelines for determination of the question whether a collective agreement has been incorporated into the individual contract of employment. Referring to the Court of Appeal’s decision in this case, he argued that the case law did not indicate what method will satisfy the incorporation or embodiment theory or practice. But that what is important is for the court to read the language of the two documents with the eyes of an eagle before taking decision. He argued that in the absence of clear language of incorporation, the courts have been enjoined to search for the real intention of the parties. He argued that in determining whether Exhibit RS11, the Collective Agreement has been incorporated in the claimant’s contract of service, it would be important to examine the Defendant’s Handbook and claimant’s letter of employment. Counsel in answering this question referred to the last paragraph of the claimant’s offer of employment wherein it was provided that: “Other Conditions of Service will be laid down in the Contract of Service Agreement and also the Collective Agreement currently in force” Also he referred to Page 21 of volume 4 of the defendant’s handbook which the claimant tendered in evidence titled ‘contract of service’ which provides that: “Every member of a staff must sign a Contract of Service Agreement and is bound by the conditions thereof in addition to the provisions of the relevant Collective Agreement. A copy of the signed contract should be placed in the employee’s file. In furtherance of his argument, counsel contended that it is law that where a Collective Agreement has been incorporated into a contract of service whether directly or by implication, the parties will be bound by the provision thereof. He referred the court to the case of ABALOGUN V SPDC LTD (2003) LPELR-18 SC; (2003) 13 NWLR (PT. 837) 309; SALAMI V UBN PLC (2010) LPELR-8975 (CA) Counsel on the strength of these case laws i.e, ABALOGUN V. SPDC Ltd and Salami v UBN Plc, counsel submitted that Page 21 of volume 4 of the defendant’s handbook and the last paragraph of claimant’s letter of offer of employment incorporates directly the Collective Agreement into the contract of service between the claimant and defendant. To the claimant, parties are of the intention to be bound by it. Counsel argued that the defendant in its final written address had admitted that collective agreement if incorporated into a contract of employment is enforceable. He submitted that the argument of the defendant’s counsel relying on the case of CHUKWUMAH V SHELL PETROLEUM DEVELOPMENT COMPANY NIGERIA LTD that collective agreement are not generally binding in paragraph 5.03 of his final written address is a misconception of the law. Counsel also argued that the reliance placed by the defendant’s counsel on the case of UBN V EMMANUEL ADEREWAJU SOARES (2012) 11 NWLR (PT. 1312) 550 as cited in her final written address is different from the facts of the case at hand. Counsel argued that the Handbook in that case which declares in very clear term the status of collective agreement and the contract of employment was never pleaded. He posited that the court in that case would have reached a different conclusion if it had been pleaded. In his argument that the facts of the case are different from the case at hand, counsel argued that the claimant in that case removed himself from the membership of the recognized association covered by the collective agreement. Counsel to the claimant also submitted that the argument of the defendant’s counsel in paragraph 5.15 of her final written address that the defendant is not a party to the collective agreement and that the claimant did not show evidence of membership of the Association of Senior Staff of Bank, Insurance and Financial Institutions (ASSBIFI) is misleading. This argument according to counsel is premised on the fact that ASSBIFI members are listed under Group 28 and the members of the Nigeria Employer Association of Banks, Insurance and Allied Institutions are specified under group 29 at page 156of the Federal Republic of Nigeria Extra-ordinary Gazette, Volume 65 No 6 dated 8th February, 1978. Continuing, counsel argued that under Part 1 (Section 1) of the Recognition and Procedural matters of the Collective Agreement (Exhibit RS11) at Page 5, all senior staff in the defendant bank are members of the Association except the following: members of the Board of Directors, Managing Directors, General Managers, Deputy and Assistant General Managers, Employees in the Management Group who by virtue of their positions would normally represent Management on issues concerning the Senior Staff Association and secretaries to members of the Board, General Managers, Deputy and Assistant General Managers. Counsel contends that the claimant by virtue of the e-mail dated 10th July, 2013 as contained in Exhibit RS2 was head Customer service therefore making her a member of ASSBIFI. Also, that the defendant is a member of the Employers Association of Banks, Insurance and Allied Institutions listed under Group 29 page 156 of the Federal Republic of Nigeria Extraordinary Gazette No. 6 Volume 65 dated 8th February 1978. Claimant’s counsel responding to the argument of the defendant that its Handbook is only a policy document which is not meant to be binding on parties submitted that the argument is misleading and incorrect. He argued that a company’s Handbook provides for the terms and condition of employment of its employees and referred to the case of RASHEED V CFAO NIGERIA LTD (2014) 40 NLLR PAGE 352. To this extent, counsel is of the view that the defendant’s handbook cannot merely be a policy document, the defendant having acted on it over the years in dealing with its employees. He argued that a company’s handbook cannot be neglected in determining the rights and duties of parties to a contract of employment. He argued that the collective agreement tendered in evidence by the claimant that was concluded in the year 2005 is the one in force before the termination of the claimant’s employment. Furthermore, the claimant’s counsel relying on the Court of Appeal’s decision in ALHAJI M.K V FIRST BANK OF NIGERIA PLC & ANOR (2011) LPELR-8971 CA argued that where there is a second contract dependent upon the original contract and giving effect to it, the two must be read together to ascertain the extent of the rights of the parties in the original contract. On a final submission on this issue, counsel submitted that the collective agreement is incorporated into the claimant’s letter of employment and that by the provisions of the Handbook (Exhibit RS5), it is intended to be read together in determining the rights and duties of the claimant and defendant. On issue two, counsel argued that Article 4 (ii) a (i) (v) of the Collective Agreement tendered in evidence provides the ground under which an employee appointment can be terminated. He argued that the interpretation of the provision is that the defendant does not have the freedom to depart from the clear letter of Article 4 to terminate the claimant’s employment, that is, that the claimant’s employment can only be terminated for the reasons stated therein. Counsel argued that the only instance when the defendant could terminate the claimant’s employment without reason is in the case of redundancy as specified under Article 5 of the Collective Agreement. To the claimant’s counsel, a letter of termination based on services no longer required is not a ground for termination. In support of this argument, he cited the case of ADEMULEGUN GBENGA COSMAS & 219 ORS V UNION HOMES SAVINGS AND LOANS PLC SUIT NO. NICN/232/2014 delivered by Hon. Justice Obaseki-Osaghae. Counsel argued that if the claimant’s termination is not based on misconduct as contained in the collective agreement or the memo from the defendant’s Internal Audit Department as pleaded by the claimant, then the reasonable conclusion that could be drawn is that the termination is wrongful having been in breach of the Collective Agreement. In support of his argument, reference was made to the case of SAMUEL ISHENO V JULIUS BERGER NIG. PLC (2008) LPELR-1544 (SC); LONGE V FBN PLC (2010) LPELR-1794 SC PP. 76-77. Counsel submitted that in order for the claimant’s termination of employment to be valid, it must comply with the procedure stipulated in the contract of employment. In the claimant’s counsel view, the termination letter issued by the defendant having stated no reason for the termination of the claimant’s employment is invalid as it could only terminate the employment of the claimant without giving reasons under Article 5 of the Collective Agreement. This counsel said could be done by declaring the claimant’s employment redundant and then paying her redundancy benefit. Also, to the counsel, the defendant only terminated the claimant’s appointment on the basis that her services were no longer required to avoid payment of redundancy benefit to the claimant. Again, he referred to the case of ADEMULEGUN GBENGA COSMAS & 219 ORS V UNION HOMES SAVINGS AND LOANS PLC (supra). Counsel while pointing the attention of the court to paragraph 7 of the contract of service argued that there was nothing therein indicating termination on the ground that services are no longer required. He also pointed to paragraph 8 of the contract of service and argued that the defendant did not at any time give notice of his intention to vary the terms of service to the claimant. He submitted that the claimant submitted to all these during cross-examination. He argued that the defendant did not place any evidence of such variation before it and therefore parties are bound by the terms of contract voluntarily entered into. He relied on the case of UNION BANK V OZIGI (1994) 3 NWLR (PT 333) 385. He argued further that oral evidence cannot contradict the contents of a document, that is, the employment letter and collective agreement which have been tendered in evidence. In canvassing argument in respect of issue three, counsel drew the attention of the court to PART II SECTION 7(6) PAGE A.5 OF THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT ACT 2010 which enjoins the court to have regard to international best practice in Labour and Industrial Relations matters. Counsel while expatiating the provision argued that the purport of it is to promote justice, equity and fair play in labour and industrial relations matters. According to him, this is also to position Nigeria and the National Industrial Court on the same practice with other courts in the civilized world. Counsel in buttressing his argument referred to Article 7 of the ILO Convention on Termination of Employment, 1982 to the effect that: An employment of a worker shall not be terminated for reasons related to the worker’s conduct or performance before he or she is provided an opportunity to defend himself against the allegations made, unless the employer cannot reasonably be expected to provide this opportunity. He also referred to Article 4 of the same Convention. Counsel relying on the provision of Article 9(2)(a) of the said ILO Convention argued that the onus of proof is on the employer to give the existence of a valid reason for termination. To further give effect to his argument on international best practice, counsel cited the provision of Article 1 of the Convention, Section 1 of the ILO Termination of Employment Recommendation, 1982, Section 58 of the ILO Convention 1982. To the claimant’s counsel the ILO Convention 58 and Recommendation 106 have been incorporated into the collective Agreement. He argued that the only time when employment could be terminated under the collective agreement without issuance of query to the affected employee is when the employment has been determined on the ground of redundancy. Counsel argued that the claimant’s termination of employment on the ground that her services were no longer required is contrary to international best practice and that the termination of the claimant’s employment by the defendant on that ground was to avoid the payment of redundancy benefits under Article 5(i) of the Collective Agreement (Exhibit RS10) Counsel reacting to the defendant’s counsel’s argument that an employer in a purely master/servant relationship has the right to terminate the employment of his employee for good, bad or no reason at all, asserted that this no longer represents the law. He referred to the case of CHUKWUMAH V SHELL PETROLEUM DEVELOPMENT COMPANY (1993) 4 NWLR PT 289 PAGE 512 and submits that the principle is to the exception that common law recognizes and respects the sanctity of contracts. Hence, parties have reduced the terms and conditions of service into an agreement, the conditions must be observed. On issue four, counsel contends that the claimant is entitled to the reliefs sought, the defendant having terminated her employment without due regard to her terms and contract of employment. In support, he cited the case of SAMUEL ISHENO V JULIUS BERGER NIG. LTD PLC (SUPRA) He argued that the cases of MOROHUNFOLA V KWARA TECH (1990) 4 NWLR (PT 145) 506; NEPA V ANGO (2001) 15 NWLR (PT 737) 627, B.C.K OJILEREV CLEMESSY (NIGERIA) (2007) LPELR-8999 (CA), OSISANYA V AFRIBANK (NIG) PLC (2007) 6 NWLR (PT 1031) 565; ADEFEMIWA V. OSUN STATE COLLEGE OF EDUCATION, ABDULRAHEEMV OLUFEAGBA (2007) ALL FWLR (PT. 360) 1502 @ 1530 PARAS D-E is no longer the position of the Supreme Court and the National Industrial Court. To buttress his argument, he cited the case of THE REGISTERED TRUSTEES OF THE PLANNED PARENTHOOD FEDERATION OF NIGERIA & ANOR V DR. JIMMY SHOGHOLA (2003) LPELR-7300 CA; (2004) 11 NWLR (PT 883) 1; OKI V TAYLOR WALL TANJON (NIG) LTD (1965) 2 ALLNLR 45 all to the effect that an employee is entitled to damages in cases of wrongful termination of employment. He argued further that the National Industrial Court is empowered by virtue of Section 19 (d) of the NIC Act 2006 to make an award of compensation or damages in any circumstance contemplated under the Act or any other Act of the National Assembly dealing with any matter that the court has jurisdiction to hear. Also, relying on the case of INDUSTRIAL CARTONS LIMITED V NUPAPPW (2006) 6 NLLR (PT 15) 258, counsel argued that the payment of one month salary in lieu of notice will be grossly inadequate as compensation where the reason given for termination of employment is invalid. In support of his argument, he cited the case of COLLINS V OBAT OIL & PETROLEUM LIMITED NIC/LA/57/2007; PETER OMOKARO V UNION BANK OF NIGERIA PLC SUIT NO NICN/LA/16/2011. Counsel on the pleadings of the defendant that the claimant is no longer entitled to any other benefits having accepted her gratuity and one month salary in lieu of notice argued that this does not represent the position of the law. He cited the case of MBILITEM V UNITY CAPITAL ASSURANCE PLC (2013) 32 NLLR PAGE 230-231. Counsel on a final note submitted that the claimant is entitled to the reliefs sought notwithstanding the acceptance of gratuity and one month salary in lieu of notice, the claimant having established that her employment was terminated wrongfully. Counsel therefore urged that the court discountenance the arguments of the defendant, hold that the claimant’s termination of employment is wrongful and grant the claimant’s reliefs. The defendant finding it necessary to respond to the claimant’s final written address filed a reply on the 11th of April, 2016 wherein it responded to paragraph 3.8 of the claimant’s final written address. The paragraph is to the effect that the defendant’s handbook and letter of appointment directly and by implication incorporates the collective agreement (Exhibit RS11) into the claimant’s contract of service. It is the contention of the defendant’s counsel in respect of this that the defendant’s handbook is not a contract document between parties. It has no parties thereto and it was not signed. Counsel argued that no mention of the document was made in either the claimant’s letter of employment or in the contract of service agreement which in the view of counsel are the only contractual documents between parties. Defendant’s counsel while responding to the claimant’s argument that the defendant is bound by its handbook having acted on it over the years in dealing with its employees argued that the facts of such dealings were not pleaded by the claimant and that there were no evidence in proof of same before the court. She maintained that the claimant cannot be allowed to lead facts and give evidence in her final address. Furthermore, the defendant in reply to the claimant’s argument that the case of UNION BANK OF NIGERIA PLC V EMMANUEL ADEREWAJU SOARES (2012) 11 NWLR (PT. 1312) 550 is not applicable to the case hand because the facts are different argued that the defendant relied on the case only to the extent that exact clause which the claimant contended incorporated the collective agreement in her contract of service came up for the interpretation of the court in the case. Counsel posited that the facts of the case must be held distinguishable from the issue of interpretation presented before the court which is in all fours with the instant case. Counsel submitted that the claimant has failed to state how in the circumstance the facts of the case become germane to the interpretation of the letter of employment. It was further noted by counsel the quotation and reliance of the claimant’s counsel on the dissenting judgment of Mohammed Ambi-Usi Kanjuma in the case of UBN PLC V EMMANUAEL ADEREWAJU SOARES and argued based on the judicial authority of ORUGBO v UNA (2002) 16 NWLR (PT. 792) 175 to the effect that: A dissenting judgment however, powerful, learned and articulate is not the judgment of the court and therefore not binding. The judgment of the court is the majority judgment which is the binding judgment. Counsel on this note submitted that the claimant cannot place reliance on a dissenting judgment but the binding judgment of the court. On the argument of the claimant’s counsel that all senior staff in the defendant bank are automatically members of ASSBIFI by virtue of Part (Section 1)of the Recognition and Procedural matters of the Collective Agreement Page 5, counsel to the defendant argued that the position of the claimant does not represent the law. That a collective agreement cannot automatically subscribe all senior staff of an organization to unionism. To the defendant’s counsel, the position clearly violates the provision of Section 40 of the 1999 Constitution which gives the right to form or join any trade union exclusively to individual citizen and not to a union like ASSBIFI or to an employer association as NEABIAI which are parties to the collective agreement. Counsel argued that for a senior staff to whom a collective agreement is applicable be regarded as a member of a union, the senior staff must in writing individually opt in or subscribe to the members of the union. He referred to the case of SAMSON KEHINDE AKINDOYIN V UNION BANK OF NIGERIA PLC SUIT NO: NICN/LA/308/2013. In the light of this submission, counsel urged the court that the said provision of Part 1 (Section 1) of the collective agreement be declared unlawful and void for being inconsistent with the provision of the constitution. The defendant argued that the claimant has to establish that she is a senior staff before she could benefit from the collective agreement between the Nigeria Employers’ Association of Banks, Insurance and Allied Institutions and the Association of Senior Staff of Banks, Insurance and Financial Institutions. Counsel argued further that the claimant did not lead any evidence at trial to prove that the position of Head of Customer Service which she held during her employment with the defendant is meant for only senior staff in the defendant’s bank. She argued again that the claimant did not establish that an “official 1” is synonymous to being a senior staff. Counsel submitted that a party cannot address the court on issue of facts not pleaded in his final address. In support of this argument, she cited the case of BURAIMOH V BAMGBOSE (1989) 13NWLR (PT 109) 352 AT 365. It was further argued that the claimant in her pleadings did not plead facts of her membership of ASSBIFI nor lead evidence at trial to establish the fact, also that she is a fee paying member of ASSBIFI which would have enabled her to take benefit of Exhibit C6. The defendant argued that the claimant must establish her membership of ASSBIFI by direct documentary evidence. She referred to the case of SAMSON KEHINDE AKINDOYIN V UNION BANK OF NIGERIA PLC, supra. Counsel submitted that the claimant in this case has failed to establish that she was a senior staff while she was in the defendant’s employment and has failed to establish her membership of ASSBIFI as required by law, thus he is not entitled to take any benefit from the collective agreement. Also, the defendant’s counsel in response to the claimant’s argument in paragraph 3.23 of the claimant’s final address argued that the provision of PART III GENERAL-ARTICLE 1 (B) of the Collective Agreement is a specific and not a general provision and has nothing to do with the general provision contained in PART II (SECTION 5) at page 54 of the collective agreement. In his argument, the claimant’s cause of action arose in 2013 when the claimant’s contract of service was terminated whereas the said collective agreement in issue expired on the 31st March 2007 well before the claimant’s cause of action arose. She argued that the claimant in this case cannot found a cause of action on an expired collective agreement, same having expired before the cause of action accrued, thus cannot be used in determining the wrongfulness or otherwise of the claimant’s termination of employment. Counsel relied on the case of TEXACO (NIG) PLC V KEHINDE (2001) 6NWLR (PT. 708) 224; MR. MASAGBOR CHRISTOPHER ALAOYE JACKSON V UNION BANK OF NIGERIA PLC SUIT NO. NICN/29/2011 Counsel also referred to the argument of the claimant at paragraph 4.1 of the claimant’s final address wherein he referred on the provision of Article 4(ii) (a) (i) (v) of EXHIBIT RS11. The defendant’s counsel argued that the operative word “may” used in Article 4(ii) (a) (i) (v) is merely discretionary and not mandatory. She relied on the case of EDEWOR V UWEGBA & ORS (1987) 1 NWLR (PT 50) 313 and submitted that the defendant is not mandated to comply with the provision of Article 4(ii) (a) (i) (v). Counsel in response to the claimant’s argument that the defendant was avoiding payment of redundancy benefits when clause 7 of Exhibit RS 7 did not provide for termination of “service no longer required” She argued that the phrase as contained in the claimant’s termination of employment letter simply amounts to giving no reason. To buttress this argument, she cited the case of NITEL V AKWA (2006) 2 NWLR (PT. 964) 391 Counsel argued that the defendant acted in line with the terms of the contract of service between them in terminating the claimant’s employment and that parties are therefore bound by the agreement they had entered into. In support of her argument, counsel relied on the case of LINTON INDUSTRIAL TRADING COMPANY NIGERIA LTD V CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA & ANOR (2013) LPELR-22036. To the defendant counsel, parties are bound by Exhibit RS12 particularly clause 7 therein which the defendant relied upon in terminating the claimant’s appointment. Also, the defendant’s counsel in response to the applicability of the ILO Termination of Employment Convention, 1982 (No. 158) as heavily relied on by the claimant counsel in his final written address submitted that Nigeria is yet to ratify the Convention. Hence, the court has no jurisdiction to apply the said convention. Counsel relied on the provision of Section 254 (c) (2) of the 1999 Constitution. Furthermore, to the defendant counsel, Recommendation 106 as cited by the claimant counsel in his written address has no binding force as they are just mere recommendations which cannot be enforced. Continuing her arguments, the defendant counsel faulted the citation of the case of MBILITEM V UNITY KAPITAL ASSURANCE PLC (2013) 6 NNLR (PT 32) 196 by the claimant in support of her argument that she is still entitled to some other benefits notwithstanding her receipt of gratuity and one month salary in lieu of notice. Counsel argued that the facts of the case is clearly distinguishable from the claimant’s as the claimant in that case made a case of discrimination wherein the court found that what actually took place was redundancy and not termination, the defendant having paid redundancy benefits to the other staff terminated along with the claimant. Similarly, counsel to the defendant also argued that the citation of the case of PETER OMOKARO V UNION BANK OF NIGERIA SUIT NO. NIC/LA/16/2011 by the claimant counsel in his written address was wrongly misplaced as the case was decided on peculiar facts. He argued that the court found in favour of the claimant that the contract of service between him and the defendant still existed having not been determined by the Board of Directors, the claimant being a management staff. On the whole, counsel urged that the claimant’s claim be dismissed in its entirety with substantial cost in favour of the defendant. Upon a careful consideration of the pleadings and evidence of parties as well as documents they tendered on record, I have equally read the final written addresses of both learned counsel including the authorities cited in support of their cases, it is my respectful and humble view that the issues that calls for determination in this case to enable the Court reach a just decision are: 1. Whether or not the collective agreement forms part of the terms of contract and is it enforceable? 2. Whether or not the claimant’s termination of employment is wrongful? 3. Whether or not the claimant is entitled to reinstatement? As regards issue one, the argument of the claimant is that the defendant has incorporated the collective agreement in her contract of service by its reference to it in her appointment letter dated 26th of April, 1993 and by virtue of the defendant’s staff handbook tendered by the claimant and marked as Exhibit RS4. It is also the argument of the claimant that she is entitled to benefit from the collective agreement being the one in force as at the time her employment was terminated and also, that by virtue of Part (Section 1) of the Recognition and Procedural matters of the Collective Agreement Page 5 which is to the effect that all Senior staff in the defendant bank are automatically members of ASSBIFI. Hence, she is entitled to benefit under the agreement being the Head of customer service prior to the termination of her employment. Regarding the first argument made by the claimant on the applicability of the collective agreement between the Nigeria Employers’ Association of Banks, Insurance and Allied Institutions and the Association of Senior Staff of Banks, Insurance and Financial Institutions to her employment, Though, the claimant counsel made reference to the case of ABALOGU V SPDC LTD to the effect that where a collective agreement is incorporated in the conditions of a contract of service whether expressly or by necessary implication, it will be binding on parties. I am however of the firm view that the position of the law is nolonger that a collective agreement is a gentleman’s agreement that has to be incorporated in an employment contract for it to be enforceable, that is only true of the common law dispensation which counsel to the defendant ought to know is no longer fashionable in the current dispensation. Section 254C of the 1999 Constitution, as amended, permits this Court to interpret and apply collective agreements. An agreement that can be interpreted and applied cannot thereby be a gentleman’s agreement. It must and does command a status higher than being a gentleman’s agreement that must be incorporated in a contract of service to be tossed around as the defendant would want the Court to do. The process through which a collective agreement is arrived at is the collective bargaining process by an employer and the representatives or union of its workers/employees. This stems from the right of Freedom of Association. This Court under Section 254C(2) of the 1999 Constitution, as amended, is enjoined to apply conventions ratified by Nigeria. ILO Conventions 87 (dealing with freedom of association) and 98 (dealing with collective bargaining/agreement) have been so ratified by Nigeria. What is in issue is the right to collective agreement; and here, Convention 98 has given a statutory backing to it. Ditto the interpretation and application of same by this Court being a Treaty ratified by Nigeria. The learned authors B. Gernigon, A. Odero and H. Guido in their piece, “Collective Bargaining” in International Labour Standards: A Global Approach, at the 75th anniversary of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, First Edition 2002 at pp. 41 – 51 especially at pp. 49 – 50 posit that collective bargaining as governed by Convention 98 is a fundamental right; it is a right of employers and their organisations, on the one hand, and organisations of workers, on the other hand (in the absence of workers’ organisations, representatives of workers may assume this right); it is a right that should be recognised throughout the private and public sectors with only the armed forces, the police and public servants engaged in the administration of the State being the exceptions; the purpose of collective bargaining is the regulation of terms and conditions of work, in a broad sense, and the relations between the parties; collective agreements (the product of collective bargaining) are binding on the parties and are intended to determine terms and conditions of employment which are more favourable than those established by law (and individual contracts are only to be preferred if their provisions are more favourable than those in collective agreements); The import of which is that the employer/employees intend to be bound by it. I took the liberty of going through the hug of explaining the process leading to what is called ''collective agreement'' to enable parties see why such an agreement is binding and enforceable by the parties. It is in my respected view that this process gives it a status the ILO Convention ascribes to it and same should be given its rightful place of pride in the modern world of works. Moreover, the claimant relied on the last paragraph of her letter of offer of employment wherein it was stated that other conditions of service will be laid down in the contract of service Agreement and also the collective agreement currently in force. Which means there was a collective agreement in existence in 1993 when she was employed, which obviously was nolonger applicable when her employment was determined. Howbeit as I had already stated supra, this Court has a Constitutional power to both interpret, apply and enforce collective agreement signed by employer and its employees. As regards the question of whether the defendant’s handbook forms part of document that regulates the claimant’s condition of service, I am in absolute accord with the counsel to the claimant's view that the defendant’s handbook cannot merely be a policy document, the defendant having acted on it over the years in dealing with its employees, it is equally binding on the parties. However, the copy of the staff Handbook, Exhibit RS4 tendered as evidence in support of claimant's claim is an incomplete document, hence. the Court ordered that the defendant in the overall interest of justice of this case produce the whole booklet constituting its staff Handbook. Also, a careful study of the handbook tendered by the defendant and admitted as (Exhibit AN1) shows clearly that the contents of Exhibit RS4 which the claimant relied upon are not contained in the former. It is trite that in civil cases, the burden of first proving existence or non-existence of a fact lies on the party against whom judgment would be given if no evidence were produced. The claimant in this case being such party against whom judgment would be given gave no satisfactory evidence to enable the Court come to the reasonable conclusion that the fact sought to be proved is established. See Section 133 (1) & (2) of the Evidence Act, 2011. Again, in determining issue one as framed and considering the contentions of parties in this case, it is important to consider the provisions of both Exhibit RS4, RS12 and ANI on termination of employment if there are any and also to what extent the provision could affect the case at hand in favour of the claimant. On the surface of Exhibit RS4 tendered by the claimant as evidence of the fact of her wrongful termination of employment, it is crystal clear that there is no provision for procedures or guidelines to be employed for termination of employment of defendant’s staff. That being made simple, Exhibit RS10 i.e the collective agreement made provision for disciplinary procedure in Article 4 therein which is also the basis of the claimant’s contention that the termination of her employment was in breach of the said provision. The position of the defendant however, is that it determined the relationship it has with the claimant based on its right to do so at will by complying with the terms of contract binding on them, which they did comply with by giving her a month salary in lieu of notice as stipulated in its contract of employment. It is in my firm view that though the collective agreement provided for misconduct that could warrant termination of employment, however, the provision is inapplicable to the case at hand. Reason being that the termination letter (Exhibit RS6) issued to the claimant and dated October 24, 2013 stated no reason for the termination of her appointment. The letter in specific words stated thus- ''... Your appointment with the bank is hereby Terminated with effect from 25th October, 2013 as your services are no longer required. Your account has been credited with a month’s salary being payment in lieu of notice. Benefits due to you and from which outstanding liabilities are to be deducted will be credited to your account shortly...'' It is plain from the above letter of termination that the claimant's services were no longer required by the defendant and no reason was given. Whereas the provision of Article 4 of exhibit RS10, i.e. the collective agreement relied upon by the claimant only laid down the disciplinary procedure to be adopted in cases of certain breaches of the defendant’s rules and regulations and other cases of indiscipline which may lead to termination or dismissal. The claimant in her written address had argued that the phrase ‘service no longer needed’ as contained in Exhibit RS6 amounts to giving a reason and that the reason is not tenable enough as to justify her termination of employment. It is an established fact that the relationship that existed between the claimant and the defendant in this case is of a purely master and servant relationship. It is also trite that in such relationship, termination of employment may be by either of the parties with no reason or with reason. It is where the employer gives a reason that it would be incumbent on it to then justify the reason proffered. Termination of employment by the employer cannot be wrongful unless it is in breach of the terms and conditions of the contract. Once the defendant complies with the terms of the contract, there could be no breach of the contract of employment. See the case of AFRIBANK (NIG) PLC V OSISANYA (2000) NWLR (PT 642) 592 CA. The claimant admitted as was contended by the defendant that she was paid her salary in lieu of notice. Meanwhile, the collective agreement which is the fulcrum of the claimant’s contention on her termination of employment has a duration period. By virtue of Article 1 (a) of PART III of the agreement, the agreement came into force and was operated from the 1st of April, 2005 to 31st of March, 2007. Whilst claimant's employment was determined in October, 2013. Hence, it becomes no longer enforceable having expired. Although the claimant failed to show the Court that exhibit RS10 is still in force. merely stating that exhibit RS10 is the extant collective agreement is not tenable. Assuming that the collective agreement is still in force as at the time claimant's employment was determined, the main issue to consider is whether or not claimant's employment was wrongfully terminated. I have held supra that this court has the power to both interpret and enforce collective agreement and have equally held that the collective agreement entered into by parties is binding on them. It is in this vein that I find that the claimant's letter of employment, contract of service exhibit RS4, RS12, collective agreement and employees Handbook, i.e exhibits RS10 and AN1 all forms part of the claimant's terms of employment. A germane question to answer is, was the termination of claimant's employment by the defendant wrongful? The answer to this is to be found in the next issue. Next is issue two as framed, it is a basic principle of law which is long settled that in a claim for wrongful termination of employment, the plaintiff to succeed in such a claim has the duty to plead and prove that: (a) He is an employee of the defendant (b) how he was appointed and the terms and conditions of his appointment (c) who can appoint him and who can remove him. See the case of EMOKPAE V UNIVERSITY OF BENIN (2002) 17 NWLR (PT 795) 139 CA. Having established that the letter of employment, staff handbook, contract of service and collective agreement made reference to by the claimant all form part of his contract of employment. What then is the requirement for termination if any in the contract of employment. A close perusal of clause 7 of the contract of service, i.e. exhibit RS12, the defendant or an employee has the right to determine the contract of service at any time giving the other party one calendar month’s notice in writing in that behalf but the defendant Bank have the right to pay to an affected employee one month salary in lieu of notice. The defendant in its pleadings has stated that the claimant was paid one month salary in lieu of notice and gratuity, a fact which the claimant also attested/admitted to under cross-examination. What more is required of the defendant? The claimant also contended that the defendant stated in her employment letter that her services was no longer required in order to avoid payment of redundancy, it is however in my calm view that this fact having not been pleaded goes to no issue. As I find no single averment in the claimant's statement of facts and evidence before the court that suggests the claimant’s termination of employment was based on redundancy or a misconduct. She has equally failed to elucidate evidence to prove that the defendant had so many staff to the extent that it could not retain her or that her position is scrapped. This in my calm view is an afterthought and such cannot hold water at this stage. Given the trite position of law that counsel's address no matter how beautifully written cannot take the place of evidence. See the case of NEPA V ABA (2006) 5 NLLR (PT 11) 37 CA. It is important at this stage to state unequivocally, that it is correct as contended by the learned claimant's counsel that it is no longer fashionable in the current world of work for an employment to be terminated without any reason or for services no longer required especially where it is obvious in the primacy of facts of a case as in this instance that an employee was investigated. As it is the current trend as enunciated in ILO Convention 158 of 1982 and its recommendation No.166, specifically Article 4-6; which provides that employment of a worker shall not be terminated unless there is a valid reason. The Article states that for such termination to be valid it must be connected with the capacity of the worker, conduct and operational requirement of the undertaking. Articles 5 and 6 gave some situations which would not be tenable as reasons for termination. This Court by Section 254C(1) (f),(h) and (i) of the 1999 Constitution as amended is empowered to interpret and apply international best practice, interpret collective agreement as alluded to above. This Court has since moved away from the Common law harsh rules which allows an employer to hide under the cloak of services no longer required in determining its relationship with an employee, where as in this case it is obvious that the claimant's employment was terminated in view of the irregularities that occurred in an account domiciled in the Branch he worked as Head Customer Service. See exhibit RS3. An investigation was conducted into the fraudulent transfer in the customer's account domiciled in her branch culminating in her termination. Although the defendant repeatedly denied this. It is in the light of this that I find that claimant's termination although the defendant was silent on this, was based on the investigation conducted by the defendant as regards the fraudulent withdrawals in a customer's account (OYAFEMI STEPHEN ADEKUNLE) domiciled at Oshodi branch of the defendant's bank where the claimant worked. It is important to state firmly that in the current world of work it is against international best practice and an unfair labour practice for an employer to terminate its relationship with its employee without any reason or justifiable reason connected with the employees conduct or performance at work. I so hold. Now, has the defendant breached any of the terms of employment between it and the claimant. The main requirement as evince in the community of the contract regulating the relationship of the duo as stated supra in this judgment, is that before the defendant can terminate its relationship with the claimant is by either given him a month notice or a month salary in lieu of same. There is nothing on record to show that the defendant accused the claimant of any misconduct and it is germane to note that, that cannot foreclose the defendant from determining its relationship with its employee. As stated earlier, the defendant stated that it gave the claimant a month salary in lieu of notice together with her gratuity which was accepted by the claimant. It is in the light of this, that I therefore find and hold that the claimant has not established how her terms and conditions of service was breached, hence the termination of her appointment is not wrongful. Given the position of the law which is to the effect that upon termination of employment an employee is entitled to be paid a salary in lieu of notice and terminal benefits. I find that the defendant has complied with the terms of claimant's employment. I thus resolve this issue in favour of the defendant. On issue three, the law is clear on payment of gratuity and receipt of same by an employee, that where an employee accepts salary in lieu of termination or accepts his entitlement upon cessation of his employment he cannot be heard to complain later that his contract of employment was not validly determined, or tainted with bad faith and improperly determined. That is the position of the Courts in these cases; LINUS AKPAI OCHIDI V THE REGISTERED TRUSTEES OF YAKUBU GOWON CENTRE FOR NATIONAL UNITY AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION [2014] 40 NLLR (PT. 121) 122; ILOABACHIE V. PHILIPS [2000] 14 NWLR (PT. 787) 264 CA; ODIASE V. AUCHI POLYTECHNIC [1998] 4 NWLR (PT. 546) 477 CA. MOROHUNFOLU V. KWARA STATE COLLEGE OF TECHNOLOGY[1990] 4 NWLR (PT. 145) 506 SC. Thus the claimant having admitted that she received her salary in lieu of notice and terminal benefits cannot be heard to complain that the determination of his/her employment by the defendant is wrongful, illegal and tainted with bad faith. In the same vein, the claimant in this case having been paid gratuity and one month salary in lieu of notice as provided under her contract of service and having received same cannot be granted an order of reinstatement. She is deemed to have mutually consented to the determination of her relationship with the defendant. See the case of AGOMA V GUINESS (NIG) LTD (1995) 2 NWLR (PT 380) 672 SC To buttress my view, there is nowhere wherein it was stated in the defendant’s handbook and collective agreement that an employee is entitled to reinstatement having received his/her gratuity. Moreso this is simply a master and servant relationship, which do not enjoy that right. The receipt of her gratuity and one month salary in lieu of notice from the defendant is an indication of her acceptance of the termination, hence she cannot come back to complain of the wrong she had earlier accepted. It is premised on the above, that I hold that the claimant is not entitled to an order of reinstatement. In conclusion and for the avoidance of doubt, I make the following Declarations: 1. That the claimant’s contract of employment is governed by the collective agreement, the defendant staff handbook, letter of offer of employment and contract of service. Both parties are thus bound by these documents. 2. That the claimant’s employment was not wrongfully terminated having complied with the claimant’s terms and conditions of service. 3. That the claimant is not entitled to an order of reinstatement, the termination of her employment being mutual having received her gratuity and one month salary in lieu of notice. Parties are to bear their respective costs. Judgment is accordingly entered. Hon. Justice Oyewumi Oyebiola Oyejoju Presiding Judge