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Representation: N. H. Nwankwo, with him, N. V. Ezeonyido (Mrs.) for the Applicant Tony Iroegbulam, with him, V. A. Asilonu for the Respondent RULING/JUDGMENT This action was commenced on the 7th day of December 2015 by way of Motion on Notice dated the 4th day of December 2015, wherein Counsel on behalf of the Applicant prayed this Court for an Order of Certorari for the following: 1. To Quash the decision of the Respondent made against the Applicant suspending her from her duties on half pay as contained in the letter dated the 12th day of October, 2015 referenced FDN/R/P/SS/983/213 attached to this Application. 2. An injunction restraining the Respondent, its servants, officers, agents, or any other person howsoever, who may be claiming to act in its stead pending the hearing and determination of this application. The application was brought on the following grounds: i. The Respondent issued the said letter of suspension without valid authority. ii. The alleged Misconduct took place before the Council of the Respondent which concluded on the matter at its sitting of 23rd June 2014. iii. The Council was later dissolved on or about July 2015. iv. There was no Council in existence at the time the letter of suspension was issued. v. The letter of Query dated 1st September 2014 was authored by a different body that did not function on the matter and never witnessed the alleged misconduct but long after Council, the body that dealt with the alleged misconduct had completed action on the matter. vi. The letter of suspension is a double punishment on the same set of facts after an apology was given and accepted by the Council. In support of this application is a 35 paragraph affidavit accompanied by 8 exhibits, deposed to by the Applicant. In arguing this application, counsel filed a written address wherein he raised the following issues: 1. Whether the alleged misconduct has not been completely dealt with by the Council on 23rd June 2014. 2. Assuming but without conceding, that the allegation still subsists, whether the Rector can competently act for a non-existing Council. 3. Whether the letter of suspension does not amount to punishing the Applicant twice on the same set of facts. On issue one, counsel submitted that the allegation against the Applicant has been completely dealt with by the dissolved Council of the Respondent. He submitted that this current punishment of suspension and payment of half salary amounts to revisiting a completed act. Counsel relied on the case of OSHOBOJA vs. AMID & ORS (2009) LPELR-2803 (SC) where it was held that it is an application of the rule of public policy and in the interest of the common good that there should be an end to litigation. He argued that in the present case, the Council is superior and higher in hierarchy to the Rector's authority. It is an administrative indiscipline and act of impunity for the Rector to reopen what has been concluded by the council. See also ARO vs. FABOLUDE (1983) 2 SC 9 at 83 and CHIEF ADOMBA & 3 ORS. vs. ODIESE & 3 ORS. (1990) 1 NWLR (Pt. 125) 165 at 178. Counsel submitted further that the Rector purported to act in excess of her authority. This is owing to the fact that there was no place in the Council's meeting that it recommended any further punishment or any issue at all on the meeting to the Rector or any other authority. He urged the Court to consider the same malice shown by the Rector in the earlier application before this court in Suit No. NICN/OW/67/2014. In the circumstance counsel urged the court to hold that issue number one has been answered in the affirmative and therefore succeeds. On issue number two, the Court was urged to take judicial notice of a known fact that Boards and Council of Federal Government Parastatal and Institutions were dissolved in July 2015.Therefore at the time the Rector purported to act there was no council in existence. Also,the letter of suspension did not indicate any misconduct. It was issued for an "alleged misconduct"of "express orders forbidding wire-tapping devices" where no such express or oral order existed. Counsel submitted that section 17 (2) Federal Polytechnic Act 2004 Cap F17 does not apply in the instant case because no one has determined that there was a misconduct. If there was one, but without conceding the Council under Section 17(1) had dealt with and therefore the Rector's opinion or discretion is ousted. Secondly, the alleged act even if is true does not amount to a misconduct under the Act. Again, it is the submission of Counsel that the Applicant who is senior staff in a statutorily regulated employment can only be regulated and guided according to that statute. See the following cases: 1. SANUSI vs. ALHAJI AYOOLA & ORS. (1992) NWLR (Pt. 265) 275 2. FEDERAL MEDICAL CENTRE ADO EKITTI & 2 ORS vs. OMIDIORA KOLAWALE (2012) All FWLR (Pt. 653) 1999 at 2011. 3. BAMGBOYE vs. UNILORIN & ANOR (1999) 10 NWLR (Pt. 622) 290 Counsel submitted that the Rector cannot lawfully act for a dissolved council; she cannot also substitute her opinion for the provisions of the Act. She lacks the vires to do so. This issue, counsel submitted should be resolved in favour of the Applicant. Finally, it is the argument of Counsel that it amounts to double jeopardy to have the Applicant suspended from her duties on half salary despite having been made to apologize and which apology was accepted by the Council, her phone and the so called wire-tapping device confiscated and later returned to her. He submitted further that the law seriously frowns at punishing an offender twice on the same set of facts. See the case of NIGERIAN ARMY vs. AMINU KANO (2010) LPELR-2013 SC. Counsel urged the Court to resolve this last issue again in favour of the Applicant and grant all the reliefs of the Applicant by quashing the suspension letter of 12th October 2015, recall the Applicant to her duties with the Respondent, and order the payment of her salaries and entitlement illegally deducted from her by the Respondent. In opposition, the respondent’s counsel filed a 25 paragraph Counter affidavit deposed to by Amanze Honourine Nneka (Mrs.), an Assistant Registrar with the respondent. In the accompanying written address, counsel distilled a sole issue for determination, which is: Whether the Rector of the Respondent institution acted within the enabling Rules of the contract of service the Applicant had with the Respondent in the manner the Applicant was suspended on 13th October 2015. Counsel argued that the Applicant was wrong in its submission that the Respondents Rector had no power to suspend an employee of the Polytechnic whether at all or in the manner and circumstance of this case. See paragraphs 4(b)(i)(ii), 4(c)(i), 12 and 23 of the Counter Affidavit. He argued further that the issue in this matter is pre-trial and not post-trial suspension and the Rules governing its contract of employment has a provision for pre-trial suspension and vests the power to impose such pre-trial suspension on two Authorities of the Respondent Polytechnic viz; (a) The Governing Council - See Section 17 (3) of the Federal Polytechnic Act 2004. (b) The Rector - See also Section 17 (2) Federal Polytechnic Act 2004. Section 17 (2) of Federal Polytechnic Act, the source of Authority of its Rector power to impose pre-trial suspension, provides thus: (2) The Rector may, in a case of misconduct by a member of the staff which in the opinion of the Rector is prejudicial to the interests of the Polytechnic, suspend such member and any such suspension shall forthwith be reported to Council. It is the submission of counsel that the main issue in this Application is: Did the Rector hold the opinion that the acts of the Applicant is prejudicial to the interests of the Polytechnic? He further submitted that the facts deposed to in paragraphs 18, 19, 20 and 24 of the Counter Affidavit show that the Rector held and still holds such opinion. Submitted further that it is the duty of this Court to enforce the application of the terms as made by the parties inclusive of those provided by Section 17(2) F.P.A, it is not the duty of Court to make the terms for them or to change any valid term for them. See the case ARTRA INDUSTRIES LTD vs. NIGERIAN BANK FOR COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY (1999) 1 NWLR (Pt. 483) 574. Counsel submitted that the Respondent’s Rector observed the Rules of fair hearing in the manner the Applicant was suspended. This is owing to the fact that the Claimant was first queried and ample time given to her to make her reply. She was given an opportunity to be heard and at the same time heard on the suspension. Also, the fact that hearing on the substantive allegation of disobedience of lawful orders had not commenced, and no verdict had been, returned on it, it is the Respondent’s argument that the Applicant’s Complaint that she was punished with a suspension without giving her a hearing is premature. That she cannot complain of lack of hearing where trial is yet to commence on the offence she was alleged to have committed, and when she has neither been pronounced guilty nor punished for it either. See Paragraphs 13, 14, and 15 of the Counter Affidavit. That the present suspension is not a punishment for that main offence but a mere administrative pre-trial safeguard provided for under the statute governing the Applicant’s employment. Furthermore, Counsel argued that the Applicant has not made out a case for an order of Certiorari. This is owing to the fact that what is required in the present case is a review of the "Records" of the Respondent’s proceeding in which the Applicant was suspended on 13th October 2015. See H.C.M vs. IYOHA (2011) 46 W.R.N 103, at P.131 Para 38-45. It is the Respondent’s Counsel further contention that the law is settled that the grounds for award of Certiorari has three (3) essentials namely: (a) There must be in existence, a record of proceedings or acts of the inferior tribunal or Authority, (b) The record contains some errors which manifests on the face of that record except it is on ground of want of jurisdiction. One does not in this case need to lead oral evidence in proof of the error or place reliance on other documentary evidence to locate the error. The error must therefore speak for itself on the fact of the records sought to be reviewed. It must be manifest and not latent. (c) The said error must be of law and not of facts. That means that the job of the Honourable Court is interpretative in nature. There are no contentious facts involved which the Honourable Court would be called upon to do an evaluation on. See generally - The Prerogative Writs and Orders under Nigerian Law and Constitution Pp27-29. See further, Ex parte Matthew Elesi & Ors 1973 (ECSLR) 3, Part 2, 967. Counsel submitted that the Applicant had not satisfied the above conditions in her present application. That principally her application failed on this ground in the following respects: a. The Applicant did not place any record before this Honourable Court upon which the Honourable Court is expected to do the review job. The pertinent question is, where is the Records of proceedings of the Respondents institution or any of its Organs, Bodies or Authorities which the Applicant wants this Court to review? According to Counsel, none is submitted in this application. b. Assuming, but not conceding that the records which the Applicant wants this Honourable Court to review judicially is the letter dated 13th September 2014 (Exhibit "A" to Applicants Affidavit) which suspended her from duty and its content, it is the Respondent’s contention that no error is shown by the Applicant to have existed or manifested on the face of the letter. This Application also did not pin point any such error. c. That the Applicant’s Affidavit is replete with contentious and contested facts which will drive this Honourable Court into the job of evaluation of those facts. That this is not a review attribute of cases commenced by mode of judicial review. Also, the Applicant did not also pinpoint any law whatsoever that was applied erroneously by the Respondent on the face of the letter of suspension. By this, it is argued that the Applicant ought to have shown where, on the face of the letter of suspension where a particular error was committed, and go on to show the particular enactment or Rule of law upon which the error was done. All these, she failed to do. See S. O. AWE & 3 ORS vs. G.M, OSUN STATE WATER CORPORATION &ANOR (2001) 32 W.R.N 53. Similarly, counsel argued that the order of certiorari will not avail the Applicant because she failed to indicate that the respondent had acted ultra vires by either exceeding its jurisdiction, that is, when it acted in excess of its jurisdiction, or acted without or want of jurisdiction, or exercised its jurisdiction on wrong persons or wrong objects. See Section 17 (2) of the Federal Polytechnic Act 2004. Also it is Counsel’s contention that the Applicant was not denied fair hearing. Counsel reiterated that there was no time the Applicant appeared before its Council, there was no time she made any apology to its Council and there was no time its Council forgave her. Rather, that she appeared before its Council Committee on Staff Discipline and the infraction complained of took place before that Committee. That it was the Committee that took up the matter to Council and Management. That both directed for Applicants investigation. See paragraphs 4 (b)(i)(ii), 6 and 7 of the Counter Affidavit and the Record proceedings of the Committee of 3/3/2014, 4/3/2014 and 23/6/2014 and that of Council of 26/6/2014. It is the submission of the Respondent’s counsel that the Applicant’s present suspension is legitimate, valid and in accordance with legitimate terms of her employment. He urged the Honourable Court to dismiss this Application with costs. The Applicant filed a Further Affidavit of 21 paragraphs and filed a further written submission in which Counsel for the Applicant argued that there ought to be a counter affidavit challenging the Applicant’s affidavit, and so the use of affidavit in opposition is wrong procedurally and in law. The Respondent here is deemed as having not filed any counter affidavit. The import here is that failure to file counter affidavit amounts to an admission of all averments in the affidavit See the case of UDENIGWE & ANOR. vs. REV. CANNON EMENALO & ANOR (2009) All FWLR (Pt. 454) Pg.1544 at 1538. Secondly, and more importantly the averments in those affidavits are full of argument, opinions, issues of law and therefore offed the provisions of section 115 of the Evidence Act. See BAMAIYI vs. THE STATE (2001) 8 NWLR (Pt.715) 270 at 286-281. Counsel further argued that the deponent of the Counter Affidavit though absent from the proceedings of the Council sittings, failed to state the source of her knowledge of facts making the affidavit defective. See GIDADO BAA vs. ADAMAWA EMIRATE COUNCIL (2013) LPELR 22068 CA. Counsel reiterated his arguments that the Rector lacked the authority to discipline the Applicant and as such Section 17(2) FPA does not apply. He argued further that the exhibits attached to the counter affidavit are forgeries made in anticipation of the pending case. Also the purported minutes being a computer generated document did not comply with sections 83(3) and 84 of the Evidence Act. See OMAC OIL NIG LTD vs. EGBADEYI (2014) LPELR 24112 CA. Counsel urged the Court to strike out the defective affidavit and grant this application. By a motion on notice filed on the 2nd day of February pursuant to Section 16 of the National Industrial Court Act 2006 and Section 6(6) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended), counsel for the Applicant sought for an injunction restraining the Respondent from further locking out the Applicant, further evicting her, from further suspending her or in any way denying her access into her Consulting Room situate at the Medical and Health Services Department, Federal Polytechnic, pending the final determination of this suit. The Grounds upon which this application is made are as follows; 1. The Applicant was purportedly suspended from her office on 12thday of October 2015, even when the Council that ought to authorize such had been dissolved on 16thJuly 2015 2. The said purported suspension was for a tenure of 3 months. 3. The applicant in spite of absence of authority in obedience to decent behavior duly went on the purported suspension pending the interpretation of the honourable court in the main application. 4. The said purported suspension ended by effluxion of time on the 12th day of January 2016. 5. Upon resumption of duties by the Applicant, the Respondent's officers at the behest of the Rector employed self-help and practically evicted the Applicant from her office and sealed up the said office. This motion is supported by an affidavit of 16 paragraphs deposed to by the Applicant herself. In the accompanying written address, counsel proposed one issue for determination thus: Whether in the prevailing circumstance of this case, the Respondent can continue to purport to block the Applicant from accessing her office. In arguing this issue, counsel relied on AKAPO vs. HAKEEM-HAEEB & ORS (1992) NWLR (Pt. 247) 266 where it was held that the essence of the grant of injunction is to protect the existing rights of a person from the unlawful invasion by another. He argued that the Applicant needs the protection of this court against the Respondent's continuous invasion of her lawful right to earn a living. The named representatives of the Respondent are not relenting as they practically threw her out of her office. In other words, they employed self-help. Counsel argued further that the Applicant cannot be punished by the Respondent for obeying its illegal suspension order while seeking a legal interpretation of it. In every decent society, that is the only civilized thing to do. Counsel urged the court to grant the application, and restrain the Respondent from further unlawfully locking out the Applicant from her office. In reaction, counsel for the Respondent filed a 16 paragrah Counter Affidavit deposed to by Amanze Honourine Nneka (Mrs), in the accompanying written address, Counsel adopted the issue raised by the Applicant’s Counsel. Counsel submitted that the Respondent is not liable to be restrained as urged by the Applicant. That the pendency of this suit is therefore not a license for her to start committing fresh and different infractions of her Rules of employment: with impunity. He submitted that Section 16 NIC Act 2006 under which this Application is brought deals with perpetual injunction and not interlocutory injunction. The Court was urged to refuse this Application on the score that it is based on the wrong provision of the law. Further, it is the Respondent contention that the issue raised for determination in this present Application is the same remedy she sought for in the substantive suit. For this reason, the Honourable Court was urged to refuse this Application by not resolving above issue raised by her in the affirmative. Otherwise, all pertinent issues in the substantive case would have been decided in this interim Application. Again, it is the Respondent counsel’s argument that an injunction as a relief, whether perpetual or interlocutory is not claimed alone neither does it stand alone. It must be attached to a substantive relief. It cannot therefore be granted before the judgment itself is delivered. Counsel referred the court to ADISA vs. MILAD of OYO STATE (2009) 15 W.R.N 126, where the Court of Appeal held thus: “Interlocutory Injunctions are generally issued during the pendency of litigation for the short term purpose of preventing injury to the application prior to the time that the Court will be in a position to either grant or deny permanent relief on the merit.....” It is submitted by Counsel that injunctive orders are granted mainly to maintain the status quo for the duration of the trial of the substantive case. In the instant case, counsel submitted that the interlocutory relief sought by the Applicant should relate to keeping the status quo of 4th December 2015, that is, the event of 12th October 2015 intact. Not events subsequent to 4/12/2015. Any latter events create another, different and distinct status quo which has not gone into trial and is not before this Honourable Court for trial. Undoubtedly, the status quo of this matter before the Applicant came to Court on 4/12/2016 was that she was on suspension. The main relief in her substantive suit is for the Court to nullify the suspension and order the Respondent to allow her return to work and assume duties. In effect, the Applicants position as at 4/12/2015 was that she was "out of her work". That was the res of the case. It is argued that the Applicant now wants to use this Application to alter the said res of 4/12/2015. By that, she wants the Court to "put her back to work" albeit before her case is heard. That means that the ruling in this Interlocutory Application would have prematurely determined the real issues to be determined at the end of the case contrary to the position of the law. See GEORGE ITA vs. NYONG (1994) 1 NWLR (Pt. 318) 56. Counsel argued that the Applicant could still be compensated monetarily, should her suspension be found to be invalid at the completion of trial. Conversely, the balance of convenience and chances of irreparable losses scale towards rejection of this Application. Counsel argued further that the Applicant is unwilling to be obedient, and if she is allowed back at work temporarily, or for the duration of this trial, it will result in irreparable injury or damage which cannot be compensated by any monetary award made by this Court at the final determination of this suit if the Applicant became unsuccessful. The Respondent’s counsel contended that as a Court of equity, this Court should be interested in the overall conduct of Applicants before it. In this regard, he contended further that Applicant’s conduct in the entire case is most reprehensible. It is for the foregoing reasons that the Respondent’s counsel urged the Court to refuse this Application and instead order for accelerated hearing of the substantive suit so that each party’s rights be decided once and for all. Court’s Decision From the foregoing, there are two applications before this court on which this ruling is premised. The substantive application is seeking the order of this court quashing her suspension from duty. The Applicant subsequently filed the second application seeking an order of injunction restraining the respondent from further locking her out, evicting her or suspending her pending the determination of the substantive application. From the particulars of the application, it is clear to me that the 2nd applicantion has its roots in the 1st application. Therefore, I shall first consider the substantive application. The applicant is seeking an order of certiorari to issue quashing the decision of the Respondent suspending the applicant from her duties contained in the letter dated 12th day of October, 2015 with reference number FDN/R/P/SS/983/213. The complaints of the applicant against the suspension are stated in the grounds of the application to be the following: i. The Respondent issued the said letter of suspension without valid authority. ii. The alleged Misconduct took place before the Council of the Respondent which concluded on the matter at its sitting of 23rd June 2014. iii. The Council was later dissolved on or about July 2015. iv. There was no Council in existence at the time the letter of suspension was issued. v. The letter of query dated 1st September 2014 was authored by a different body that did not function on the matter and never witnessed the alleged misconduct but long after Council, the body that dealt with the alleged misconduct had completed action on the matter. vi. The letter of suspension is a double punishment on same set of facts after an apology was given and accepted by the Council. The applicant stated the facts of the application in the affidavit she deposed in support. She averred that she was employed by the respondent as a Medical Staff in the department of Medical and Health Services. On 12th October 2015, she was served a suspension letter which she annexed as Exhibit A. The suspension letter made reference to a Query of 1st September 2014 and the said Query made reference to an alleged incident that took place at the Respondent's Council Sitting of 26th June 2014. The applicant averred that no Council sat on 26th June 2014 and the incident under reference was that she brought a wireless recording device to the Council meeting of 23rd June 2014. Even though there is no regulation against the wearing of wire-tapping or recording device into the respondent institution, the recording device found on her was not worn purposely for the Council meeting but as a practice which she cultivated due to frequent threats to her life by unknown persons. In the meeting of 23rd June 2014, she was found with a recording device which she removed and surrendered to the Chairman of the Council with apology. The Council members accepted her apology and the meeting went on to conclusion. The applicant averred that she did not record the proceeding of the Council meeting of 23rd June 2014. Three months after the Council had finished with the incident and had left the respondent institution, she received a letter of query dated 1st September 2014 issued by other persons other than Council and she replied the query on 5th September 2014. The applicant contended that the letter of suspension was actuated by malice and anger arising from the outcome of the previous court proceeding. By a Regulation of the respondent, any staff with query or suspension may have his or her appointment reappraised. Serving out the suspension which is for three months in the first instance would have the effect of disqualifying her for annual increment of salary and will have the effect of excluding her from appointive positions or promotion. In her further affidavit, the applicant stated that there is no difference between Council Committee and the Council. She further maintained that all the matters concerning her was concluded on 23/6/14. She was not aware or invited to any other meeting nor was there a time she was warned not to bring any recording device to the meeting. In paragraph 3 of her further affidavit, the Applicant attacked the Respondent’s counter affidavit and urged this court to strike it out. The reasons averred are that the Affidavit is not in the form it should be and also offend the provisions of the Evidence Act. In his reply address, the applicants counsel submitted that besides that the fact that the respondent’s affidavit is titled wrongly, it is full of arguments, opinions and issues of law and that the deponent did not disclose the source of her information. Counsel submitted that the respondent’s affidavit is thus detective as it offends section 115 of the Evidence Act. On the issue of the affidavit being titled wrongly, I do not think this is a strong point to nullify the Respondent’s affidavit. The Respondent’s affidavit is titled “affidavit in opposition”. According to the Applicant’s counsel, it should have been titled “Counter Affidavit” and since it is not so titled, the Respondent has not filed any counter affidavit. In my view, it is the content that matters and not the title. No matter what title the respondent ascribed to its affidavit, its content is clear as to its purpose. It was filed to counter the facts deposed in the Applicant’s affidavit. The Applicants counsel also submitted that the Respondent’s affidavit is full of arguments opinions and issues of law but counsel did not mention the particular paragraphs of the Respondent’s affidavit which contained the arguments, opinions and issues of law. Counsel did not also make illustration of what he meant by arguments, opinions and issues of law in the Respondent’s affidavit. I have read the Respondent’s affidavit but I cannot place any value on the contention of the Applicant’s counsel. The Respondent’s affidavit contains facts. Similarly, the Applicant’s counsel has contended that the deponent, who was not in any of the Council meeting, is not in a position to depose to facts of the meetings. Counsel argued that since she did not state the source of her information, her deposition offended Section 115 of the Evidence Act. In paragraph 1 of the respondent’s affidavit, the deponent stated that: I am an Assistant Registrar, legal in the employ of the Federal Polytechnic Nekede, Owerri, the Respondent. By virtue of that position, I am very conversant with the facts of this case”. She went on to narrate the facts. The issue in this application concerns the suspension of the applicant. I do believe that as the Assistant Registrar, legal, the deponent is in a position to be abreast of disciplinary matters in the Respondent institution. With respect to the contention of the Applicant’s counsel that the deponent was not in any of the Council meeting, this is a matter of evidence which should come from the Applicant. There is no such evidence before this court. In the result, the issues raised against the Respondent’s affidavit have no merit. The affidavit has not offended the Evidence Act in any way. In the Respondent’s counter affidavit, it was deposed that the Applicant’s suspension vide the suspension letter was valid. The misconduct for which the Applicant was queried and suspended took place before a proceeding of Committee of Council and not before the Council itself. While admitting that Council was dissolved in July, 2015, the deponent stated that the case was not concluded by Council on 23rd June 2014 or at all but was handed over to the Management of the respondent for further action. The case only began when Council was dissolved but investigation into the allegation continued. The deponent narrated that when the applicant was invited for the first time to appear before the Committee on 3rd March 2014 on a an allegation the committee was investigating, she came to the meeting with a letter from her solicitor, annexed as EXHIBIT CC, demanding among others that the applicant be permitted to video tape the proceedings of the Committee as a pre-condition for her appearance before the Committee. The Committee turned down her request and this made the Applicant to leave the venue without appearing before the committee. The Applicant eventually appeared before the committee on 23/6/2014 after refusing to honour 2 previous invitations. During the proceedings of 23/6/2014, the Committee discovered that the Applicant had a pen-like taping device on her. When the Committee invited the ICT experts from the ICT unit to verify the device, the Applicant admitted that the pen had a hidden wire-taping device but insisted she has not taped anything with it. When the ICT personnel played the device on a laptop, visual and audio of all the proceedings of the Committee was shown. The Applicant was ordered to remove the device and the proceedings proceeded thereafter. The incident of taping device found on the Applicant did not take place in a Council meeting but in a Council Disciplinary Committee sitting. It was the said Committee that sat on 23rd June 2014 and not the council. The Council met only on 25th and 26th June 2014 and it was in the council meeting of 26th June that the Committee reported the incidence of 23rd June to council. Council thereat referred the matter to Management headed by the Rector. Minutes of the Committee meeting of 23rd June 2014 and Council meeting of 26th June 2014 were annexed as Exhibits AA and BB respectively. After the meeting, the Registrar/Secretary to Council communicated the directive of council to the Rector for implementation and it was on that basis a query was issued to the Applicant which the Applicant replied. The issue of taping device was a new and different misconduct from the one the committee was hearing, as such, the Committee made a report of the incident to the Council in its meeting of 26th June 2014 and the Management of the respondent. The Council thereafter ordered that the Applicant be queried. The query given to the Applicant was in line with disciplinary process for misconduct alleged against the Applicant but the process was stayed on account of the Applicant’s Suit No: NICN/67/2014 over the query. Investigation into the allegation in the query was stayed because of Suit No NICN/67/2014 seeking to quash the query but the Respondent had to proceed on the investigation when judgment in the suit upheld the validity of the query. After the judgment, the Respondent resumed its inquiry on the matter from where it stopped when the suit was filed. After considering the Applicant’s explanation in her reply to the query and the investigation which revealed that the Applicant had a record of disobeying administrative instructions of the Respondent, particularly that the Committee had earlier forbidden her from recording or wire-taping its proceedings but she disobeyed the instruction, the Rector was of the opinion that the applicant be suspended pending investigation. The deponent averred that by the provision of Section 17(2) Federal Polytechnic Act 2004, suspensions may be imposed on the Authority of the Rector of the Respondent institution in the absence of Council. The suspension was not a double punishment but merely a procedural step to keep away the Applicant from work environment during the period of trial for misconduct. From the facts as presented by the parties, the background of this application is that on 1st September 2014, the Respondent issued a query to the Applicant in respect of the allegation that the Applicant was wire-taping the proceedings of the Staff Disciplinary Committee meeting. The Applicant submitted a reply to the query after which she brought an Application in Suit NICN/67/2014 seeking, among others, an order to quash the query. In the ruling delivered on 7th October 2015, this court held that the query was valid. After the said ruling, the Respondent continued the disciplinary action commenced by the query and issued the Claimant a suspension by the letter dated 12th October 2015. The Claimant has now brought this application seeking the suspension to be quashed on the grounds and the facts which have been set out earlier in this ruling. The singular task in this application is to determine whether the Applicant’s suspension contained in the letter dated 12th October 2015 ought to be quashed. I agree with the Respondent’s counsel’s submission that this application for judicial review in respect of the suspension can only be considered on the grounds of (a) error of law on the face of record (b) ground of denial of natural justice (c) ultra vires or (d) fraud. The court will only interfere by way of order of certiorari where the decision of the inferior court or body is unreasonable; there is lack of or exceeded its jurisdiction; acted contrary to natural justice; or there is error on the face of the record of such inferior Court or body. See EKPO vs. CALABAR LOCAL GOVERNMENT (1993) 3 NWLR (Pt. 281) 324 at 347; UNIVERSITY OF UYO vs. ESSEL (2006) All FWLR (Pt. 315) 80 at 101. From the case of the Applicant and documents Exhibited, it is clear to me that the record and the act which the Applicant wants this Court to review is the suspension letter dated 12th October 2015 suspending her from duty and the act of the suspension itself. The question arising therefrom is: Was there any error manifest on the face of the suspension letter or any error in the act of suspension which render them quashable? Before I go about answering the question, it is very important that the content of the suspension letter, which is the originating factor of this application, be first examined. The suspension letter, annexed by the applicant to her affidavit as exhibit A, reads- 12th October 2015 Dr. (Mrs.) Carol Obinwanne, Medical and Health Services Division, Federal Polytechnic Nekede, Owerri. SUSPENSION FOR MISCONDUCT Recall that on 1st September 2014 you were issued a query vide letter reference FPN/R/P/SS/983/199 for an alleged misconduct. Recall again that the query was on your alleged disobedience of express orders forbidding you from bringing wire tapping device into sitting of the Disciplinary Committee/wire tapping them and the proceedings Recall further that on 5th September 2014, vide letter reference FPN/MC/CS/21, you had purported to respond to the query. Management after careful review of your reply found same to be unsatisfactory, most evasive and unremorseful. This is despite the obvious contempt you had earlier visited upon the Disciplinary Committee and the Council of this great institution over the incident. Management therefore rejected your purported defence and referred the matter for council attention and trial. On this score, I have as a consequence been directed to convey the Rector’s decision pursuant to Section 17 (2) Federal Polytechnic Act 2004 suspending you from duty. This is sequel to Rector’s opinion that the alleged misconduct in issue is prejudicial to the maintenance of discipline and decorum in the general administration of the Polytechnic. In the first instance, you are by the decision suspended for three months on half salary commencing from Tuesday the 13th day of October 2015 Kindly hand over the Polytechnic property in your custody to the Director, Medical Services and drop your physical contact address with the undersigned as you proceed on the suspension. Thank you. Azubuike Nduka Deputy Registrar SSP, For: Registrar. From the content of the suspension letter, the Applicant was suspended by the Rector of the respondent pursuant to Section 17 (2) of FPA 2004 and the misconduct for which the applicant was suspended was disobedience to express orders forbidding her from bringing wire tapping device into the sitting of the Disciplinary Committee, which act, in the Rector’s opinion, was prejudicial to the maintenance of discipline and decorum in the general administration of the Polytechnic. The duration of the suspension was stated to be three months from 13th October 2015. Let me now find the answer to the question I posed above. In doing that, I will examine the question in the light of the complaints of the Applicant against the suspension (as can be seen in the grounds of the application) as well as the established grounds on which an order of certiorari is granted. One of the grounds of the Applicant’s application is that the letter of suspension was issued without valid authority and there was no council at the time the suspension letter was issued (see grounds i, ii, and iii). The averments of the Applicant remotely touching on this ground of the application can be seen in paragraphs 11 and 20 of the affidavit in support of the application. The Applicant’s depositions in these paragraphs are that the Rector was not present in Council meeting of 23rd June 2014 and that the letter of query was served on him long after the Council was dissolved. I find these averments quite insufficient in the consideration of this ground of the application. In his written address, the Applicant’s counsel submitted that the Council of the Respondent was dissolved in July 2014, as such, at the time the Rector suspended the Applicant, there was no Council in existence which he acted on behalf. It is clear from the suspension letter that the decision to suspend the Applicant was taken by the Rector of the Respondent. If I follow the argument of the Applicant’s counsel on this ground of the application, it is his position that the Rector could not validly suspend the Applicant when there was no council in place. In the letter of suspension, it was indicated that the Rector exercised his power under section 17 (2) of the FPA 2004 to suspend the Applicant. The section provides: “(2) The Rector may, in a case of misconduct by a member of the staff which in the opinion of the Rector is prejudicial to the interests of the polytechnic, suspend such member and any such suspension shall forthwith be reported to the Council. This provision empowers the Rector to suspend members of staff of the Respondent. The exercise of the power of suspension is not stated to be dependent on Council being in place. Where the Council comes in is only after the suspension, whereby the Rector is required to report the suspension to Council. In my view, the Rector can exercise the power to suspend a staff whether or not a Council was in place. Therefore, the fact that no council was in place at the time the Rector suspended the Applicant does not affect the suspension. The Applicant’s counsel has also argued that the Rector's opinion for suspending the Applicant as expressed in the letter of suspension is not covered by the FPA because no one has determined that there was misconduct. With respect to the Applicant’s counsel, the Applicant had already been served a query, the Applicant’s Exhibit B, with respect to the incidence where her action was viewed as misconduct. That is to say, there was already an allegation of misconduct laid against her in respect of the wire-tapping incidence. Now, the subsection gave discretion to the Rector to suspend any member of staff of the respondent in respect misconduct “which in the opinion of the Rector is prejudicial to the interests of the polytechnic”. What is required in the provision for the Rector to suspend a staff is for him to hold an opinion that the alleged misconduct is prejudicial to the respondent. In this context of this application, did the Rector hold such an opinion when the applicant was suspended? In the letter of suspension, it was unmistakably stated that the applicant was suspended “sequel to Rector’s opinion that the alleged misconduct in issue is prejudicial to the maintenance of discipline and decorum in the general administration of the Polytechnic.” It is now obvious that misconduct was alleged against the Applicant and the Rector had the opinion that it was prejudicial to the Respondent before suspending the Applicant. The section conferred discretion on the Rector. Whether or not the Rector’s opinion or discretion was validly exercised or not is not the concern of this court. Such can only be determined at the end of the trial for that misconduct. It is not for this court to consider in this application whether the opinion held by the Rector when suspending the Applicant was well-founded. In the various arguments of the Applicant’s counsel, he argued even on the merit of the allegation of misconduct for which the Applicant was suspended. It should be noted that this court is to review the letter of suspension only and not take over the responsibility of the Respondent to try its staff for allegations of misconduct. The arguments of the Applicant’s counsel, particularly on issue 2, attempts to persuade this court to take over the functions of the Respondent in the internal discipline of its staff. I will not be swayed into that venue. I agree with the Respondent’s counsel that the issue of the allegation should not be made an issue in this application because the applicant has not even been tried by the Respondent on that allegation. The action taken by the Respondent is to first suspend the Applicant pending trial of the misconduct. This court cannot go into the authenticity or truthfulness or otherwise of the misconduct alleged against the Applicant for which she was suspended. The issue in this application is simply and basically the propriety of the suspension imposed by the Rector of the Respondent Polytechnic and not to trial of the misconduct alleged against the Applicant. The Applicant’s counsel has also complained about the duration of the suspension and the delegation of the suspension. Although the Applicant did not proffer any evidence on these issues nor did they arise from any of the grounds of the application, I will consider them nonetheless. The Applicant’s counsel quoted the portion of the suspension letter stating the duration of the suspension and submitted that the implication is that it allows the Respondent to continue to suspend the Applicant. The portion of the suspension letter in issue reads: “In the first instance, you are by the decision suspended for three months on half salary commencing from Tuesday the 13th day of October 2015". From this content, what I see is that the duration of the suspension placed on the Applicant was only 3 months. Section 17 (4) FPA provide: “Any person suspended pursuant to subsection (2) or (3) of this section, shall be placed on half pay and the Council shall before the expiration of the period of three months after the date of such suspension consider the case against that person and come to a decision…” It can be seen from this provision that the duration of the suspension has not offended the law. Furthermore, the Applicant was suspended with effect from 13th October 2015 and she brought this suit on 7th December 2015. As at the time of this suit, the 3 months period of the suspension has not lapsed. The Applicant’s counsel’s submission that the Respondent will continue to extend the suspension is a mere apprehension and it is not a valid reason to fault the suspension. I have already said in this ruling that the Rector has power under the Federal Polytechnics Act to suspend any member of staff. The suspension letter also contained that the applicant’s suspension was done by the Rector. It is obvious from the content of the suspension letter that the suspension of the applicant was not delegated to the Rector. It was not the writer who suspended the applicant but only communicated the Rectors action. It cannot therefore be said that the Rector delegated his power to the writer. With respect to the applicant’s suspension, there was no delegation of authority. Another ground for which the applicant wants the suspension quashed is that the suspension is a double punishment as the misconduct leveled against her took place in the meeting of Council held on 23rd June 2014 and it was concluded because she apologized and it was accepted by the Council. See grounds (ii) and (vi) of the grounds of the application. In her deposition, the Applicant averred, in respect of this ground of the application that the incident under reference was that she brought a wireless recording device to the Council meeting of 23rd June 2014. In the meeting of 23rd June 2014, she was found with a recording device which she removed and surrendered to the Chairman of the Council with apology. The Council members accepted her apology and the meeting went on to conclusion. In her further affidavit, the Applicant stated that the incident of wire tapping was concluded in the meeting of 23/6/2014 and that whether the meeting was council committee meeting or council meeting, it is the same. Now, this ground of the application will require a review of the records of that meeting to determine the merit of this ground of the application. The Applicant did not put any record of the meeting before this court. All I have is her averments of what transpired in the meeting. The Respondent has however deposed that the misconduct for which the Applicant was queried and suspended took place before a proceeding of Council Disciplinary Committee and not before the Council itself. It was the said Committee that sat on 23rd June 2014 and not the Council. The Council met only on 25th and 26th June 2014 and it was in the Council meeting of 26th June 2014 that the Disciplinary Committee reported the wire tapping incidence of 23rd June 2014 to Council. Exhibits AA and BB annexed to the respondents counter affidavit are the Minutes of the Committee meeting of 23rd June 2014 and Council meeting of 26th June 2014. I have read these minutes and I discover therein that the body before whom the Applicant appeared on 23rd June 2014 and before whom the incident of wire tapping occurred was the Council Disciplinary Committee and not in the Council meeting as alleged by the Applicant. The Council had its meeting on 25th and 26th June 2014. In the Council meeting of 26th June 2014, the Council Disciplinary Committee reported the incidence of recording of its proceedings to Council and the decision of Council was that a query be issued to the Applicant for the unauthorized recording of council Committee proceedings. Let me correct the impression the Applicant held about Council and Council Committee. The records or the minutes have clearly shown that the Disciplinary Committee is only a Committee of Council. It is not the Council. Therefore, Disciplinary Committee meeting and Council meeting are not the same. Accordingly, the incidence of wire tapping did not occur in Council meeting. From facts and the records of the meetings, the Council had initiated a disciplinary process with respect to the incidence of wire tapping which occurred in Committee meeting of 23/6/2014. I find no merit in the Applicant’s allegation that the incident was completely dealt with by Council on 23/6/2014. Council did not sit on that day and could not have dealt with it. The apology made by the applicant was made to the Committee who is not Council. The fact that the applicant apologized to the Committee and the Committee accepted her apology cannot be considered as a disciplinary action such that her suspension on the same allegation will amount to double punishment. In any case, the decision to discipline staff is that of Council. The respondent’s Disciplinary Committee does not have the power to discipline staff but can only report or recommend to Council who has the power to impose punishment. From the Council’s directive in its meeting of 26th June 2014, it is obvious that the matter was not concluded. The query of 1st September 2014 was issued in accordance with Council directive. Therefore, the Claimant’s suspension on the basis of the allegation in the query is not and cannot be double punishment. The 5th ground of the application is that the letter of query dated 1st September 2014 was authored by a different body that did not function on the matter and never witnessed the alleged misconduct but long after Council, the body that dealt with the alleged misconduct had completed action on the matter. The complaint here is about the authority of the writer of the query to write the query. I recall that the said query was an issue I resolved in the ruling in suit NICN/OW/67/2014. An issue estoppel has been created in respect of the query. I cannot therefore revisit it in this application. Having examined the grounds raised in the application for seeking to quash the suspension letter and the suspension, all the grounds have no merit and I cannot therefore find any reason to grant the order sought by the Applicant. The Applicant has also failed to establish any of the factors for the grant of an order of certiorari. Particularly, I do not see any error on the face of the suspension letter or in the suspension itself that would warrant quashing it. Let me say that suspension is only a temporary disciplinary procedure to keep away the person being disciplined from his duty or regular occupation for a fixed or terminal period pending investigation or trial of the misconduct. The Applicant’s suspension did not conclude the matter. The applicant was told clearly in the suspension letter that the allegation against her had been referred to Council for trial. That is to say the Applicant will have a chance to defend herself. In my view, the Applicant’s instant application is pre-mature and an attempt to frustrate the Respondent’s disciplinary process. I will dismiss this application. The outcome of this application also affects the Applicant’s application for injunction. I do not see any merit in that application too. Consequently, both applications are hereby dismissed. No order as to cost. Ruling is entered accordingly. Hon. Justice O. Y. Anuwe Judge