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INTRODUCTION 1. The claimant took out this action vide an originating summons filed on 10 February 2021. The originating summons is supported by an affidavit with 6 exhibits and a written address. The claimant is asking the Court to determine the following two questions: (1) Considering the decision of this Honourable Court, presided upon by O. Y. Anuwe J. in Suit No. NICN/ABJ/125/2019 delivered on the 17th December, 2019, whether the defendant can continue to operate and/or parade herself, particularly with the claimant, as a union for senior staff cadre in Federal/States statutory corporations or bodies? (2) If the answer to the above question is in the negative, whether the defendant can unionize, purport to unionize and/or continue to unionize the senior staff of the claimant? 2. The claimant then prayed for the following reliefs: (1) A declaration that the defendant cannot continue to operate and/or parade herself, particularly with the claimant, as a union for senior staff cadre in Federal/States statutory corporations or bodies. (2) A declaration that the defendant cannot unionize, purport to unionize and/or continue to unionize the senior staff of the claimant. (3) An order of this Honourable Court perpetually restraining the defendant, her officers, agents, servants, privies and/or any other person claiming through them from continuing to parade herself, particularly with the claimant, as a union for senior staff cadre in the claimant’s Commission. (4) An order of this Honourable Court perpetually restraining the defendant, her officers, agents, servants, privies and/or any other person claiming through them from unionizing, purporting to unionize and/or continuing to unionize the senior staff of the claimant. (5) Costs of this action. 3. In reaction, the defendant entered appearance and then filed a preliminary objection and a counter-affidavit to the originating summons with a supporting written address. To these, the claimant filed a written address in opposition to the preliminary objection and a reply on points of law in respect of the defendant’s written reaction to the originating summons. 4. Both the preliminary objection and the originating summons were moved on the same day and the Court informed the parties that the ruling on the preliminary objection will be given alongside the decision on the originating summons. THE CASE OF THE CLAIMANT 5. There is a decision of this Court attached to the affidavit in support of the originating summons as Exhibit A in Senior Staff Association of Statutory Corporations and Government Owned Companies (SSASCGOC) & anor v. Amalgamated Union of Public Corporations Civil Service Technical and Recreational Service Employees (AUPCTRE) Suit No. NICN/ABJ/125/2019, the judgment of which was delivered on 17 December 2019 wherein the defendant (AUPCTRE) was declared to be a union for junior staff cadre in Federal/State Government Statutory Corporations and Government owned companies and expressly restrained from unionizing the staff in the senior cadre of such bodies. 6. The claimant in the instant case is of the opinion that it comes within the categorization of Federal/State Government Statutory Corporations and Government owned companies. And so in spite of the decision of 17 December 2019, the defendant has not only been parading itself as a union for senior staff of the claimant but has been unionizing the senior staff, purportedly agitating for the interest of the claimant’s senior staff and threatening to cripple the operations of the claimant with an industrial action in furtherance of her miscomprehension of the judgment of the Court. 7. Furthermore, that the defendant, in furtherance of obvious miscomprehension or willful disobedience of the decision of this Court in the judgment in Exhibit A has gone ahead to write letters and issue notices consisting in Exhibits B - F attached to the affidavit in support of the originating summons. That these notices and letters are to threaten the operation of the claimant with industrial action and hence have the capacity to cripple the operation of the claimant and to embarrass it. 8. As regards the contention of the defendant that it has appealed against the judgment of 17 December 2019 and that the claimant was not a party to the judgment, it is the contention of the claimant that the said judgment is one in rem and in respect of which the claimant or anyone whose interest is affected can take advantage of. The claimant is accordingly calling on this Court to interpret its judgment of 17 December 2019 vis-a-vis the actions of the defendant, determine if the judgment is valid and subsisting, make a declaration on the judgment one way or the other and for the defendant, who has persistently misunderstood or miscomprehended the judgment, to be restrained from actions that tend towards disobedience of the judgment of the Court. That flowing directly from all this are the questions whether miscomprehension and/or disobedience of this Court order or any court order at that could operate to vest any valid right on a party and particularly on the defendant in this case and whether such miscomprehension and/or disobedience should be allowed to be to the detriment of the claimant’s interest. THE CASE OF THE DEFENDANT 9. In addition to the preliminary objection challenging the jurisdiction of this court to hear and determine this case as constituted, the case of the defendant is that the claimant was not a party in the proceedings which gave rise to the judgment sought to be interpreted. That the defendant who was a party in the said proceedings was dissatisfied with the judgment of this Court, and filed an appeal to the Court of Appeal challenging the decision of the National Industrial Court. That while the appeal is still pending, the claimant who did not apply to be joined as a party to the appeal began to threaten, harass, intimidate and embarrass members of the defendant in the employment of the Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC) through the Registrar General. 10. As a result of the hasty, draconian policies and over attentiveness to pettiness being exhibited by the claimant’s Registrar General, the defendant issued letters to the claimant’s Board Chairman as contained in Exhibits B, C and D attached to the originating summons intimating the Board of these issues of concern and highlight the need to urgently resolve same. That since the claimant was adamant to the defendant’s concern, the defendant issued Exhibit E to the claimant, a 14 days’ notice to embark on industrial action. However, due to the prompt intervention of the Honourable Minister and the Permanent Secretary Ministry of Trade and Investments requesting parties to maintain the status quo and peace, the strike action was not carried through. That the defendant issued another letter, Exhibit F, suspending the intending industrial action. However, the claimant’s Registrar General continued relentlessly to intimidate, harass and suppress members of the defendant and has instituted this matter seeking to rehear Suit No. NICN/ABJ/125/2019 which had long been concluded and parties in that case had proceeded on appeal to the Court of Appeal, Abuja Division in the matter. THE DEFENDANT’S PRELIMINARY OBJECTION The Submissions of the Defendant 11. The defendant’s preliminary objection was brought pursuant to Order 47 Rules 23, 24 and 25 of the National Industrial Court (Civil Procedure) Rules 2017 (NICN Rules 2017) and under the inherent jurisdiction of the Court. The defendant is praying for two orders: (1) An order striking out and/or dismissing this suit for being incompetent and for lack of jurisdiction. (2) And for such further order(s) as this Honourable Court may deem fit to make in the circumstances. 12. The grounds upon which the preliminary objection is brought are: (1) This Honourable Court lacks the jurisdiction to entertain the originating summons. (2) The mode of commencing this action is wrong and in violation of the Rules of Court. (3) By virtue of the Rules of this Honourable Court, application for interpretation of judgment is by motion on notice and not originating summons. (4) The claimant/respondent was not a party in Suit No. NICN/ABJ/125/2019 and cannot approach this court for interpretation of its decision. (5) A party can only apply within thirty (30) days to the court to interpret its judgment. (6) Failure to follow a laid down procedure for doing a thing where a statute has provided for the procedure, renders any act done under that statute null and void. 13. The defendant submitted a lone issue for determination of the preliminary objection i.e. whether this Court has the jurisdiction to entertain this suit. To the defendant, the undisputed fact in this case is that the claimant in the instant case was not a party in the proceedings that led to the judgment sought to be interpreted and which is subject of an appeal pending before the Court of Appeal. That the claimant/respondent not being a party to the suit lacks the locus to institute this action and this Court lacks the vires to entertain it. What is even more is that there is no ambiguity in the judgment sought to be interpreted by the claimant/respondent. That a court cannot be surreptitiously clothed with jurisdiction to exercise appellate authority over its own decision. The claimant wants to employ a short cut to have a bite in a cherry of a suit that this Court had given a final decision on and determined the rights of the parties. That the claimant cannot move this Court under any guise to sit on appeal over its judgment . As such, this Court lacks the jurisdiction to entertain this suit, urging the Court to so hold and protect its integrity. That this is necessary because if this Court makes any finding or declaration that will change the content and character of the judgment while the case is to be heard on appeal before judgment is delivered at the Court of Appeal it will amount to judicial derogation. 14. It is the defendant’s contention that the classification of the judgment sought to be interpreted by the claimant as judgment in rem is of no consequence. That the subject matter of this suit raises the issue of competence because it is still pending at the Court of Appeal. The Court, therefore, lacks the legal authority to deal with the subject matter of this suit. That the case at hand is an invitation on this Court to sit on appeal over its judgment. That the issue of jurisdiction raised in this case relates to the competence of the Court to hear and determine matters relating to the judgment that the Court of Appeal is seized of. That it is trite that once a court has delivered its decision on a matter, it ceases to be seized of the case. It cannot re-open it for any purpose whatsoever. 15. That the circumstances or factors under which a court can set aside its own ruling, order, or judgment have been laid down by Supreme Court, viz: (a) When the judgment is obtained by fraud or deceit. (b) When the judgment is a nullity and a person affected by the order is entitled ex debit justitiae to have it set aside. (c) When the judgment is delivered under the mistaken belief that the parties consented to it. (d) When the judgment is given in the absence of jurisdiction. (e) Where the procedure adopted was such as to deprive the judgment or decision of the character of legitimate adjudication; referring to Ibrahim v. Gwandu [2015] 5 NWLR (Pt. 1451)1 at 30. 16. It is the defendant’s submission that the judgment sought to be interpreted does not come within the purview of any exception listed above. And that the judgment sought to be interpreted, the subject matter of this suit, is clear, precise and direct. There is no confusion, no ambiguity, no uncertainty. It is a valid judgment and all the ingredients of a valid judgment were present and satisfied, citing CPC v. INEC [2021] 13 NWLR (Pt. 1317) 285 on the essential requirements of a judgment. That the defendant, who is dissatisfied with the judgment, has gone on appeal. As such, it will best serve the interest of justice if this case is dismiss as the Court lacks the jurisdiction to entertain the originating summons, relying on Madukolu v. Nkemdilum [1962] 2 SCNLR, Lado v. CPC [2011] 12 SC (Pt. 111) 113 and Obiuweubi v. CBN [2011] 1 NWLR (1247) 465 at 506. 17. The defendant went on that another point of importance is that the claimant did not comply with the provisions of the Rules of this Court to enable the Court exercise its jurisdiction to entertain this suit. That Order 47 Rules 23 and 24 of the NICN Rules 2017, provides as follows: (23) In a matter before the Court in which the Court has delivered its judgment, any of the parties in the suit may by an application with a Written Address to the Court apply for an interpretation of the judgment. Provided that such an application shall not be for the purpose of requesting the Court to rewrite its judgment or reverse itself. Provided further that the application with a Written Address shall only be for the purpose of clearing any ambiguity or uncertainty, or for ascertaining the true meaning of or the intent of any ward used in the judgment. (24) An application for interpretation of a judgment of the Court shall be by motion on notice and shall be filed not later than thirty (30) days after the delivery of the judgment or ruling (emphasis is the defendant’s). 18. To the defendant, it trite law that when a time is appointed or limited for the doing of any act by the Rules of court, parties are bound to comply with such Rules. That the failure to comply with the Rules is not only fatal to the act or process before the Court but renders it incompetent. 19. That it is important to note that there is no ambiguity to ascertain the true meaning of or intent of any words used in the judgment sought to be interpreted. That the judgment is very clear and unambiguous, the claimant is not a party to the suit, and is out of time, and initiated this application with a wrong procedure without leave of Court. That these are fundamental defects that cannot be cured and accordingly this Court is without the jurisdiction to entertain this matter. The defendant then submitted that the judgment sought to be interpreted by this Court is brought in bad faith and intended to irritate and annoy the defendant and to foist a case of nugatory on the Court of Appeal, which constitutes an abuse of court process, citing Messrs NV Scheep & anor v. The MV S Araz & anor [2000] 15 NWLR (Pt. 691) 222 at 664 20. To the defendant, this suit has become academic. This is so because the judgment sought to be interpreted by this Court was decided on the merits by this same Court against the defendant. That there is nothing in the subject matter of the suit for this Court to delve on. That it is only the Court of Appeal that has jurisdiction to review the judgment sought to be interpreted, relying on AG, Federation v. ANPP [2003] 13 NWLR (Pt. 851) 182 at 215 - 216 21. The defendant concluded by submitting that the claimant’s suit is fundamentally defective and incompetent, and so is liable to be dismissed for lacking in merit; urging the Court to dismiss this action for being an abuse of court process and lacking in merit. The Reaction of the Claimant 22. To the claimant, by Woheren v. Emereuwa [2004] 13 NWLR (Pt. 890) 398 SC at 419, where facts which are obscure or at large as it is in the case of this preliminary objection, which has to be supported by affidavit, where the facts are not discernible from the plaintiff’s claims, then the facts could be better used as defence to the substantive suit and not as a preliminary objection. The claimant then submitted one issue for determination i.e. considering the provisions of the 1999 Constitution and the totality of the facts in the originating summons, whether there is anything that robs the case of the claimant of competence so as to militate against this Honourable Court’s jurisdiction. 23. It is the submission of the claimant that the objection of the defendant is misplaced; it is wrongfully based on the provisions of the procedural rules of this Court. That it is not the Rules of this Court that vest jurisdiction on this Court, rather it is the 1999 Constitution that confers jurisdiction on this Court. That the law is well settled that it is not the Rules of Court that confer jurisdiction on the court but the statute creating the court, citing Dalhatu v. Turaki [2003] 15 NWLR (Pt. 843) 310 at 337 - 340, AG, Rivers v. AG, Akwa Ibom [2011] 8 NWLR (Pt. 1248) 31 and Adah v. NYSC [2004] 13 NWLR (Pt. 891) 639 at 648. 24. That in the instant case, it is the Constitution in section 254A that created this Court and section 245C of the Constitution clearly states its jurisdiction. And section 254C (l)(j)(iii) which states as follows; (1) Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 251, 257, 272 and, anything contained in this Constitution and in addition to such other jurisdiction as may be conferred upon it by an Act of the National Assembly, the National Industrial Court shall have and exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of any other court in civil causes and matters — (j) relating to the determination of any question as to the interpretation and application of any — (iii) award or judgment of the court. 25. The claimant then pointed out that section 254C(1)(j)(iii) of the 1999 Constitution is written in plain words, without any ambiguity, and in such a situation the Court in construing it does not need a recourse to any tool of interpretation but to give it its literal and ordinary meaning, citing Buhari v. Obasanjo [2005] 2 NWLR (Pt. 910) 241 at 412. That against the backdrop of the foregoing, it is plain and clear that this Court has the exclusive jurisdiction to interpret her own awards or judgments. 26. That the law is clear as well that for the Court to decipher her own jurisdiction what the Court considers is the totality of the claim of the plaintiff or the claimant as contained in the statement of claim or affidavit in support of originating summons as it is in this case, citing Adeyemi v. Opeyori [1976] 9 - 19 SC 31 and UBN Plc v. Integrated Timber & Plywood Producers Ltd (2000) 12 NWLR (Pt. 680) 99 at 110. 27. To the claimant, from the totality of its the pleadings, it could be easily discerned that the case of the claimant is for the interpretation of the decision of this Court as contained in the judgment of the Court in Suit No. NICN/ABJ/125/20l9. That apart from this fact that it is easily discernible on the face of the originating summons and the affidavit in its support, the defendant admitted this fact in the affidavit in support of the preliminary objection making it settled between the parties that the issue before this Court relates to interpretation of the judgment in the suit under reference. 28. The claimant continued that the only thin line of dispute between the parties, which is legal and not factual, is whether the Court should premise its jurisdiction on the provisions of her own Rules as being urged upon her by the defendant in this case or place it on the Constitution which created the Court. The claimant then submitted that this position had been settled by the Supreme Court in Dalhatu v. Turaki (supra), Adah v. NYSC (supra) and a host of other judicial authorities. That by the golden principles of judicial precedents and stare decisis the Court should prefer and follow the position of the Supreme Court that it is the Constitution or statute that confers jurisdiction. The claimant then commended the admonition of the Supreme Court on deferring to the judgments of the higher court by lower courts, citing Okonji v. Mudiaga & ors [1985] 10 SC 267 at 268 - 269. The claimant urged the Court to prefer to use the Constitution as the source of its jurisdiction and not the Rules as the defendant is urging on the Court. That if this is done, the Court will not find it difficult to discountenance the objection of the defendant, which is premised on the Rules of the Court. 29. The defendant had argued that the case of the claimant is a move to let this Court sit on appeal over its own judgment and that there is no ambiguity in the judgment that calls for interpretation. And this argument is based on the fact that there is a pending appeal against the judgment. To the claimant, the defendant has totally misplaced the essence of this case. That, as can be garnered from the originating summons and the supporting affidavit, this case is for the interpretation of the judgment of this Court with a view to stopping the trend of disobedience of the judgment by the defendant. That whether they have disobeyed or not is a matter that goes to the merit and not for discussion here since jurisdiction is deciphered from the case of the claimant and not from the defence of the defendant. The claimant then stressed that its case is not for the purpose of the Court to sit on appeal over its judgment but for the interpretation of her judgment within the ambits of section 254C(l)(j)(iii) of the Constitution. 30. The defendant had also submitted that there is nothing ambiguous in the judgment of this Court and that the judgment is already on appeal. To the claimant, if we all agree that there is nothing ambiguous about the judgment of this Court and it is to the effect that the defendant is a union for junior staff, and they already appealed against that decision, is that enough reason for the defendant to disobey the judgment which, as they conceded, is unambiguous? That the law is settled that an appeal does not stay the judgment or render the judgment ineffectual and parties are still bound by the terms of the judgment until the appeal is determined one way or the other, except there is an order for stay of execution by the trial court or by an appellate court, which is not the case here, citing Oloyede v. Olaleye [2010] 4 NWLR (Pt. 1183) 1 at 38 - 39. 31. The claimant then submitted that even if the Court decides to consider the provisions of the Rules under which this objection is brought, that is, Order 47 Rules 23 and 24 of the NICN Rules 2017 one would see that the Rules were made for party in litigation and not for a party, like the claimant in this case, seeking the interpretative jurisdiction of the Court as allowed by the Constitution. That the Rule is very clear that it is applicable to parties in a case before the Court and not to anyone like the claimant seeking the constitutional powers of the Court to interpret her own judgment, referring to the opening words of Rule 23: “In any matter before the Court in which the Court has delivered its judgment, any of the parties in the suit may by an application with a Written Address to the Court apply for an interpretation of the Judgment…” That from this, one can see that the provisions of the Rules under which this preliminary objection is based is directed to parties in litigation before the Court who want to seek interpretation of the judgment of the Court and not to third parties like the claimant. That the consequential effect of this is that the preliminary objection is misplaced and all the laws cited in its support are misapplied, urging the Court to so hold. 32. The claimant went on that the law is well settled that judicial authorities are only binding precedents where the facts of the former case are on all fours with the facts of the latter case, citing Odu’a Investments Co. Ltd v. Talabi [1997] 10 NWLR (Pt. 523) 1 at 56 and Ali v. Osakwe [2009] 14 NWLR (Pt. 1160) 75 at 140 - 141. That in light, since the facts of this case are totally different from the facts of the cases cited in support of the preliminary objection, those cases are decided on their own peculiar facts which are distinct and distinguishable from the facts of this case. 33. Finally, that the defendant is challenging the competence of this action on the ground that it is academic and hypothetical. That nothing can be further from the truth than this assertion. That an action is said to be academic or hypothetical where the action has no practical or utilitarian value to the plaintiff, citing Ugba v. Suswan [2014] 14 NWLR (Pt. 1427) 264 at 313. That the case of the claimant would have been academic if it is only for the interpretation of the judgment without seeking declaratory and injunctive orders. That is when the case would have served no practical purpose to the claimant. But considering the totality of the case of the claimant, particularly the reliefs sought in the case, the case cannot be said to be academic and forensic. To this end, that the argument that the case of the claimant is academic goes to no issue and the case cited in support of the argument is irrelevant, urging the Court to so hold. 34. The claimant concluded by urging the Court to overrule this preliminary objection, strike it out and proceed to hear the case of the claimant on the merit. 35. The defendant did not file any reply on points of law regarding the claimant’s submissions opposing the preliminary objection. THE CLAIMANT’S ORIGINATING SUMMONS The Submissions of the Claimant 36. The claimant submitted one issue for determination i.e. whether the Court should not intervene by interpreting her decision contained in Exhibit A to the affidavit in support of the originating summons, restrain the defendant from any further willful disobedience or miscomprehension of her decision under reference and to protect the right of the claimant. To the claimant, an order of the Court must be strictly adhered to by all parties concerned, as long as that order subsists and has not been set aside by a superior court of competent jurisdiction, citing Purification Technique (Nig) Ltd v. Jubril [2012] 18 NWLR (Pt. 1331) 109 at 139. That it is not in dispute that a court of competent jurisdiction, like this Court presided upon by His Lordship O. Y. Anuwe J. declared the defendant a union for the staff in the junior cadre in Federal/State Government statutory corporations and government owned companies, the category of which the claimant belongs, and made an order restraining the defendant from unionizing the senior staff of such bodies. 37. That the defendant has been persistent in unionizing the senior staff of the claimant and even threatening industrial action which has the capacity of crippling the operations of the claimant and thoroughly embarrassing it. That this singular act of the defendant has portrayed it as a body that lacks respect for the rule of law, citing Obi v. INEC [2007] 11 NWLR (Pt. 1046) 560 at 645. To the claimant, the facts of the instant case are similar but more disturbing that the facts of Obi under reference. In Obi, the case was on-going, there was no court order yet but in this case, the defendant took law into its own hands and in flagrance disobedience to the order of the Court continues to unionize the staff of the claimant in the senior cadre. This, the defendant has done and keeps doing in order to cripple the claimant’s operation and to embarrass her. 38. It is the further submission of the claimant that there is already a court order which had not been set aside as at the time the defendant was writing all its letters and issuing notices of threats to the to the claimant. It must be pointed out that the defendant was aware of the order and yet acted against the dictates of the order. That this fact is clearly established by the assertion of the defendant that the judgment is on appeal already. That the law is that where an order is made in the presence of a party or same had been served on the party, non-compliance with such an order will render any action taken on it a nullity, citing Onagoruwa v. Adeniji [1993] 5 WRN (Pt. 293) 297 at 348. That though there is said to be a pending appeal against the valid and subsisting decision of this Court, the appeal was yet to be decided as at the time the defendant started and continue to act against the dictates of the judgment. That this action of the defendant is caught by the doctrine of lis pendens which forbids parties taking anticipatory steps during litigation. That the implication of this is that the pendency of the appeal as alleged does not excuse the defendant from respecting the dignity and sanctity of the judicial institution by allowing the Court of Appeal to decide the appeal before the anticipatory action of the defendant. That the position of the law is that parties are to stay action completely until the determination of the pending suit before the court, relying on Enekwe v. IMBN [2007] 11 WRN 1 at 19, Amaechi v. INEC [2008] 10 WRN I at 255, Military Governor of Lagos State v. Ojukwu [2001] 39 WRN 155 at 170 and Inakoju v. Adeleke [2008] 3 WRN 1. 39. On the question of the claimant not being a party to the judgment in Exhibit A, which is the main subject of this action, the claimant submitted that the judgment is one in rem and it regulates not just the affairs of the parties to the litigation but the whole world. That Noekoer v. Executive Governor of Plateau State [2018] LPELR (2013)-44350(SC) defined a judgment in rem as “a judicial decision of court of competent jurisdiction which determines the status of a person or a thing as distinct from the particular interest of a party in the litigation”. That Dike v. Nzeka II [1986] 4 NWLR (Pt. 34) 144 at 153 on its part defined a judgment in rem in contradistinction with a judgment in personam in the following words: It is therefore necessary to have a clear idea of distinction between a judgment in rem and judgment in personam. A judgment is said to be in rem when it is an adjudication pronounced upon the status of some particular thing or subject matter by a tribunal having the jurisdiction and competence to pronounce on that status. Such a judgment is usually and invariably founded on proceedings instituted against or on something or subject-matter whose status or condition is to be determined. It is thus a solemn declaration on the status of some persons or thing. It is therefore binding on all persons in so far as their interests in the status of the property or person are concerned. That is why a judgment in rem is a judgment contra mundun — binding on the whole world — parties as well as non-parties. A judgment in personam, on the other hand, is on entirely different footing. It is a judgment against a particular person as distinguished from a judgment declaring the status of a particular person or thing. A judgment in personam will be more accurately called a judgment inter partes. 40. The claimant then submitted that this definitive description of a judgment in rem accurately fits the case of claimant and defeats the position of the defendant that the claimant was not a party to the judgment of this Court in Suit No. NICN/ABJ/125/2019. 41. In conclusion, the claimant urged the Court to decide the sole issue in its favour and hold that the fact that there is an appeal against a judgment of court does not obliterate the judgment. That the fact that there was a pending appeal but had not been decided renders the act of the defendant irreversibly and irrevocably bad by the principle of lis pendens. Also that the fact that the claimant was not a party to the case which gave rise to the judgment does not mean that the claimant cannot benefit from the judgment as the judgment is one in rem. The claimant then urged the Court to grant the reliefs sought in the originating summons. The Submissions of the Defendant 42. The defendant submitted a sole issue for determination, which is: whether from the facts and circumstances of this case, this Honourable Court can interpret its judgment in Suit No. NICN/ABJ/125/2019 which is a subject of a pending appeal before the Court of Appeal. To the defendant, this Court cannot interpret, alter or review its own judgment or final order after it is signed, except to correct clerical or arithmetical mistakes. This is because, as soon as the judgment is pronounced or order is made by the Court, it becomes functus officio (court ceases to have control over the case) and has no power to interpret, review, override, alter or interfere with it. However, the Court can only interpret its judgment under the circumstances provided for under the Rules of this Court i.e. Order 47 Rules 23 and 24 of the NICN Rules 2017. That form this, the Court can only be moved to interpret its judgement for the purpose of clearing any ambiguity or uncertainty, or for ascertaining the true meaning of or intent of any words used in the judgement, However, that is not the case here because the judgement the claimant is urging this Court to interpret is very clear and unambiguous. 43. That in the instant case, that the defendant being dissatisfied with by the judgement of this Court in Suit No. NICN/ABJ/125/2019 delivered by His Lordship O. Y. Anuwe J. on 17 December 2019 has filled an appeal which is pending at the Abuja Division of the Court of appeal. While this appeal is still pending, the claimant, who is neither a party in that case on appeal nor affected by the judgment, has filed this originating summons through the back door seeking to use this Court to reopen the case which has since been disposed of. That in essence, what the claimant is seeking to do is to prompt this Court to rehear the matter or rewrite the judgement in Suit No. NICN/ABJ/125/2019 despite the pendency of the appeal at the Court of Appeal in Appeal No. CA/A/14/2020. Moreover, that the claimant is not a party affected by the judgement sought to be interpreted. And even where the applicant is a party to the case, he must commence this proceedings by filling a motion on notice together with a written address as provided for the express provision of Order 47 Rule 23 of the NICN Rules 2017. That the claimant did not comply with this Rule of the Court to enable the Court exercise its jurisdiction to entertain this suit, referring to Ojukwu v. Ya’Adua & ors [2009] 38 NSCQR 492 at 559. That the law is trite that failure to follow the laid down procedure for doing a thing where a statute has provided for the procedure, renders any act done under that statute null and void and liable to be set aside by the court, referring to Chairman Board of Inland Revenue v. Rezeallah & Son Ltd [1961] NRNLR 32 and Adesanoye v. Adewole II [2006] 27 NSCQR 783 at 800 - 801. 44. The claimant had cited Obi v. INEC [2007] 11 NWLR (Pt. 1046) 560 at 645 and Onagoruwa v. Adeniji [1993] 5 WRN (Pt. 293) 297 at 348 in stating that the defendant is in flagrant disobedience to orders of court by unionizing staff of the claimant to cripple and embarrass the claimant as its reason for initiating this matter. To the defendant, the claimant’s allegation is false. That these cases do not support the case of the claimant, as the claimant has not clearly shown in this case where and how the defendant has continued to unionize the staff of the claimant. That a clear examination of the exhibits attached to the affidavit in support of the originating summons shows that the defendant was merely agitating for the welfare and wellbeing of its members who were being maltreated, intimidated, oppressed and harassed by the Registrar General of the claimant through his obnoxious and inhuman policies. 45. The claimant went on that pleading is the bedrock upon which evidence is laid to sustain a claim. That a party swims or sinks with his pleadings. Therefore, pleadings must be detailed and comprehensive on material facts and not evasive or vague as in the instant case, citing Akande v. Adisa [2012] 15 NWLR (Pt. 1324) 538 at 574. Similarly, that averments in pleadings on which no evidence is adduced are deemed to have been abandoned as mere averments. Where there is no proof of facts pleaded as in this case, the averments must fail. That the claimant’s pleadings in paragraphs 10 - 18 of the affidavit in support of the originating summons are not supported by any evidence, urging the Court to deem the averments as abandoned, citing Olaniyan v. Oyewole [2011] 14 NWLR (Pt. 1268) 445 at 483. 46. The defendant continent that since it initiated its appeal, the defendant has remained law abiding and has not done anything whatsoever to render the decision of the Court of Appeal nugatory. However, it is the claimant through its Registrar General who, despite the pendency of the appeal and the intervention of the Minister and the Permanent Secretary Ministry of Trade and Investment, has continued to maltreat, intimidate. oppress and harass members of the defendant working for the claimant, just because of their agitation for a better welfare and conditions of service. 47. That the claimant had also admitted at paragraph 8 of the supporting affidavit that the judgment is quite clear when it stated thus: That by the tenor of the Judgment in Exhibit A, the Defendant herein, who was also the Defendant in that case, and the judgment quite clearly declared the Defendant not being a Union for the senior staff of statutory corporations and government owned companies. That it is settled law that facts admitted need no further proof, citing Ologun v. Fatayo [2013] l NWLR (Pt. 1335) 303 at 319 - 320. The claimant then submitted that since by the claimant’s own admission that the tenor of the judgment in Suit No. NICN/ABJ/125/2019 is quite clear, this suit is therefore an abuse of court and ought to be dismissed. That there is, therefore, no iota of law supporting the originating summons by which this action was commenced, citing Manson v. Halliburton Energy Service Ltd [2007] 2 NWLR (Pt. 1018) 211 48. Furthermore, that the claimant filed this action purposely to harass, irritate and to annoy the defendant, which is thus an abuse of court process, referring to Dapianlong v. Dariye [2007] 8 NWLR (Pt. 1036) 239 at 322. That the claimant had no business engaging the originating summons except to achieve his only aim, which is to harass, irritate and to annoy the defendant. That this renders the action an abuse of the process of the court, and the originating summons employed by him is a process not supported by law. The defendant then urged the Court to hold that this action is premised on frivolity for which the suit should be dismissed, citing Offor v. Leaders & Company Ltd [2007] 7 NWLR (Pt. 1032) 1 at 24. Accordingly, that this Court lacks the power to grant the reliefs sought by which the claimant is urging the court to interpret its decision in the judgment delivered by His Lordship O. Y. Anuwe J. in Suit No. NICN/ABJ/125/2019 even when the said judgment is the subject of a pending appeal before the Court of Appeal. 49. In conclusion, the defendant urged the Court to dismiss the claimant’s case for being frivolous and lacking in merit and being abusive of the process of this court. The Claimant’s Reply on Points of Law 50. The claimant’s reply on points of law is on specific points raised in the defendant’s written address. The defendant had argued that the Court cannot interpret, alter or review her own judgment because it is functus officio and in that case had lost jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the case. The defendant further argued that by Order 47 Rules 23 & 24 of the NICN Rules 2017 the Court can only interpret her judgment upon an application supported by a written address and within 30 days of the judgment. To the claimant, the learned senior counsel made this submission without averting his mind to section 254C(1)(j)(iii) of the 1999 Constitution, which confers jurisdiction on this Court to interpret her own judgments. That this constitutional provision is written in plain words, without any ambiguity, and in such a situation, the Court in construing it does not need a recourse to any tool of interpretation but to give it its literal and ordinary meaning, citing Buhari v. Obasanjo [2005] 2 NWLR (Pt. 910) 241 at 412. 51. That what the learned senior counsel is advocating is that the Court should construe the provision of the Rules in such a manner that it will have a limiting effect on the provisions of the Constitution. That the law is well settled, going by section 1(1) and (3) of the 1999 Constitution, that where there is a law, including the Rules of this Court, that contradicts or runs counter to the Constitution is null and void to the extent of its inconsistency with the Constitution. The claimant also referred to Labiyi v. Anretiola [1992] 8 NWLR (Pt. 258) 139 at 160, Ehirim v. ISIEC [2008] l5 NWLR (Pt. 1111) 443 at 471 and Okulate v. Awosanya [2000] 2 NWLR (Pt. 646) 530, all of which interpreted section 1(1) and (3) of the 1999 Constitution. The claimant then submitted that by the terms and operation of the above constitutional provision, the Rules of this Court cannot operate to limit the operation of the Constitution. 52. That the senior counsel had also commended Ojukwu v. Yar’Adua [2009] 38 NSCQR 442, Chairman Board of Inland Revenue v. Rezealla & Sons Ltd [1961] NRNLR 32 and Adesanoye v. Adewole [2006] NSCQR 783 to the effect that where there is a statutory provision for how an act is to be performed, it can only be validly performed in that manner. That this argument is to aid their position that the plaintiff did not follow the Rules of the Court by bringing the action by originating summons and within 30 days of the Judgment. To the claimant, the Rule is very clear that it is applicable to parties in a case before the Court and not to anyone like the claimant seeking the constitutional powers of the Court to interpret her own judgment. In that wise, it may be quite relevant to quote the opening words of Rule 23: “In any matter before the Court in which the Court has delivered its judgment, any of the parties in the suit may by an application with a Written Address to the Court apply for an interpretation of the Judgment…” That from this provision one can see that this provision is directed at parties in litigation before the Court who want to seek interpretation of the judgment of the Court and not to third parties like the claimant. 53. The defendant had also argued that the claimant has left his assertions on the fact that the defendant has been agitating for the interest of senior staff and management staff of the claimant against the tenor of the judgment which is subject of the action. In aid of this argument, the defendant relied on the case of Olaniyan v. Oyewole [2011] 14 NWLR (Pt. 1268) 445 at 483 to the effect that averments not backed by evidence are deemed abandoned. To the claimant, the case cited is good for the purpose for which it was cited but the situation here is different. The claimant conceded that the claimant made this assertion in paragraph 12 of the affidavit in support of the originating summons and in support of that assertion it attached Exhibit B, which is a document of the defendant and which was prepared after the judgment. That on a careful perusal of Exhibit B, the Court will see that at page 3 item 2 under the heading “Recommendations” the defendant was agitating for the interest of Principal Managers, Assistant Directors and Deputy Directors. The claimant then asked: what better evidence will the defendant require in proof of this assertion? 54. To the claimant, the fact that this document is a document made by the defendant constitutes an admission by them that they were agitating for the interest of senior and management staff as against the tenor of the judgment in Exhibit A, which restricts their activities to junior staff. That it is a well settled position of the law that admission against the interest of a party in litigation is the best evidence in favour of his adversary, citing Onyege v. Ebere [2004] 13 NWLR (Pt. 889) 20 at 39 and I.F.A. International Ltd v. Liberty Merchant Bank Plc [2005] 9 NWLR (Pt. 930) 274 at 291. That the claimant cannot ever have any better evidence of the activities of the defendant agitating for the interest other than that of the junior staff than the one contained in Exhibit B, urging the Court to so hold. 55. The defendant had further admitted that the judgment of the Court is clear and unambiguous. To the claimant, the implication of that submission is that both the claimant and the defendant are all on the same page on the ground that the judgment of the Court is to the effect that the defendant is not a union for senior staff of statutory corporations and government owned companies. However, that in the opinion of counsel for the defendant, since the case is clear and needs no interpretation the case sf the claimant constitutes an abuse. In response to this, the claimant submitted that the admission of counsel for the defendant here first takes us to the legal consequential effect of the defendant’s admission that the judgment, subject of this case, states the defendant is an association for junior staff. That the effect is that the case becomes non-disputant and the fact of filing a counter-affidavit become superfluous. That the law is clear on the fact that it is where there is material conflict in a trial by affidavit evidence as this, that the court will need to call oral evidence to resolve such conflict or contradiction, citing Ogah v. Ikpeazu [2017] 17 NWLR (Pt. 1594) 299 at 335. However, that such conflict must be on a “crucial and material” issue, citing Mabamije v. Otto [2016] 13 NWLR (Pt. 1579) 171 at 192 - 193, Momah v. Vab Petroleum [2000] and Falobi v. Falobi [1976] 10 SC 1. In view of the foregoing, the claimant urged the Court to see this as a case of admission of material fact by defendant that makes the case non-disputant and not hostile rather than to see it as a case of abuse as being erroneously argued by the defendant. 56. The defendant also argued that the claimant’s case is an abuse since there is no dispute between the parties as to the effect of the judgment and hence the case is just for the purpose of irritating and/or annoying the defendant. That the defendant relied on cases on abuse which would have been apt if they were relevant to the facts of this case. To the claimant, the case of the claimant is totally different from the picture painted by the defendant’s counsel in the sense that the case of the claimant is not just for the interpretation of the judgment but also for consequential order of injunction. 57. The claimant continued that the argument that the case of the claimant is only for the purpose of irritating and annoying the defendant would have been of moment if there was no prayer for injunctive relief. However, that if what the defendant finds annoying and irritating is the fact that the claimant wants to get them to obey and respect the judgment of this Court which they concede is clear and unambiguous, then no apology. 58. The claimant then submitted that this Court has the jurisdiction and even the duty to protect her own integrity by ensuring compliance with her own orders. This is more so in this case that the defendant has demonstrably shown that the judgment of this Court is clear to her but chose to ignore it, citing Fatb v. Ezegbu [1993] 6 NWLR (Pt. 297) 1 at 25 where the court held that no court or tribunal worth its salt would allow a party to get away with impunity as we have here. 59. In the final analysis, the defendant’s counsel had submitted that this Court lacks the power to interpret the judgment because it is on appeal. To the claimant, this position has no foundation in law. That the 1aw is well settled that a judgment of court remains valid and subsisting until same has been set aside by an appellate court, citing AG, Federation v. AIC Ltd [2000] 10 NWLR (Pt. 675) 293 at 308 and Purification Techniques (Nig) Ltd v. Jubril [2012] 18 NWLR (Pt. 1331) 109 at 139. That assuming without conceding that there is any error in the judgment of His Lordship O. Y. Anuwe J. in Suit No. NICN/ABJ/125/2019 it remains subsisting and valid until set aside on appeal. That any disobedience to the terms of that judgment is an act of impunity which this Court should frown at. This is more so where it has not been shown that this Court has granted an order for stay of execution or if there is such a pending application for stay pending before this Court or in the Court of Appeal. 60. In conclusion, the claimant submitted that the fact that it did not respond to some issues in the written address is not an indication that it has conceded to such issues. That it is either that such issues have been adequately dealt with in its own written address in support of the originating summons that it will amount to rearguing its position or that the issues are too flippant or frivolous to merit a response. Accordingly, that except as otherwise expressly stated, nothing in the defendant’s written address is conceded. COURT’S DECISION 61. I have given due consideration to all the processes and submissions of the parties. A preliminary point or two may be necessary before looking at the merit of both the preliminary objection and the originating summons. In paragraph 1.02 of its reply on points of law, the claimant wrote thus: It must be highlighted that the fact that the Plaintiff has chosen not to respond to some point canvassed in the 2nd Defendant’s Written Address is not an indication of conceding those points but just to avoid a situation of rearguing our position in the Originating Summons or that the points canvassed afresh by the 2nd Respondent are so irrelevant not to merit a response. As can be seen, the claimant talks of “the 2nd Defendant’s Written Address” and “the 2nd Respondent”. From the processes before me, there is only one defendant. I do not know where the claimant got his idea of a 2nd defendant or 2nd respondent from. 62. Reading the defendant’s written address in opposition to the claimant’s originating summons is like reading its written address in support of the notice of preliminary objection. I find it quite detestable that the very issues raised as supporting the preliminary objection are in the main the very issues also raised in opposition to the claimant’s originating summons. The question is, therefore, raised: why would the defendant file a preliminary objection on grounds that it knows are same with those on which it will oppose the merit of the case? I raised this question in open court with the learned Silk and got no satisfactory answer beyond a statement that one was based on law and the other on the facts of the case. This made no sense at all. The preliminary objection is based on the defendant’s belief that this Court cannot interpret its judgment; that the matter is on appeal; that the claimant was not a party to the judgment sought to be interpreted; that the judgment sought to be interpreted does not come within any of the permissible exceptions where a court can set aside its own decision; and also that Order 47 Rules 23 and 24 of the NICN Rules 2017 was offended. It is on these same grounds that the defendant opposes the originating summons. So, if the defendant knows that these are grounds upon which the originating summons can be opposed, why use the same grounds to file a preliminary objection? Why not simply defend the case? This duplicity makes no sense at all. It merely places additional workload on the Court. Having to read repetitive arguments disguised as addresses in support of a preliminary objection and in opposition to the merit of the case is something that should never be encouraged — not with the full dockets of cases that courts face today. 63. Aside form the workload involved, I asked the learned Silk in open court whether in raising same issues as preliminary objection and defence to the merit of the case he is hoping for a slip on the part of the Court in arriving at different conclusions so as to cash in on the slip — almost like laying a trap for the Court. The denial was unsatisfactory. As it is, therefore, whatever answer I give to the issues raised by the defendant in its preliminary objection must necessarily feed and answer the same issues raised in the opposition to the originating summons. 64. And so I start off with the defendant’s preliminary objection. The defendant’s preliminary objection is that this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the instant suit. And this is hinged on a number of grounds: (a) the claimant’s originating summons is one for the interpretation of the judgment of this court — and this court has no jurisdiction to interpret its judgment; (b) the claimant in the instant case was not a party to the suit that led to the judgment sought to be interpreted and so has no locus to file the instant suit; (c) the judgment sought to be interpreted is one that has been appealed against, and so it cannot be the subject of the instant suit as this Court would thereby be sitting on appeal over its decision; (d) the judgment sought to be interpreted does not come within any of the permissible exceptions where a court can set aside its own decision; and (e) by Order 47 Rules 23 and 24 of the NICN Rules 2017, the instant suit was not filed vide an originating motion and within the 30 days allowed for such actions. 65. On the argument of the instant suit being one of interpretation of the judgment in Senior Staff Association of Statutory Corporations and Government Owned Companies (SSASCGOC) & anor v. Amalgamated Union of Public Corporations Civil Service Technical and Recreational Service Employees (AUPCTRE) Suit No. NICN/ABJ/125/2019, which was delivered on 17 December 2019, both parties seem to be in agreement that the instant suit is actually one of interpretation. The claimant especially copiously made this point in its written address in opposition to the preliminary objection as well as its written addresses in support of the originating summons. We may have to take a closer look at question posed in the originating summons in order to ascertain if what the claimant brought to this Court is an action for interpretation. 66. Question (1) in the originating summons quoted at the start of this judgment states thus: Considering the decision of this Honourable Court, presided upon by O. Y. Anuwe J. in Suit No. NICN/ABJ/125/2019 delivered on the 17th December, 2019, whether the defendant can continue to operate and/or parade herself, particularly with the claimant, as a union for senior staff cadre in Federal/States statutory corporations or bodies? 67. A closer look and construction of this question does not suggest that what this Court is called upon to do is only to interpret the said judgment of 17 December 2019. What this Court is called upon to do is to determine if the defendant can operate or parade itself as a union for senior staff of the claimant taking into account what the judgment of 17 December 2019 decided. What is required here is the application of the judgment of 17 December 2019 to the fact situation of the instant case. 68. I do not doubt that the judgment of 17 December 2019 must be understood, construed/interpreted before it can be applied to the facts of this case. So when section 254C(1)(j)(iii) of the 1999 Constitution gave jurisdiction to this Court in respect of “the determination of any question as to the interpretation and application of any…award or judgment of the Court”, this is exactly what is contemplated. I must make the point that, like argued by the claimant, this is the only Court actually permitted by law and in very clear words to interpret its award or judgment. And this power and jurisdiction is historical. All the enabling instruments of the Court starting with the Trade Disputes Decree 1976 (now Trade Disputes Act Cap. T8 LFN 2004), the National Industrial Court (NIC) Act 2006 and the Third Alteration to the 1999 Constitution which inserted section 254C(1)(j)(iii) of the 1999 Constitution, all bear testimony to the power and jurisdiction of this Court to interpret its decision. 69. So, even if, as argued by the parties, this suit is one of interpretation of the judgment of 17 December 2019, it comes squarely within the purview of section 254C(1)(j)(iii) of the 1999 Constitution. The defendant made no reference at all, nor did it avert its mind, to this provision of the 1999 Constitution. 70. I need to clarify on the concepts of “interpretation” and “application” as used in section 254C(1) of the 1999 Constitution — for this Court is often called to interpret rules (and apply them). Two specific provisions exist in section 254C(1) of the 1999 Constitution where this Court is given the jurisdiction to interpret and apply certain provisions or instruments. The first is section 254C(1)(d) of the 1999 Constitution, which gives this Court the jurisdiction “relating to or connected with any dispute over the interpretation and application of the provisions of Chapter IV of this Constitution as relates to any…matter which the Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine”. The second is section 254C(1)(j) of the 1999 Constitution, which gives this Court the jurisdiction to hear and determine matters relating to the determination of any question as to the interpretation and application of any of the following: (i) collective agreement; (ii) award or order made by an arbitral tribunal in respect of a trade dispute or a trade union dispute; (iii) award or judgment of the Court; (iv) terms of settlement of any trade dispute; (v) trade union dispute or employment dispute as may be recorded in a memorandum of settlement; (vi) trade union constitution, the constitution of an association of employers or any association relating to employment, labour, industrial relations or work place; (vii) dispute relating to or connected with any personnel matter arising from any free trade zone in the Federation or any part thereof 71. On the concepts of “interpretation” and “application” of rules, William Twining and David Miers in their book, How To Do Things With Rules (Law in Context, Cambridge University Press: UK), 4th Edition, 2008 at page 158, have it that in respect of rules, interpretation is generally used in the sense of “to clarify, the scope of” or “to attribute a meaning to” a rule or part thereof; and that it is also used as a synonym to “elucidate”, “expound’, “explain” or “construe”. Borrowed from theology, a distinction is often made between strict linguistic interpretation (exegesis) and the search for truth i.e. the intention and meanings behind the texts (hermeneutics). The latter is what approximates to liberal approaches to interpretation in law. So while interpretation refers to clarification of the general scope or meaning of a rule, application refers to putting that rule into operation in terms of specific fact situations. So, we interpret a rule so as to hold which of either the claimant or defendant should be held liable/responsible, or enjoys a right or privilege. This is called an attributive inquiry where we must decide, as between the two sets of parties before us, who must carry the day and is especially so where wrongdoing is an issue. What the claimant brought to this Court is thus the interpretation and application of the judgment of 17 December 2019. This falls squarely within the purview of section 254C(1)(j)(iii) of the 1999 Constitution. The talk by the defendant that this Court has no jurisdiction over this case is thus illusory and certainly not tenable. I so hold. 72. The talk by the defendant that this suit is academic because the judgment sought to be interpreted by this Court was decided on the merits by this same Court against the defendant and so there is nothing in the subject matter of the suit for this Court to delve on misunderstands the duality of interpretation and application of the judgment of 17 December 2019 to the facts of this case. I so hold. 73. The judgment of 17 December 2019 is not being reviewed in this instant suit — it is merely being applied. So, the argument of the defendant that only the Court of Appeal has jurisdiction to review the judgment sought to be interpreted is one that is misplaced. I so hold. 74. Equally misplaced is the argument that the judgment sought to be interpreted is one that has been appealed against, and so it cannot be the subject of the instant suit as this Court would thereby be sitting on appeal over its decision. For one, the fact of an appeal does not mean that the judgment of 17 December 2019 is a nullity. The rule known to all is that until set aside, a judgment, even if wrongly given, subsists and is binding. And being asked to apply the judgment of 17 December 2019 to the fact situation of the instant case cannot, and is not, by any means a case of this Court sitting on appeal over its decision. I so hold. 75. The argument of the defendant that the claimant in the instant case was not a party to the suit that led to the judgment sought to be interpreted and so has no locus to file the instant suit is also misplaced as what is asked of this Court is to apply the judgment of 17 December 2019 to the fact situation of this case. There is no rule of law known to me that says only parties to a suit can ask for its application to their particular circumstances as is being asked of the Court in the instant suit. In any event, section 254C(1)(j)(iii) of the 1999 Constitution does not delimit its application to only the parties of the judgment in issue. The essence of the instant suit is for the claimant to prove that its right or interest has been infringed. If that right or interest inures from the judgment of a court then so be it. 76. Also misplaced is the argument of the defendant that the judgment sought to be interpreted does not come within any of the permissible exceptions where a court can set aside its own decision. No one is asking this Court to set aside the judgment of 17 December 2019. All that is being asked of this Court is to apply the said judgment. 77. Lastly, the defendant talks of the instant suit going against Order 47 Rules 23 and 24 of the NICN Rules 2017 in that the instant suit was not filed vide an originating motion and within the 30 days allowed for such actions. What the defendant did not, however, tell this Court is what the NICN Rules 2017 themselves provide as the consequences of the breach. The rule that I know of is that where a rule requires the doing of a thing but does not provide any sanction for its breach or non-compliance, then that thing required to be done is directory, not mandatory. This point, even in terms of the doing of a thing within a specific time frame, was succinctly made in Bode Thomas v. FJSC unreported Appeal No. SC.228/2013, the judgment of which was delivered on 16th February 2018 per Akaahs, JSC in these words: When the learned trial Judge x-rayed Rule 030307(xiii) of the Public Service Rules, there was nowhere it was provided that failure to observe the 60 days period would vitiate the proceedings. The logical conclusion which the court ought to have arrived at is that since the Rules did not provide any sanction for non-compliance, the period stated is directory and not mandatory. The lower court was right to intervene and set aside the finding that it was a breach of the plaintiff’s right to fair hearing because of the failure of the defendant to commence and complete the disciplinary procedure against the plaintiff within 60 days as stipulated in Chapter 3 paragraph 030307(xiii) of the Public Service Rules. 78. I agree with the claimant that Order 47 Rule 23 of the NICN Rules 2017 delimits its application to only the parties in the judgment sought to be interpreted. The claimant in the instant suit was not a party to the judgment of 17 December 2019 and so is not bound by Order 47 Rule 23 of the NICN Rules 2017. I so hold. 79. On the whole, and for the reasons given, the preliminary objection of the defendant is baseless and so lacks merit. It fails and so is hereby dismissed. Accordingly, I hold that this Court has jurisdiction over this suit. I shall, therefore, proceed to consider the merit of the originating summons. 80. The claimant presented two questions for the determination of the Court. The first question is whether given the judgment of 17 December 2019 in Suit No. NICN/ABJ/125/2019, the defendant can operate or parade itself as a union for the senior staff in the service of the claimant. If the answer to this first question is in the negative, the second question is whether the defendant can unionise, purport to unionise and/or continue to unionise the senior staff of the claimant. The long and short of it is whether the defendant can unionise the senior staff in the service of the claimant. Hon. Justice Anuwe in Suit No. NICN/ABJ/125/2019 decided that the defendant union is a union for junior staff, not senior staff. 81. In paragraph 5 of the affidavit in support of the originating summons, the claimant was described as “a creation of statute as a body corporate having perpetual succession with powers to sue and be sued”. It is this fact that brings the claimant within the rubric of a public corporation as to justify this suit in the first place. 82. Item 2 of Part B of the Third Schedule to the Trade Unions Act (TUA) 2004 puts the jurisdictional scope of the defendant union as: All junior staff employed in the Federal and State Corporations; Civil Service Employees classified as Technical; Workers of Sports Commissions and Stadia; Public Recreation Clubs by whatever name called; swimming pools; amusement centres including carnivals, circuses, zoological gardens and services similarly classified, excluding Radio, Television, NITEL, NIPOST, Railways, Nigeria Airways and other Corporation Workers already unionised. 83. It is based on this provision that Hon. Justice Anuwe held that the defendant union can only unionise junior staff. From this decision, the straight answer to both questions is that the defendant cannot unionise the senior staff in the service of the claimant. 84. But the matter does not end there or appear as straightforward as the claimant puts it. To be entitled to the reliefs claimed, the question is whether the claimant has proved that the defendant is in fact unionising or attempting to unionise the said senior staff in the service of the claimant. This is because the case of the claimant is that the defendant has been persistent in unionizing the senior staff of the claimant and even threatening industrial action which has the capacity of crippling the operations of the claimant and thoroughly embarrassing it. 85. What then is the proof of the defendant’s unionization of senior staff in the service of the claimant? The claimant’s evidence of the defendant unionizing senior staff is essentially Exhibit B, which at page 3 item 2 under the heading “Recommendations” has the defendant agitating for the interest of Principal Managers, Assistant Directors and Deputy Directors. In paragraph 12 of the affidavit in support of the originating summons, the claimant averred thus: That against the tenure and spirit of the Judgment, on the 30th November, 2020 the Defendant wrote a letter to the Chairman of the Board of the Claimant in which she was purportedly agitating for the interest of senior staff and management staff of the Claimant. That I hereby attach a copy of that letter and mark same as “EXHIBIT B”. 86. As can be seen from paragraph 12 of the supporting affidavit, the claimant equates agitating for the interest of senior staff and management staff of the claimant to unionisation of same group of staff. The contention of the claimant, therefore, is that Exhibit B (a document made by the defendant) constitutes an admission by them that they were agitating for the interest of senior and management staff as against the tenor of the judgment in Exhibit A, which restricts their activities to junior staff. In other words, agitation for the interest of senior staff is unionization and so goes against the judgment of 17 December 2019. 87. The claimant’s case, to my mind, is structured on very faulty premises chief of which is its understanding of what unionism is as against what the judgment of 17 December 2019 decided. In the context of the said judgment, the claimant equates agitation with unionism. Even if this were to be true, the exhibits attached to the affidavit in support of the originating summons in the main talk of agitation by the defendant in favour of staff of the claimant. Exhibit B relied heavily on by the claimant at page two talks of “there is…widespread disenchantment and frustration amongst staff…”, “…staff have been further subjected to rigorous and unmotivated work schedules”, “…restrictions of vacancies on staff promotions…”, “unjustified barring of certain category of staff from writing promotion examination…”, “stoppage of all staff Loans…”, “punishment of staff by stopping their salaries even before queries were issued…”, and “lingering injustices against staff…” In all of these agitations, no where did the defendant categorise the staff as senior staff. Even at page 3 of Exhibit B, item 2 referred to by the claimant is prefaced by the words, “In the light of the above, we hereby forward the resentment and resolutions of the Union and the entire staff members as follows”. Item 2 itself alluded to by the claimant states thus: To allow all eligible staff to sit for the examination without restrictions or exemptions, especially Principal Managers to Assistant Directors and Assistant Directors to Deputy Directors”. I must point out that even this item 2 relied on by the claimant talks of eligible staff before qualifying it with the word “especially” and then listing Principal Managers, Assistant Directors and Deputy Directors. 88. I must stress that the word “staff” connotes both senior and junior staff. The point is, even if agitation in favour of senior staff is unionization and so goes against the judgment of 17 December 2019, what of the agitation in favour of junior staff which is perfectly within the remit of the defendant? The claimant made no effort to distinguish this fact. It made no attempt to accommodate the defendant’s agitation in favour of junior staff even when it denounced the agitation in favour of senior staff. The act of the claimant in lumping the two together and denouncing both as going against the judgment of 17 December 2019 showed ulterior motive on the part of the claimant. 89. I indicated earlier that the claimant’s case is structured on faulty premises chief of which is its understanding of what unionism or unionisation is. The verb “unionise/unionize” by The New Oxford American Dictionary means “become or cause to become members of a labor union”. The question then is: how can agitation for the interest of senior staff be said to be an act of the defendant geared towards making senior staff become or cause to become members of the defendant union? It is because the claimant misunderstands the meaning of unionisation that prompts it to file this case as it did. The judgment of 17 December 2019 held that the defendant can only unionise junior staff. Did the claimant show to this Court that the defendant asked any senior staff in the service of the claimant to be its member? Did the defendant embark on any membership drive in respect of senior staff in the service of the claimant? Did the defendant ask of the claimant the deduction of check-off dues in respect of its senior staff? The answer to all these questions is NO. I asked the claimant’s counsel in open court to show me a paragraph in all the exhibits they attached to the claimant’s processes showing where the defendant did any of these acts and all he did was to refer me to paragraphs stating that the defendant was agitating for the interests of senior staff. 90. The claimant even restated this in very strong terms when in paragraph 2.18 of its reply on points of law it stated thus: It is submitted that the Claimant cannot ever have any better evidence of the activities of the defendant agitating for the interest other than that of the junior staff than the one contained in Exhibit B… I must state, however, that agitating for the interest of senior staff is not the unionization that the judgment of 17 December 2019 frowned on as against the defendant union. Trade unions may agitate. But that in itself is not what defines unionism or unionisation. It is commonplace in the world of work for sympathy or secondary strikes to occur in support of causes by unions other than the secondary or sympathetic strikers. Here, it is not uncommon for a junior staff union to sympathize or support the strike of a senior staff union. Such agitation does not make the junior staff union a senior staff union. The claimant does not seem to understand this, hence the filing of this suit as it did. 91. So, is there any basis for filing this case? None at all, I will say. The case is utterly baseless. There is no iota of any evidence before the Court showing that the defendant is attempting any unionization of senior staff in the service of the claimant contrary to the dictates of the judgment of 17 December 2019. The claimant is on a wild goose chase. And has only succeeded in wasting the precious time of this Court. Nothing else! 92. I find no merit in this suit. It fails and so is hereby dismissed. 93. Judgment is entered accordingly. I make no order as to cost. …………………………………… Hon. Justice B. B. Kanyip, PhD